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The Global
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Editors' Note

Interesting Journal is compiled of 19 essays from the Faculty of Arts at the University of Auckland. The essays are independent academic works that have been written by undergraduate students in Semester One 2016. As editors, we have decided to present the material to you in the form of a story, structured around the overarching theme of globalization and how it impacts our world, our society and our personal lives. This will be explored in our three chapters: The Global, The Social and The Personal. Each chapter will be begin with a summary page introducing the essays in that category.

THE GLOBAL

Edition 4 of Interesting Journal begins by taking a look at fluctuations in racial ideas of two countries founded on immigration: New Zealand and the United States of America. *New Blood: America and New Zealand's Immigration Mentalities* from the 17th Century to today examines how attitudes about race have changed over time. In an age of wide-reaching messages like the Donald Trump campaign, we are in a position where we will be forced to question whether or not we have learnt lessons from our history.

Since the age of world wars, our world has moved towards political unions and alliances. Britain's recent exit from the EU demonstrates a step away from treaties and unions and back to nationalism. The theory of realism brings light to a state-centric perspective with little responsibility to the world outside their borders. *The Role of Realism in an Antagonistic World* argues the world will cease to function if national interests become prioritised over pressing global issues.

Our next essay looks at our political system in its current state and asks how we might address environmental issues without a political overhaul. *A Liberal Environment? Distribution, Rights, and the Viability of Conservation in a Liberal International Paradigm* argues that despite liberalism's flaws, the system of the rational man is better equipped to deal with environmental crises than its alternatives.

Profit Over Progress: The Financialization of Innovation provides an immanent critique of intellectual property, demonstrating how the financialisation of innovation today stands in the way of societal progression. The author explores the contradiction of granting monopoly rights to knowledge produced collectively, and subsequently outlines how intellectual property is instrumentalised in the operations of monopolisation and speculation which serve to detach revenue generation from the production of new use-values. Through this work the truth of innovation is revealed, that it is a wholly social process which can only be hindered by attempts to differentiate the knowledge it produces. Fidelity to this truth is foundational to an emancipatory politics that seeks to build a new world."

A common theme of dystopian texts is to critique current world issues in an undesirable and often futuristic setting. *Post-Humanism: Our Precarious Pursuit of our Future* explores how video game Deus EX: Human Revolution and science fiction film Ex Machina comment on the social and philosophical implications of commodified artificial intelligence. It is interesting to consider how trans-humanism may be too powerful a tool for the wealthy elite as inevitably they will be the ones to own and control the production and distribution of artificial intelligence.

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Racial Histories

Scott Yang

New Blood: America and New Zealand's immigration mentalities from the 17th century to today

New Zealand and the United States of America are countries founded on the concept of immigration. From the early 17th and 19th centuries respectively, the British began systematically immigrating to America and New Zealand, tumultuously asserting themselves as the dominant culture in both countries. Once the British had established their dominance, their understandings of race shaped the attitudes of wider society in terms of attitudes and politics towards immigration, destroying the lives of countless immigrants. European attitudes towards race shifted from being non-existent from the 17th-18th Century, to conflicting between the 18th and late 19th Century. The late 19th century saw the rise of scientific racism, and then finally ambivalence during and post-World War Two. This essay examines how New Zealand and American immigration attitudes and policies also changed and mirrored these fluctuations in racial ideas.

The earliest views of race between the 17th and 18th Century were not exactly 'racial', and American attitudes towards immigration mirrored this. Differences between people were based more on the binaries of savagery and civilisation, paganism and Christianity, and inferiority and superiority. Racial nativism, the idea that a country should be Anglo-Saxon in race, had not taken hold yet. For example, the African slave trade of the early to mid-17th Century shows there was little uproar towards people of non-white skin from coming to America. Instead, African slaves were purchased in large numbers to work the fields due to their perceived inferiority.[2] And while it is important to emphasise that these Africans did not come of their own will, and hence the term 'immigration' might be debatable here, it still highlights how society viewed Africans on superior-inferior lines, rather than racial lines. Historian Nell Painter posed the question, "Did anyone think that they were 'white' or that their character related to their colour? No, for neither the idea of race nor the idea of 'white' people had been invented, and people's skin colour did not carry useful meaning." Hence, because there was no defined idea of race being based on the colour of one's skin, immigration policy was influenced by non-racial factors during this time, such as economic need.

However, this lack of definition of race would not last long. In the 18th Century dimensions of racial nativism began to creep in, beginning to hold some sway when it came to immigration attitudes and policies. In America, this was caused by the institutionalisation of slavery at the end of the 17th Century which subordinated Africans. This created a feeling of white superiority which led Congress to pass the Naturalisation Act in 1790, which limited the naturalisation of immigrants to free white people of good character only. This directly shows how shifts in ideas about race towards white superiority were mirrored in American immigration policy. However, it is important to note that during this time period, other criteria for immigration still held large sway.

[1] John Higham, 'Patterns in the Making', in Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925, New York, 1985, p.9.
[2] T.H. Breen, 'The "Giddy Multitude": Race and Class in Early Virginia', in Ronald Takaki, ed., From Different Shores: Perspectives on Race and Ethnicity in America, 2nd ed., New York, 1994, p. 109.

For example, the mass migration of Irish Catholics during the 1840s and the discrimination they faced showed that factors such as religion still held large influence concerning those whom Americans thought worthy to come to their shores.[3] This conflict between the Naturalisation Act, which supported white immigration, and the anti-Irish sentiment of the 1840s despite Irish being white themselves, highlights the conflict between racial ideas of the 18th and 19th centuries. Ideas of race split into two streams during this time, the 'romanticised' view of race and a 'quasi-scientific' view.[4] The former focused on the inner validity of one's own culture, such as the righteousness of Protestantism, while the latter concentrated more on physical appearances and the link between skin colour and white supremacy.[5]

On the other hand, conflicts arose during this time in New Zealand about who was a 'true New Zealander', which acted as a springboard for immigration discrimination in the future based on skin colour. Before the signing of the Treaty, relations between the Maori and Pakeha were generally positive. However, they collapsed after the Treaty was signed due to Maori disillusionment over the treaty's outcomes, leading to war.[6-7] The Maori were ultimately defeated, and this inspired a bout of white supremacy among colonists, who felt that they had proven their might over the natives. This sharpened the Pakeha idea that a 'true New Zealander' was white, helping shape immigration attitudes and policies then and into the future. In both America and New Zealand, conflicting ideas about race and the nudge towards racial nativism created conflicting attitudes and policies towards immigration, with a shift towards a pro-white policy.

At the end of the 19th Century however, a surge in scientific theories on race and the inferiority of other races caused the quasi-scientific view of race to become dominant. This led to a large flood of immigration restrictions and discrimination in both countries. The ideals of the Eugenics movement heavily fed into the minds of many white people and made it seem legitimate to discriminate against other races from coming to their shores.[8] In America, during the second wave of migration between 1880 and 1920, there was widespread discrimination against Slavs, Italians, Irish, Greeks and Jews.[9] However, it was the Asian population that faced the brunt of anti-immigrant attitudes. Chinese were totally barred from immigrating to America due to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, and in 1908 a de facto restriction on Japanese immigrants was implemented.[10] These restrictions were further compounded by the passage of the National Origins Act of 1924, which allowed for an annual immigration rate of 2% of each national group represented on the 1890 census. This act essentially favoured northern 'white' European immigrants, as they comprised the predominant immigration groups in 1893.

[3]Higham, pp.5-6.
[4-5]John Higham, 'The Evolution of Thought on Race and the Development of Scientific Racism', in Jon Gjerde, ed., Major Problems in American Immigration and Ethnic History, Boston, 1998, pp.292-293.
[6]M.P.K. Sorrenson, 'How to Civilize Savages: Some Answers from Nineteenth-century New Zealand', New Zealand Journal of History, 9, 2, 1975, pp. 98-99.
[7]Richards S. Hill, 'Maori and State Policy' in Giselle Byrnes, ed., The New Oxford History of New Zealand, Melbourne, 2009, p.515.
[8]Higham, 1998, pp.294-296.
[9]John Higham, 'Strangers in the Land: Nativism and Nationalism', in Ronald Takaki, ed., From Different Shores: Perspectives on Race and Ethnicity in America, 2nd ed., Oxford and New York, 1994, pp.67-71
[10]Leonard Dinnerstein, Roger L. Nichols, David M. Reimers, 'Ethnic Tensions and Conflicts, 1880s-1945', in Natives and Strangers: A Multicultural History of Americans, New York, 1996, pp. 232-233.

Meanwhile in New Zealand the aforementioned feeling of white superiority, coupled with the rise of scientific racism, provided the perfect breeding ground for racist attitudes and immigration policies. In 1881, the government passed the Chinese Immigrants Act which set a poll tax of $10 on Chinese migrants, which in turn would be raised in the future. In 1907, further restrictions against Chinese migrants were implemented with the Chinese Immigrants Amendment Act, which mandated an English language test for Chinese migrants. Immigration restrictions against Chinese were further compounded in 1908 with the passage of the Immigration Restriction Amendment Act, which required Chinese people to place a thumbprint on their certificate of registration in order to re-enter the country. Lastly, the Immigration Restriction Amendment Act was passed in 1920, which gave the Minister of Customs the power to determine who was eligible to enter New Zealand.[11] A permit system was established for immigrants, but citizens of British birth and parentage were exempt from these restrictions.[12] In both New Zealand and America during this time the rise of scientific racism helped drive a strong racial nativist perspective on race, helping to bring about a whole host of anti-immigrant legislation.

However, during and after World War Two, ideas associated with race in America and New Zealand changed towards being more ambivalent as reflected by their immigration policies. After World War Two, both America and New Zealand faced a moral contradiction: how could it keep racially discriminatory immigration policies at home when it championed against Nazi Germany racism against Jews? In both cases, the answer to the question was subtle discrimination towards immigrants. In the United States, a strong example of this was the internment of Japanese Americans during the Second World War. After the bombing of Pearl Harbour by Japan, America entered into World War Two. However, at home the government faced a dilemma about what to do with Japanese American citizens. After much mulling over the issue, President Roosevelt called for the internment of Japanese citizens in camps.[13] However, this was subtly hidden in many ways by the propaganda of the government and the view from citizens that this was necessary during wartime.[14] The government had essentially sidestepped the issue of racial prejudice by hiding the policy behind the cloak of wartime need, due to its ambivalence over the subject.

In New Zealand, the government also faced a dilemma over race and immigration during the 1970s with the Dawn Raids. During the 1970s, the New Zealand economy fell into recession. This coincided with high migration from the Pacific Islands, causing society to blame Pasifika migration for New Zealand's problems.[15] Anger directed at Pasifika people culminated in the random checks and dawn raids of Pasifika families to check if they

[11]Sean Brawley, 'No "White Policy" in New Zealand: Fact and Fiction in New Zealand's Asian Immigration Record, 1946-1978', New Zealand Journal of History, 27, 1, 1993, pp.18-19.
[12]ibid., p.19.
[13]Alice Yang Murray, 'The Internment of Japanese Americans,' in Murray, ed., What did the Internment of Japanese Americans Mean?, Boston, 2000, pp.6-8.
[14]ibid., p.9.
[15]Melani Anae, 'All Power to the People: Overstayers, Dawn Raids and Polynesian Panthers', in Sean Mallon, Kolokesa Uafa Mahina-Tuai, and Damon Ieremia Salesa, eds., Tangata o le Moana: New Zealand and the People of the Pacific, Wellington, 2012, p. 221.
[16]ibid., p.230.

were overstaying their visa, despite them making up only a third of the overstayers.[16] The only people targeted were coloured people, leading to a number of Maori citizens being investigated. The government was essentially playing out its prejudiced ideology behind the façade of economic necessity and actively denied that its policy was racially prejudiced, arguing that New Zealand had the 'best race relations in the world'. In both New Zealand and America, government policy perpetuated feelings of ambivalence about race during and after World War Two, and this ambivalence would last well into the 1980s.

In both New Zealand and America, as ideas about race changed over time, these changes were reflected in societies' attitudes and policies towards immigration. European attitudes towards race fluctuated from being non-existent between the 17th and 18th Century to ambivalence during and post-World War Two, with both New Zealand and American immigration attitudes and policy reflecting these shifts. With today's increasing move towards racial fearmongering (with the rise of candidates like Donald Trump), we only have to look back into history to see its devastating consequences. To quote French novelist Gustave Flaubert, "Our ignorance of history causes us to slander our own times."

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International Relations

Grace Partridge

It is an integral part of human nature to define and differentiate between certain groups of people and areas of space. With the evolution of the world into a series of defined nation-states, the notion that the territorial division of the world is both artificial and arbitrary is, in itself, an arbitrary one. While it is certainly true that many states' borders are becoming increasingly porous as a result of globalization, further diversifying the exact territories that they protect, this does not negate the importance of this geographical division. At the heart of this issue is the political theory of realism, preaching a state-centric view in which national interest presides over international obligation. States often adopt a realist perspective for reacting to urgent global issues of national identity such as the treatment of foreign prisoners by certain states and the restrictive concept of citizenship, notably concerning the international refugee crisis. Their exclusion, or in some cases deterrence, of all that lies beyond their immediate borders directly establishes the notion of "outsiders", to whom they owe no responsibility. When such "outsiders" pose a threat to the state, the sovereignty it has acclaimed supposes that it may react as desired. Drawing evidence from both the classical realist, Thomas Hobbes, and the neorealist, Kenneth Waltz, the argument that I will assert is that the world simply cannot and will not function if states continue to prioritise their own power, prosperity and unique national identity ahead of such pressing global crises. Without international cooperation, the various effects surrounding these issues will never gain the recognition that they need.

Without realism, the notion of territorial division and the various consequences that it entails simply would not exist. At the core of this theory is the concept of state-centrism, to which one can assign the qualities of rationality and egoism.[1] Such qualities, in the context of state interaction, have acquired increasingly negative connotations due to their restrictive capacities. The reaction of realist states to certain global crises – particularly to those of identity – necessarily encompasses an element of egoism due to the belief that such behavior is rationalized. The rationalization of this often-immoral behavior is based upon the imperative need for the state's individual survival,[2] without consideration of the collective survival of the international political system itself. Not only survival, but also the irrepressible thirst for legitimized autonomy within their own territorial boundaries.[3] Thomas Hobbes, a theorist of classical realism, asserts three key assumptions about this theory: that "all men are equal; they interact in anarchy; and they are motivated by competition, diffidence and glory".[4] This "equality" is portrayed in a dominant scheme of "great power politics" that serves to benefit the most powerful states, with little regard for those below.[5] According to Hobbes, the international system constitutes a "war as is of every man against every man",[6] due to the very conflictual nature of humanity. Whilst Hobbes' classical realism focuses on human nature, Kenneth Waltz's structural or "neo"

[1]Scott Burchill et al., Theories of International Relations (Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 31-32
[2]Ibid., 43
[3]Ibid., 35
[4]Ibid., 34
[5]Ibid., 35-36
[6]Ibid., 34

realism places its emphasis on the very structure of and interaction within the international political system. Here, the hierarchy of domestic politics against the anarchy of international politics is utilized to explain the constant balancing of power between states, resulting from a perceived "threat".[7] Though separate, both of these adaptations are essential to understanding the exclusive nature of certain states and the global crises that such behavior can create.

One particular example of a negative realist approach by states is that of their harsh and often immoral treatment of foreign prisoners, due to conflicting national identities. Following the 9/11 bombings by terrorist group Al-Qaeda on the towers of the World Trade Center, a large number of predominantly Middle-Eastern suspects of terrorism were transferred to the Guantánamo Bay detention camp, in Cuba. The importance of this location lies within its ambiguity, having been identified as a geographical "grey area", simultaneously forming part of U.S. territory yet remaining under the political sovereignty of Cuba.[8] Within this disjointed location, various injustices have occurred against detainees by the U.S. government, under President George Bush's rule. Clearly enforced in the International Geneva Conventions, it is recognized worldwide that all prisoners of war who are not specifically combatants have certain rights to which punitive states must adhere. At Guantánamo Bay, these international rights have been too easily evaded due to detainees' greater association with terrorism over a "national army".[9] Additionally, it is one of the most notorious sites known for the breaching of the "UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment".[10] According to political philosopher Giorgio Agemben, however, there exists the notion of a homo sacer - a human being stripped of its determining political rights and citizenship. This categorization is openly accentuated and violently exploited within "spaces of exception", such as the politically illegitimate Guantánamo Bay.[11]

The root of this immoral behavior lies within the realist - particularly classical – approaches of states to issues of national identity. Arrested suspects of the war on terror, due to their differing national identities, were deported to a location not even within the exact boundaries of the punitive force controlling them. As a result of irrepressible mistrust and the threat of the "unknown" - that which lies beyond the security of territorial boundaries - Bush took to an intrinsic displacement of such detainees in order to diffuse the fear of an "outside" threat to the stability and security of the state. When crises have the potential to be detrimental to a state, its sovereignty, and its citizens, realist governments accept the responsibility of giving less consideration to moral factors in order to ensure the state's survival.[12] George W. Bush's belief, therefore, that self-defense must necessarily entail a degree of egotistic

[7]Ibid., 37
[8]Simon Reid-Henry, "Exceptional Sovereignty? Guantánamo Bay and the Re-Colonial Present," Antipode 39, no.4 (2007): 628
[9]Ibid., 633
[10]Alex J. Ballemy, "Is the War on Terror Just?", International Relations 19, no. 3 (2005): 277
[11]Reid-Henry, "Exceptional Sovereignty? Guantánamo Bay and the Re-Colonial Present", 630-631
[12]Ballemy, "Is the War on Terror Just?", 281
[13]Ibid., 276

and even immoral behavior failed to provoke an extreme uproar from the public, despite its clear breach of international obligations and undermining of the modernized cooperative international system. Classical realism reinforces the understanding that morality is "created within and confined to the community",[13] thus it is possible for certain breaches of morality on an international level to be overlooked. The greatest powers, whose authority is legitimized and respected, are restricted the least in international anarchy.[14] The "Hobbesian fear" proclaims that even the slightest intolerance of international cooperation has the capacity to resurrect complete global anarchy,[15] for the threat of a disobedient state only encourages more disobedience at the core.

According to Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country",[16] yet, despite this law's supposedly binding nature, various states continue to violate it. Following the Second World War, the supra-territorial organization of the United Nations was established with the intent of encouraging a more inter-connected global political system, in place of the previous international anarchy. Against realist and state-centric bodies however, this objective has proven to be extremely slow moving. One extreme example of the effects of realist and state-centric thinking can be observed in the United States and Mexico border crisis. "Pushed" out of Mexico due to low incomes and lack of access to necessities, combined with the attractive "pull" of the United States' rich and thriving economy,[17] Mexican immigrants continue to attempt to cross La Linea in search of a better quality of life in a more developed country. While this might initially have seemed a simple task, the gathering of immigrants at the border and the ever-rising number of deaths of those who have attempted to cross illegally reflects the restrictive and preventative nature of state-centrism. Without a document declaring the "accepted" citizenship or national identity of the United States, Mexican immigrants are generally denied entry, further reflecting the exclusionary aspect of citizenship and the repressive element of the "passport". [18]The "unitary identity"[19] that accompanies citizenship was heightened in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United States, thus a strong anti-immigration sentiment was fueled out of the rising fear of terrorism.[20]

In accordance with Kenneth Waltz's structural or "neo" realism, which places emphasis on the constraints of the international political structure itself over human nature, this ongoing border crisis demonstrates the limits of a supposedly inter-connected and cooperative international system comprised of states governed internally by realism. Waltz noticed that, "National politics consists of differentiated units performing specific functions. International politics consists of like units duplicating one another's activities",[21] reinforcing

[14]Ibid., 284
[15]Burchill et al., Theories of International Relations, 39
[16]Karl E. Meyer, "The Curious Life of the Lowly Passport," World Policy Journal 26, no. 1 (2009): 71
[17]Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Why is people's movement restricted?" in Global Politics: A New Introduction, eds. Jenny Edkins and Maja Zehfuss (New York: Routledge, 2008), 201
[18]Meyer, "The Curious Life of the Lowly Passport", 72-73
[19]Doty, "Why is people's movement restricted?", 209
[20]Ibid., 204
[21]Scott Burchill et al., Theories of International Relations (Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 36
[22]Stuart Elden, "Why is the world divided territorially?" in Global Politics: A New Introduction, eds. Jenny Edkins and Maja Zehfuss (New York: Routledge, 2008), 224-225

the idea of internal sovereignty versus external equality. Thus, despite the explicit reference to the free movement of people between countries in the UN's Declaration of Human Rights, this is very much only a moral constraint on realist states. Such states, therefore, deem their internal sovereignty and autonomy as justification for their disobedience of international obligations.[22] If this, for example, means the negligence of desperate immigrants due to their differing, and potentially threatening, foreign identities, in order to prevent the contamination of the sovereign state's unitary citizenship, then that course of action cannot be prevented. Realism, in this case prominent classical realism, has allowed the United States to evade its international obligations due to its irrefutable domestic sovereignty. Such evasion, however, has only resulted in extreme suffering, desperation and, in many cases, death for the Mexican immigrants who have attempted to cross the notorious La Linea.

Although it is undoubtedly true that the division of the world into territorial units, known as states, remains highly contentious and relevant, I will not attempt to profess the complete absence of instances in which its relevance is more questionable. There is certainly no lack of globalization in the world today, a particularly prominent example being the supra-territorial institution of the European Union (EU) which renders almost entirely irrelevant the territorial borders of its 27 component countries, though only to those who possess its unitary citizenship.[23] In this instance, membership serves to lessen the preventative nature of territorial boundaries to encourage citizens of the EU to benefit from greater inter-connectedness. Such an approach is often linked to the similarly state-centric, yet more cooperative, theory of neo-liberalism.

While globalization and state-cooperation do undoubtedly exist in the world today, the assumption that this therefore renders the territorial division of the world arbitrary and artificial is simply incorrect. As long as realism and its accompanying quality of state-centrism exist, the territorial division of the world will continue to remain highly contentious and relevant. Whether "classical", drawing its emphasis on the competitive and conflictual aspects of human nature, or "neo", criticizing the very structure of the international political system itself, the result of this realism is consistently an inability or mere refusal to cooperate. With the growing threat of terrorism and the rapid acceleration of fear, insecurity and instability it has inflicted, rather than recede alongside the rise of supra-territorial institutions, the prominence of realism has only intensified across the globe. States tend to adopt a realist approach to global issues of national identity and, the more likely such issues are to pose a threat to the state, the more radical the state's reactions will be. In this way, realism can be employed to explain the extreme and immoral actions of the United States in Guantánamo Bay and at their very border – La Linea. In each case, the United States has neglected international moral obligations due to

[23]Ibid., 234-235

a perceived threat by “outsiders”, whose national identities do not coincide with its own. The violation of these international agreements, primarily by the “great powers”, marginalizes less fortunate populations according to their categorization as “outsiders”. Under this guidance of realism, the world will cease to function.

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Modern Political Thought

Julia Weiner

Rights, Distributions and Liberalism's Shortcomings: An Environmental Paradigm

By its very nature, liberalism is aimed at the individual – the atomistic man, rational in his consumption, justified in his self-interest. As such, any evaluation of external entities – the environment chief among them – will be of importance to liberals only in the instrumental value it provides for those rational subjects. Consequently, there are fundamental ways in which liberal thought is ill-fitted to problems of the environment, treating it either as a good to be distributed or a space in which individual rights are grounded. However, liberals have provided some viable solutions to environmental problems, harnessing tenets of mutually justifiable authority and individual responsibility.

The disconnect between liberalism and environmental problems is not that liberalism cannot value the environment on mutually agreeable terms, but rather at face value it seems unable to provide a feasible solution to environmental problems. It is relatively easy for "reasonable people... to reach broad agreement on desirable goals, and the recent liberal accommodation of environmental goals" is testament to this.[1] "But what is desirable has in practice also to be conditioned by what is possible"[2], and this raises the question of how liberalism will be able to accommodate the "aim of securing a decent environment, especially when that environment is understood globally."[3] Liberals look to human welfare when evaluating environmental value, and due to our inseparable interdependence with our environment, it is justifiable to stretch the boundaries of liberal thought to include it as a good to be protected.

Hayward offers dual critiques of liberalism in its ability to respond to environmental threats. By his account, it is misplaced in both time and space - having developed both before awareness of ecological finitude, and on the scale of the nation state, thus prior to consideration of cosmopolitan politics.[4] The latter concern is more important, as critiques of liberal appraisals of global economic justice also extend to global environmental justice. The state-regulated system of distribution of burdens and benefits cannot simply be scaled up in the absence of an authoritative international body to enforce environmental norms.

The first disconnect between liberal thought and environmental protection is in the ambit of distributive justice. By a Rawlsian conception, the environment may be treated as a 'primary good' to be distributed in order to achieve justice among humans. Liberalism treats the environment – both its benefits and burdens – as a good to be distributed, like wealth or healthcare.[5] The Lockeian conception of 'dominion' over land through property rights is thus supplemented with a right to nature by means of its necessity for human survival and flourishing.

[1]Hayward, Tim. "International Political Theory and the Global Environment: Some Critical Questions for Liberal Cosmopolitans." The Journal of Social Philosophy 40, no. 2 (2009): 282.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Ibid.
[4]Ibid., 276.
[5]Jamieson, Dale. "Environment." In Issues in Political Theory, ed. Catriona McKinnon, 236-258. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 249.

As with Rawlsian approaches to economic justice, the perennial question of global application arises: How can the difference principle be applied internationally? There is no basic structure at the transnational level, so conceptions of just distribution, though perhaps theoretically justifiable, are impossible to implement.

This tension within liberalism itself is secondary, however, to a broader critique. Treating the environment as something humans have a right to by dint of having labored over land or acquired through a just transaction, as well as categorizing it as a good to be distributed by some metric of just distribution, has two problems. First, it ignores the intrinsic value of the environment as worthwhile in itself. Pure environmentalism treats nature as intrinsically valuable regardless of its use to humans, and this may well present the most holistically appropriate approach to environmental degradation. A liberal view, which only treats as worthwhile those environmental crises that directly threaten humans, pays less regard to environmental problems, thus is less likely to take measures to combat them. The individuated justifiability of liberal thought makes it incompatible with 'deep' environmentalism, and less likely to turn its eye to environmental problems which are distant from human concern.

The second critique of liberalism's 'dominion' relationship with nature is that it is ineffective in sustaining the environment. Recalling a "tragedy of the commons" justification for dominion over the environment, even when land is privatized according to classical liberal justifications of property rights, the necessarily global externalities which come from the use of land and industrial production means that small-scale liberal ideals are inappropriate. Harking back to Hayward's idea that liberalism, having developed before the maturation of international industry, is ill-equipped to provide solutions to global problems, one can see how liberal ideals of distribution fail in combating the adverse environmental consequences of mass-scale resource extraction, production and land use.[6] The consequences of grazing in Minnesota can be felt in Kazakhstan, and mineral mining in Australia has effects on fishermen in Greenland. Liberalism is too small in outlook for its classic solutions to be applicable to a problem of this scale.

The second shortcoming of liberalism in combating environmentalism is the nature of the rights it endorses, particularly those of ownership and control. A liberal demand that the freedoms of the individual be left alone, restricted only when they confront the rights of another, is in direct conflict with what environmentalism would demand of us. While an individual action may be innocent to liberals, it may be indictable from an environmental perspective. "Much of the challenge comes from the environmentalist idea that "everything is connected to everything else..." By this account, almost no

[6]Jamieson, "Environment." 249.
[7]Ibid., 248.

action is innocent: it is either part of the problem or part of the solution."[7] For example, using a vehicle which one has bought, pays registration fees for and takes care to be cautious when driving is an innocent expression of one's freedom in a liberal view, but is incompatible with a worldview which places environmental protection as the highest good. The schedule of rights which liberalism affords us creates environmental problems.

Thus, for environmental movements to substantively succeed in combating problems of environmental degradation caused by humans, they must restrict the schedule of rights and freedoms to which an individual is entitled. "Any serious collective attempt, at a global or state level, to curtail climate change or mitigate its harmful effects would place limitations on the actions of individuals. It would, in other words, restrict their liberty."[8] A liberal view, and particularly a libertarian approach, intuitively rejects this this as a prima facie imposition on the freedoms of individuals. A liberal characterisation of individuals as rational agents who will always act in their own self-interest is the justification for minimal restrictions on what individuals can do – anything further is suspiciously regarded as paternalistic.

Besides the issues of distributive justice which treat the environment as a good to be passed out based on principles of distribution, there is something to be said about the distribution of rights themselves. Liberty to do as one wishes with the goods and land over which one has dominion is central to the schedule of rights held by those in liberal states, and this right is subject to principles of just distribution in much the same way as land itself. Thus, when liberal theorists account for a justifiable distribution of both property rights and material goods, the ideological basis of an extended schedule of rights – to be the sole determinative agent regarding one's lands, to improve one's conditions by exploiting the resources available to one – is likely to trump concerns that the environment be respected in its own right. This arises from the paramount importance placed on individuals' ability to make moral judgments which liberalism respects above secondary concerns.

Two factors illustrate why liberalism is likely to prioritise individual rights and liberties over pure ecological needs: First, a conception of the environment as "for" human use, to be distributed according to principles of justice equally applicable to money or power. Second, a distribution of the rights of usage in and of themselves, as part of a schedule of rights to which individuals are entitled. Conceptions of 'pure ecology' whereby humans are part of the environment rather than masters of it are made secondary to the dual interpretations of distribution and rights of usage.

[8] Cripps, Elizabeth. "Climate Change, Collective Harm and Legitimate Coercion." In Climate Change and Liberal Priorities, ed. Gideon Calder and Catriona McKinnon. (New York: Routledge, 2012): 82.
[9] Winter, Stephen. "Environment." (Lecture, Politics 209, University of Auckland, May 18, 2016).

Further constraints arise from liberalism's insistence on democracy. Though environmentally friendly policies may find favour on mutually agreeable terms when nations are prosperous, at the point when environmental protection is not compossible with economic wellbeing, the voting polity will inevitably prioritise the latter. In a Humean scenario of material scarcity, the space of theory itself shrinks[9], but so, in real life terms, does the ambit of politics. Postmaterial (Green) parties thus thrive in developed nations in times of plenty (contingent on proportionally representative systems), but their voices are marginal at best in states which flounder to provide basic goods to their citizenry. Though an examination of the pitfalls of democracy in combatting climate change is a separate direction of inquiry, it is worthwhile to note that the diminishing ambit of theoretical space which arises in conditions of dire material need is also reflected in real politics.

Despite its shortcomings, however, liberalism has produced some possible solutions to environmental problems. These solutions typically rely on the tenets of individual responsibility and legitimately authoritative directives. Cripps advocates for coercively imposed measures, finding a way to fit liberalism to collective action around environmental degradation "Firstly, an attempt by the harming elite, or its subsets, to fulfil the collective duty to end environmental harm could involve the legitimate allocation of enforceable duties to individual members. Secondly, some legitimately established authority at the level of the broader, global collectivity... entitled to restrict the harm-causing ability of the elite, thereby limiting the liberty of its members."

Although the second of these two proposed liberal solutions seems idealistic at best, the idea of an international body able to implement an international pollution tax is appealing from a liberal point of view. The former proposed option is quite possible. International emissions trading schemes allow for the possibility of 'individual responsibility' of elite for polluting, with the proviso that the system be efficient and devoid of loopholes.

Cripps' liberal solution appeals to "an expanded understanding of collective responsibility and a collectivised version of the harm principle."[10] Despite its flaws, however, it is more realistic than an alternative of ecocentric priorities. A way to rectify and halt the destruction of the environment at human hands, claims Meyer-Abich, would be to reverse core beliefs of liberalism altogether. The suggestion "our anthropocentric ethic must give way to a holistic one"[11] is a normative ideal with which liberalism is incompatible. More than theoretical incompatibility, the rise of a "holistic ethic" is simply implausible in a world where economic drivers are still largely determinative of domestic environmental policy, and almost entirely determinative of international action around climate change.

[10]Cripps, "Climate Change, Collective Harm and Legitimate Coercion." 82.
[11]Meyer-Abich, Klaus. Revolution for Nature: From the Environment to the Connatural World. (Cambridge: The White Horse Press, 1993): 1.

Though liberalism is incompatible with purely integrative environmentalism, it potentially provides some solutions to the problems faced by the environment. Though liberalism is no panacea, its tenets are the closest the world is likely to get to seeing global solutions which are justifiable to an international citizenry.

For an environmentalist argument to be liberal, "promoting environmental values would have to be necessary for human survival or flourishing, or it would, at least, have to be consistent with the possibility that people who do not share green values can live their lives in their own preferred ways."[12] Thus, using mechanisms proposed by Hayward and Cripps, turning liberalism towards protecting the environment will only ever be effective insofar as the environment on which they focus is instrumentally valuable for human survival.

Despite its flaws, a modified liberalism is better equipped to respond to environmental problems than alternative frameworks of 'deep ecology'. Calls for a new environmental ethos carry an implicit restriction of rights, potentially totalitarian in ambit, and this restriction of allowable human activity could not be reasonably justified to either governments or their peoples. Despite the truism that you can't solve a problem with the same thinking that caused it, liberalism is "the devil we know", and its tenets provide the most viable, if imperfect, mechanisms for solving the collective action problem of environmental degradation.

[12] Jamieson, "Environment." 248.

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Fantasies of Finance

Cameron Lawerence

Profit Over Progress: The Financialisation of Innovation

Intellectual property is an umbrella term that refers to legal structures such as patents and copyrights which grant monopoly ownership to intellectual creations. Of particular interest is intellectual property in the case of innovations that have potential benefits to society. These include technologies in healthcare and agriculture that are commonly patented, and extend to the works of academics that are commonly copyrighted by publishers. With this in mind, this essay explores the relationship between intellectual property and innovation, arguing that intellectual property's true operations are based on logics of the world of finance that result in the stifling of new knowledge and thus benefits to society. In exposing these operations, the truth of innovation is revealed, and it is urged that fidelity to this truth is foundational to an emancipatory politics.

Intellectual property is said to promote innovation as the exclusive rights assigned to the owner allow them to disclose their knowledge to society, while legal protections against unlicensed use retain their ability to generate revenue from the innovation (Lemley, 2004). It is alleged that without this relationship between society and the intellectual property owner, many business models centred on research and development would be untenable. Disclosure of innovation to society would be unprofitable without monopoly rights, as competitors could simply copy the products or services provided without having invested in the research and development themselves. Conversely, profiting from innovation without disclosing knowledge would lead to an inefficient process in terms of societal development, as competitors would be unable to build on the work of others and would thus be forced to recreate existing technologies and concepts in order to reach a point in which new innovations could be made (Granstrand, 2003). However, accepting intellectual property's supposed role of innovation promotion conceals the true operations of intellectual property in the world of finance, and negates the possibility of another world.

Before beginning this exploration, it is necessary to briefly establish the theoretical framework in which this analysis is conducted and from which its intent is derived. In speaking of worlds, this work refers to the positioning of, and relations between, objects that exist in a particular state of affairs. The combination of objects that constitutes a world is not static, it may be affected by both material and subjective changes. These processes of change, that by which worlds are generated and modified, are known as worlding. Financialisation refers to the process of worlding the world of finance, in which the logic of finance is centred in the economic and normalised to its subjects (Jones, 2016). This analysis focuses on the financialisation of innovation as elicited by exposing the functioning of intellectual property in the world of finance. The aim of this work is to touch

on the Real in the sense that this word is given by Jacques Lacan, that is, the functions of intellectual property that are impossible to symbolise within the world of finance. From Badiou (2010), it is the Real that tells us of the possibility of an event, a happening outside of the state of a world which brings truth into being, where truth is that which exists outside of the knowledge of finance. Thus, it is by touching on the Real that the truth of innovation may be encountered. It is this truth that an emancipatory politics must hold fidelity to in order to resist the world of finance and world an alternative world in which this truth becomes knowledge (Badiou, 2001).

On a foundational level, the operation of intellectual property as a monopoly right granted over knowledge exists in contradiction with the social nature of innovation. The creation of knowledge, even if by an individual, necessarily draws upon prior knowledge generated by universal labour, that is, the innovative labour of many in social life (Zeller, 2008). In this light, the differential logic of finance inherent to the process of assigning exclusive ownership rights is revealed (Jones, 2016). In order to commodify knowledge, finance must strip it of its collective character and bind it via legal 'protections' into differentiated knowledge-commodities (Teixeira & Rotta, 2012). Only by this process of differentiation can innovation be made tradeable. Thus, in the mundane act of granting intellectual property rights in offices across the globe, we witness finance's worlding of the world, and in this process of worlding we glimpse the Real, the unrepresentable social nature of innovation.

Central to understanding the instrumental operations of intellectual property is the context of increasingly financialised corporate management. The 1960s were marked by the conglomerate merger movement that combined strategically independent companies. This process saw the beginning of a managerial shift in which expertise in the main business was no longer the central requirement, and instead was replaced by financial knowledge of how to buy and sell subsidiaries (Crotty, 2003). This was followed by the hostile takeover movement of the 1980s, which was accompanied by a shift towards rewarding managers with stock options, both stemming from the belief that managers often had different aims to that of shareholders and creditors, and that this needed to be mitigated (Orhangazi, 2008). It was this latter shift that granted shareholder value its central importance in the governance of corporations today.

For corporations whose primary products or services are non-financial, the centrality of shareholder value in their governance plays a major role in how intellectual property operates instrumentally. The interests of shareholders are entirely removed from the production of new use-values that innovation

may allow, that is, products and services that may benefit society. Financial investors seek to maximise profit or share price in the shortest time possible. This short-term focus lies in contradiction with the more experimental long-term process of research and development necessary for the most progressive innovation (Zeller, 2008). Thus, rather than focus on the discovery of new knowledge that is able to generate revenue through the owner or licensee's production of new use-values, corporations utilise intellectual property rights themselves as an instrument of revenue generation. As a result, the production of new use-values is at best incidental. Here these instruments are divided into two main operations: systemic monopolisation and speculation.

Outside of speculation, intellectual property may be used to generate revenue in two principal ways, irrespective of how the intellectual property was obtained. Firstly, the owner may limit use of the knowledge solely to themselves so that only they may produce use-values from which they can generate revenue, be it by distributing their copyrighted information, providing a service, or producing material goods. Secondly, the owner of the knowledge-commodity may grant others the license to use the knowledge in exchange for knowledge-rent (Teixeira & Rotta, 2012). While not central to the examination of systemic monopolisation here, knowledge-rent itself enables the intellectual property owner to bypass any generation of new use-value, receiving revenue purely from the valueless knowledge-commodity itself (Teixeira & Rotta, 2012). By situating these principal operations in the context of shareholder value governance of corporations, we again see the financial logic of detaching revenue generation from the production of new use-values that may benefit society; instead of investing in riskier long-term innovation, corporations focus on systemic monopolisation.

Monopolisation is sought by purchasing or filing for ownership of the broadest and most basic intellectual property possible, a process of intellectual property blocking that also extends to the pre-emptive lodging of intellectual property that may be used by competitors in the future. For smaller companies not yet publically listed, and hence more managerially driven towards generating new use-values, they are often bought out by monopolistic corporations. Once an effectively restrictive monopoly is achieved, the intellectual property owner is then able to increase the price of their products or service, knowledge-commodities, and knowledge-rents in an arbitrary fashion, completely detached from any intention of creating new use-values (Zeller, 2008). Fundamentally, this model of wealth creation is based on knowledge restriction, providing a direct contrast to intellectual property's alleged mutual benefit of revenue generation and innovation disclosure as asserted by the world of finance. Yet again we touch the Real

in coming to understand intellectual property as fundamentally limiting innovation. In a subversive twist, this systemic monopolisation of intellectual property can be viewed as a reunification of interrelated knowledge. However, the alienation of the social nature of innovation that occurred in the process of differentiation remains. This process of reunification does not serve to reverse the original process of differentiation, but instead seeks to create a far larger difference between the monopolistic corporation and its competitors in the interests of wealth creation. In this rearrangement of objects, we bear witness to the worlding of the world of finance once more.

In the case of speculation, financialisation's detachment of wealth from the production of new use-values is most glaring. Via differentiation and commodification, knowledge is made an object of speculation in intellectual property markets. The market value of this fictitious capital fluctuates as the predicted value of future revenues varies, which, as above, is detached from the production of new use-values that would truly allow a society to benefit from innovation. In fact, the mere existence of intellectual property markets has been shown to increase the price of knowledge-commodities and rents. Thus, in the world of finance, innovation is rendered an intangible asset able to be traded between portfolios, generating revenue without ever being utilised to benefit society. Innovation becomes just another way to make money out of money (Teixera & Rotta, 2012). Through recognising the detachment of revenue generation from the production of new use-values, the process which forms the core of both systemic monopolisation and speculation, we glimpse the Real once more; while intellectual property is touted as promoting innovation, if new use-values that are beneficial to society are created from intellectual property, this is merely incidental to yet another method of revenue creation. To finance, innovation does not matter.

Taken together, the glimpses of the Real that this analysis of intellectual property has captured reveal the truth of innovation, which is particular to, but not limited by, the contents of the world of finance (Badiou, 2001). The truth we encounter is that innovation is a wholly social process in which attempts to differentiate forms of knowledge from their collective whole may only serve to limit innovation, and thus the benefits a society may yield. Alexandra Elbakyan personally encountered this truth as an event and brought it into being through another. During her time studying neuroscience in Kazakhstan, she faced immense difficulties in gaining access to academic papers when her university could not afford them. This struggle was her event, and in 2011 she developed Sci-Hub, an online repository granting full access to paid academic journals which now boasts free access to 48 million papers (Russon, 2016). The establishment of Sci-Hub may be seen as a secondary event through which she brought the aforementioned truth into being. Despite a copyright

lawsuit filed and won by academic publisher Elsevier against Elbakyan, Sci-Hub remains operational and she retains a resilient fidelity to this truth, believing that paywalls prevent the progressive development of society due to their restriction of innovative knowledge (Murphy, 2016). Elbakyan's fidelity to truth represents the foundations for an emancipatory politics able to bring another world into being, a world outside of that of finance that gives primacy to society's collective wellbeing over financial profit logics.

In the world of finance, innovation itself becomes financialised. The true operations of intellectual property serve to strip knowledge of its collective character, rendering it a commodity whose sole purpose is to be used as an instrument to generate wealth, necessarily detaching innovation from the production of new use-values that may benefit society. In laying out these operations, innovation's fundamental truth of collectivity is revealed. This essay itself represents a holding of fidelity to this truth and reiterates the need for an emancipatory politics with the same fidelity. Not limited to innovation, we must continue this intellectual work of exposing and capturing the truths of finance, as it is from principles established by this task that organisation and action may be best directed towards worlding an alternative world of collectivity.

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Science Fiction Media

George Greig

Post-humanism: Our Precarious Pursuit of Our Future

Being 'human' has long been explored in science fiction media through post-humanist and trans-humanist perspectives. The contemporary definition of post-humanism serves this comparison best as it focuses on the loss of bodily importance and the rise of consciousness (Hayles 5-6). Trans-humanism can be intimately connected to the objectives of post-humanism as it describes the technological integration that moves towards post-humanism (Tirosh-Samuelson 714). A critical comparison between Alex Garland's Ex Machina (2015) and Edios Montreal's Deus Ex: Human Revolution (2011) can demonstrate this post-humanist exploration. The texts explore post-humanism as exceeding our biology, trans-humanism as a tool of the new powerful and the religious parallels between post-humanism and religious narratives.

Both Ex Machina and Deus Ex depict a post-humanist state focusing on consciousness and technological integration respectively. Ex Machina deconstructs post-humanism through the human interaction with Ava, a humanoid AI. The narrative centres on protagonist Caleb examining her through a modified Turing test. Ava has a humanoid body with parts of humanlike skin scattered between parts of visible mechanics and wiring. Her humanlike movements and detailed facial features strengthen her position in an uncanny valley between distrust and empathy (Krämer and M. Rosenthal-von der Pütten 435-436). Her humanity is constructed through inquisitive dialogue and a convincing voice performance by actress, Alicia Vikander. The uncanny design alienates viewers from physical notions of Ava's humanness by emphasising intangible connotations of consciousness. Post-humanist discourse contends that being human exceeds biological definitions by focusing on consciousness over physicality (Hayles 5). Ava epitomises this contention as her body uncannily repels viewers, leaving them to humanise her personal, characterised consciousness. The antagonist, Nathan, validates this intention in discussing how the ultimate Turing test is that of Ava's cunning and deceptive consciousness. The Ex Machina approach to post-humanism therefore emphasises the intangible consciousness alienating the humanlike body through an uncanny valley of design.

In contrast, Deus Ex explores post-humanism through a trans-humanist lens through applying technology to the human body. Adam Jensen, the game's protagonist, is revived and technologically rebuilt after a terrorist attack in his workplace. The cinematic prologue depicts Adam being revived and enhanced with nanotechnology. The enhancement might not be unique to the diegetic world where enhancement is a normal progression in life. Nonetheless, the dialogue sequences describe that Adam has a unique biological acceptance with nanotechnology, by-passing its progressively negative effects on human tissue. Deus Ex extends a post-humanist future

through Adam's trans-humanist potential. Trans-humanism explores the development and integration of nanotechnology to extend humans to a post-humanist state (Tirosh-Samuelson 714). The game distinguishes itself from thematic developments in Ex Machina as it centres on the relationship between the tangible biology of humans and technology. Adam's ability to accept lifelong enhancements positions post-humanism as a series of possibilities for humanity as manifested through technology (Lee 79-80). Ava posited post-humanism through the notion of consciousness beyond biology. However, Adam represents post-human potential made possible through the enhancement of human biology. Post-humanism may be a multifaceted discourse; however, Deus Ex narrows it scope with the relationship between biological limitations and trans-humanist potential.

Both texts illustrate the implications of human progression and who influences its manifestation. The notion of minority and elite control is central to both stories. Ex Machina and Deus Ex discuss respectively post-humanism as a constrained and exclusive transition and trans-humanism as a commodified lifeline. In Ex Machina, Ava is created by Nathan who is the developer of the world's most used online search engine. Nathan isolates his AI breakthrough in his personal facility located on a desolate mountain range. The sweeping aerial shots of mountain ranges and the on-screen settings of glaciers and grassy fields denote its secrecy from the outside world. Ava's post-humanist potential becomes a problematic notion when it is juxtaposed with her isolation. Post-humanism impliedly requires the mass proliferation of its progression to enable the movement from human to post human (Lee 77-78). Ava's isolation demonstrates that post-humanism and its trans-humanist means cannot manifest while it remains in the possession of a minority. She fantasises with Caleb about standing in a busy intersection and observing people. The dialogue suggests she has inherent post-human intentions to observe and integrate herself amongst the normal population. The narrative itself is predicated on the testing of Ava, an AI creation by human design in human control. It highlights a discrepancy that questions whether normal humans are suitable to assess a post-humanist AI like Ava (Lee 83). Therefore, Nathan's control over her exemplifies a Frakensteinian disconnect that ignores his creation's own inherent intentions. The film contends that mankind cannot progress to a post-humanist state when the technology and the control of it are exercised exclusively by a human minority elite.

However, Deus Ex uses a commodified lens of trans-humanism to describe the implications of a technologically enabled post-humanism. The diegetic world exists in the year 2027 where humanity is producing and integrating advanced tech augmentations. Augmentations are sold by a select number of companies that compete in a closed market without independent innovation.

The augmentations grow incompatible with human flesh and require a fictional drug, neuropozyne, to biologically stabilise it. Neuropozyne is a contentious theme in the narrative; becoming the centre of riots, black market crime and monopoly through the L.I.M.B stores that sell it. Augmented people survive through a lifelong dependency on expensive neuropozyne purchases and equally expensive augmentations sold on a monopolised market. The game projects a prescient future where post-humanism creates a new stratified society where access to resources is controlled and available to the wealthy elite.

Deus Ex demonstrates how concentrating post-humanism to a wealthy elite transforms non-augmented and lower socioeconomic people alike into a new lower class (Persson and Savulescu 663-664). A monopolised market creates a monolithic form of capitalism that demands consumption of these commodities, black market activity or non-participation with augmentation. Trans-humanist and inherently higher income people become a post human population affording them a privilege justified by their economic ideology (Persson and Savulescu 666-667). The thematic issues in Ex Machina focus on the disconnect between mankind and the inherent intended direction of a post-humanist progression. In contrast, Deus Ex exemplifies the more prescient notion that mankind will use political economic ideology to justify the social gaps between the proverbial haves and have-nots (Persson and Savulescu 666). The social or moral responsibilities necessary to assist lower class enhanced people or non-enhanced people is negated by a commodity fetishism that ignores the human sacrifice of its consumption (663). The game illustrates a prescient future where post-humanism is available only to the wealthy elite, subjugating all others to obsolescence and dependency. The philosophical and theological roots of post-humanism give science fiction the platform to create religious parallels between post-humanism and mankind as God. Ex Machina suggests that man's pursuit of a sentient AI is a process befitting of a biblical representation of God. In contrast, Deus Ex draws parallels between trans-humanism and classical era theology depicting its technology as a tool reserved for the gods. In Ex Machina, Garland makes frequent use of biblical references, dialogue and stylistic features to emphasise the God-like relationship between Nathan and Ava. The film unfolds in a chronological 7-day period divided by title screens stating "Day 1" and so on. The title screens correspond with each new interaction connoting that Nathan is enacting the genesis of the new post-humanist world. The characters' names also reference Old Testament names, most notably Ava which can be construed to be a play on Eve. Further, Nathan anchors its biblical referencing when he misconstrues Caleb's comments regarding himself a God if Ava was a true sentient being. Religion and post-humanism share common objectives for mankind most notably including dogmatic

perfectionism and eschatological outcomes (Tirosh-Samuelson 720-721). Nathan's self-professed title of God implies he had organised Caleb and Ava into an isolated garden of Eden. The perspective that Ava is a manifestation of an Eve-like character suggests that she is the post-humanist departure from Nathan's isolated perfectionism. She embodies an element not afforded to his Genesis story where she exceeds her creator by transcending his potential (717). Ava effectively kills Caleb through entrapment and fatally stabs Nathan, enabling her to leave the confines of the facility. This resolution extends an eschatological commentary or the branch of religion concerned with the soul and life after death (717-718). Ava becomes the true post-humanist God when she uses human death to transcend her creators' biological limits. Her technological immortality therefore appropriates the position of God implying that Nathan's 7 days of genesis were truly Ava's days of manifestation. Ex Machina establishes a prediction that post-humanist beings will become the new God superseding the mortal limitations of mankind.

In the alternative, Deus Ex explores the perspective that post-humanism through trans-humanist means uses tools only fit for the gods. The game features frequent cinematics and dream sequences that depict imagery of the classical tale of Icarus. The non-combative antagonist and creator of human augmentation, Hugh Darrow, refers to himself as the father of Icarus, Daedalus. This religious reference likens the development of trans-humanist technology as a complacent use of tools reserved for the gods. The final chapter of the game summarises this perfectly as it requires players to decide technology's fate. The player must either destroy human augmentation technology or preserve it with heavy regulation and capped potential. The game's procedural rhetoric suggest that trans-humanism is a tool too powerful for mankind's possession (Bogost 3). Procedural rhetoric describes how video game mechanics and affordances can connote the innate ideologies embedded in its design (3). The choices offered in the final mission express a deeply pessimistic perspective on mankind's degree of preparation in handling trans humanist tools and technologies. Ex Machina contends post-humanism can be controlled in immortality, however Deus Ex contends it is a process dictated by higher powers. Ava represented a form of post-humanism that was created, however Adam Jensen must interact with a post-humanist form that was supplemented to mankind (Tirosh-Samuelson 730). Trans-humanism becomes an object of revelation whereby mankind must either withdraw its progress or face destruction by oligarchy and conflict (728-729). It fractures what Jürgen Habermas considered an innate cohesion of society (2003, 44-50). The final chapter of the game solidifies its classical religious framework that a transhumanist progression is not an inherent progression of mankind. Deus Ex stands as the most dystopian of the texts representing post-humanism by trans-humanist means a manufactured transcendence unfit for mankind.

The two texts interact with post-humanism in common styles commenting on its philosophical and social implications. Ex Machina considers post-humanism a potential future that is confined by the mortal limitations of mankind. In contrast, Deus Ex depicts trans-humanism as the primary mechanism in achieving post-humanism. It suggests the technological developments are beyond the capability of mankind, leading only to its demise. The different perspectives of post-humanism illustrate its multifaceted nature implying a precarious future to follow.

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THE SOCIAL

In this deeper level of analysis, it becomes clear how broad global trends funnel down to affect different social groups and the moral fabric of society. *Dek-Wenz (Thailand's Bikeboys): reflecting the Failure of Modern Thai* society uses Thailand as the perfect case study to demonstrate the harsh realities of fast-track modernisation in developing countries. As traditional Thai culture is eroded by capitalism and mass consumerism, it is the young people of Thailand who face the biggest impact; 'bikeboy' culture offers a sense of belonging and prestige to those who feel marginalized in their own society.

Although we have seen vast social change across many areas of society, feminism remainswe a contentious topic in both academia and real life which experiences much prejudice and misunderstanding. In *On the Waves of Feminist Anthropology: Representation, Perspectives and Identity* we see how feminist anthropology seeks to understand the diverse roles of women in different cultural contexts across the world, generating increasing realization of the different experiences faced by women in different sectors of society. The result is a substantial shift in the way that we study the broader context of gender relations and the social constructs which inform it.

It is important to recognise however that even as we are striving for equality between the sexes, there is strong merit to understanding the innate differences between them to highlight the diversity in the human experience. *The Rhetorics of Gendered Writing: A Technology that Restructures Feminist Consciousness* explores how the medium of writing is inherently gendered to produce specific discourses that shape what it means to be a man or a woman. "As all advocates of feminist politics know most people do not understand sexism or if they do they think it is not a problem. Masses of people think that feminism is always and only about women seeking to be equal to men. And a huge majority of these folks think feminism is anti-male. Their misunderstanding of feminist politics reflects the reality that most folks learn about feminism from patriarchal mass media." - bell hooks. Thus, the way in which we conceive ideas of what is masculine or feminine is strongly influenced by the messages this form of media disseminates to society.

Such ideas which inform our understandings of different social groups are equally relevant to the field of Queer Studies, and how the Queer experience itself varies hugely according to the cultural context. *Queer Studies in Anthropology: Challenging a Universal Western Queerness* confronts the traditional Anglo-centric narrative concerning what it is to be Queer, and the ways in which scholars are seeking to expand this concept to express the diversity of experiences. The result contradicts the so-called 'universal narrative' of Queerness and shows how values such as class, race and wealth define the Queer identity.

Increasing understandings of Queerness are changing how we perceive the 'family norm' in the 21st century; increasing acceptance in society of same-sex relationships, as shown through the legalization of gay marriage, has bought to the light new struggles currently being experienced by the LGBT community. *Nostalgic Nuclear Family goals leading to the Reality of Diverse Family Forms* reflects on how this new acceptability is causing same-sex couples to be forced into frameworks of heteronormativity, particularly as a result of the new possibilities of child-bearing. This has created an identity flux as the LGBT community seeks to integrate these new legal and medical advances into their experience and how society understands the concept of family.

The concept of family is a core value at the heart of most cultures across the world, and governs many of our closest relationships. *Female Selective Abortion: A dichotomy between North and South India* explores the complex gender relations within Indian culture which simultaneously drives and resists sex-selective abortion, as demonstrated by contrasting regional practices and attitudes perpetuated by diverse marital customs. Such a study is instrumental in understanding the underlying structural differences between ethnic groups which result in varying levels of 'son preference' and female inequality in Indian society.

Institutional gendering however extends much further into society than just family life; *The Scars of the Systemically Oppressed Gender* demonstrates, by utilizing the theory of intersectionality, that the criminal justice system is an inherently social structure that supports the white patriarchy. Such a system is highly detrimental to women of colour, where they experience a deeper level of marginalization. Media portrayals reinforce the perception of incarcerated women as over-sexualised, ruthless and morally inferior for not fitting female societal norms. This results in perpetual subjugation for such women, which in a broader context reflects the ongoing efforts needed to achieve gender equality across all areas of society.

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Outsiders: Youth and Adult Subcultures

Chutchaya Siriwattakanon

Dek-Wenz (Thailand's Bikeboys): Reflecting the Failure of Modern Thai Society

A Thai slang word "Dek-Wenz" refers to " Thai bikeboy subculture" according to the Thai Royal Dictionary (2014). Thailand's bikeboys are well known for their delinquent behaviours: illegally occupying a highway for a race; vandalising public property; abusing innocent people; drug abuse and sexual violence (Chamnansook, 2008 p.1). Members of the Thai bikeboys subculture range from 15-25 years of age. In addition, the majority of them come from low-socioeconomic families in rural or urban areas (Chamnansook, 2008 p.1). For decades, Thailand's local authorities have been trying to address "Dek-Wenz" as a significant social problem (Chamnansook, 2008 p.1). In fact, the emergence of "Dek-Wenz" subculture is not an accident. Their presence unfolds the harsh reality Thailand faces in modern days. In this essay, I will demonstrate that the Dek-Weanz subculture is caused by the rapid and unpleasant modernisation that Thailand has experienced in just five decades. This essay is divided into three sections. Firstly, Thailand's social change and its impacts on the society will be taken into account. Secondly, I will unpack the manifestation of Dek-Weanz subculture in relation to Thailand's modernisation. Lastly, we will come to understand this subculture as a reflection of modern Thai society.

The unpleasant social transition of Thailand through a Durkheimist lens
Thailand's modernisation has created a normless society that has fostered the Dek-Wenz subculture. Park (1925) argues that modernisation breaks down the social control of traditional institutions: family, community, and religion.. As a result, the social institutions failed to regulate individuals, which caused the emergence of delinquent subcultures.

Through a functionalist lens, Thailand was once an agrarian society for nearly one thousand years (Limanonda, 1995). Throughout time, Buddhism and family have been essential elements of Thailand's culture and society. Limanonda points out that one "cannot deny the fact that in the Thai society, Buddhism has long borne much influence over the Thai way of life, thoughts and behaviour (p.77)." Traditionally, these social institutions regulated and united the Thai people.

Thailand's values and family insitutions have been disrupted over time. From a collective, agrarian society to an individual, consumerist society, Thailand has undergone great change in just fifty years. Thailand's modernisation started in just the1960s when the country entered the industrial revolution (Pasuk & Baker, 1998). Park (1925) argues that "Any form of social change that brings any measurable alternation in the routine of social life tends to break up habits; and in breaking up habits upon which the exiting social organisation rests, destroys that organisation itself" (p. 107). We can apply Park's argument to Thailand's context. Modernisation has undermined

Thailand's traditional social institutions: Buddhism and Thai family. Meanwhile, the dominating consumerism under modernisation is seeing Thai people pursue materiality and wealth (Limanonda, 1995) . For example, modern Thai people strongly believe that every household should own a vehicle. Each of these foreign influences has disrupted Thailand and the country's traditional routine. As a result, the social institutions cannot prevent Thai people from pursuing their material desires (Rigg & Ritche, 2002). In reality, the majority of Thai people struggle to realise their capitalist goals due to limited recourse, particularly low income earners (Pasuk & Baker, 1998, p. 25). Consequently, these newfound strains can provoke low income households to engage in domestic violence toward their children in order to relive anxiety. According to Unicief Thailand (2014), 30 per cent of Thai youth experienced domestic violence in 2013. Most of the cases come from a low socioeconomic background in rural areas (Uniceif Thailand, 2014). This harsh social change has motivated some youth who are the victims of domestic violence to engage in "Dek-Wenz" subculture. The subculture is their solution to relieve their suffering and anxiety and to enhance their power (Horpiboonsook & Horpiboonsook, 2010, p20) . The following section will discuss how the Thai youth create Dek-Wenz subculture to cope with their problematic circumstances.

The Manifestation of Dek-Wenz as a Response to Normless and Uncertain Society

Cohen (1955) proposes that youths create subculture as a solution to their status problem. Young people struggle to obtain society's legitimate means and goals due to their limited access to resources. Therefore, they change "the mainstream frame of reference" to "the subcultural frame of reference" (p. 30). In order to change the conventional frame of reference, youth have to recreate their cultural means and goals (Cohen, 1955. P. 30). It is possible that subcultural means and goals will consist of deviant elements to enhance their status and power (Cohen, 1955. P. 30). In relation to Dek-Wenz subculture, young Thai people engage in the culture to enhance their status after being abused by their families (Chamnansook, 2008, p.50). They are aware that they cannot be "good students" in school or " good people" in Thailand's modern society (Horpiboonsook & Horpiboonsook, 2010, p7). This is because the young motorcyclists lack the family and financial support to reach the goals (Horpiboonsook & Horpiboonsook, 2010, p7). Consequently, youth employ motorbikes as the tools to construct their own cultural means and goals (Horpiboonsook & Horpiboonsook, 2010, p5). Their goal is to be recognised by mainstream society as "a powerful out-lawed bikers" not "the victims at home" (Horpiboonsook & Horpiboonsook, 2010, p10) In order to be recognised as the "powerful out-lawed bikers". they engage in delinquent behaviours that shock

society (Horpiboonsook & Horpiboonsook, 2010, p10). The mainstream media know the young motorcyclists mainly for illegally occupying a highway for a race, illegally modifying their bikes, and vandalising public property (Horpiboonsook & Horpiboonsook, 2010, p20). Chamnansook (2008), a Thai sociologist who conducted ethnographic research on the subculture, points out that her participated bike boy said:

"My bike gave me power and muscle. With my bike, it has changed my life forever. Whenever I hear people talk about me as a hustler on his motorbike, or the fastest biker, I feel super proud of myself!" (Chamnansook, 2008, p.60, translated by author).

His quote reflects how he felt satisfied and powerful from engaging in the deviant behaviours.

Last year, I was teaching English as a volunteer tutor in the North of Thailand. Most of the students here came from low socioeconomic backgrounds. One of my students, who was a young motorcyclist, told me about his pride of being a biker boy:
"I have occupied a street, and won a fight many times. Look, I've survived from being caught by the police!"
Similar to Chamnansook's findings, my student's words imply that Dek-Wenz subculture is their most effective solution in order to enhance power and status in Thailand's uncertain modern society.
Next we must ask: why do the youth use a motorbike to create and facilitate their cultural means and goals? In global and Thai history, a motorbike has been associated with masculinity, power, mobility, fashion, and smartness. Furthermore, motorcycles are popular in Thailand and other developing nations due to their affordability (Pinch & Reimer, 2012). Chamnansook (2008) says that 93 per cent of Thai households owned motorbikes in 2007. On the other hand, cars are expensive and affordable only to high and middle income earners (Pinch & Reimer). In addition, the Japanese motorcycle companies Yamaha, Suzuki, and Honda established export factories in Thailand and have since been targeting Thai working class and lower-middle income youth (Chamnansook, 2008 p.20). These circumstances contribute to the place motorcycles have gained as an essential element of the Dek-Wenz subculture.

Dek-Wenz: The Mirror of Modern Thai Society

The manifestation of Dek-Wenz reflects the failure of Thailand's society for a number of reasons. Firstly, modern Thai society has failed to help the young bikeboys who are the victims of domestic violence. It is horrific that a young

motorbiker in Chamnansook's (2008) ethnographic studies told her " I love you. I have never told this word to anyone else even my parents. They don't love me at all. Please... don't leave me alone!" (2008, p.100, translated by author). In fact, the majority of her participants expressed a similar emotion towards the researcher, which demonstrated how vulnerable the youth are (Chamnansook, 2008, p.60, translated by author). Chamnansook (2008) also points out that because the bikeboys come from dysfunctional family backgrounds, a motorbike is seen by them as their only buddy in their isolated homes. "I love him (the motorbike). I want to kiss and hug him. I even take him to bed. No one at home loves me at all!" said 17 year old motorcyclist Kra (Chamnansook, 2008, p.100, translated by author). Furthermore, Thailand's high rates of domestic violence reflect the absence of traditional morality in modern society. Since Thailand's traditional social control has been eroded by modernisation, the country's homicide and domestic violence rates have risen by 50 per cent in two decades (Thailand Uniceif, 2014, p.5). Moreover, Thai modern society even stigmatises them as "delinquent youth" instead of considering them the victims of modernisation. An interesting point to bring to light is that the term "Dek-Wenz" is used within mainstream society but never by the young bikers. This is because the term "Dek-Wenz" connotes a negative stigma about the bike boys. This stigma has been attached to the group due to their perceived inability to pursue material success. Below are a number of harsh online comments about the young motorcyclists:

"They are the rubbish of Thai society" (Pantip, 2015, translated by author).
"The only solution to address them is ... death... "(Thai Rath, 2012, translated by author).
"No matter how hard the authority teaches them, they are not going to listen, the best solution is death.." (Thai Rath, 2012, translated by author).
It is rare to see young motorcyclists' online communities on Facebook, Instragram, Twitter or even ordinary Thai websites. This demonstrates their subordinate status in Thai society.

Conclusion

The existence of "Dek-Wenz" in Thailand's society reveals the negative impact modernisation has had since the country's industrial revolution fifty years ago. It has been found that the Thai boy-bikers are often victims of domestic violence, which is a result of the newfound stress of obtaining wealth under the notion of consumerism. I suggest that Thailand's authorities and the mainstream society should stop stereotyping the bike-boys as society's enemy. Instead, authorities and society should address the underlying issue of poverty in modern Thai society. Furthermore, a better balance must be found between traditional Thai culture and moden capitalist culture in order to mitigate the social problems and enhance social welfare.

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Anthropology 203

Theoretical Apporaches to Society and Culture

Daniel Brady

On the Waves of Feminist Anthropology: Representation, Perspectives and Identity

Initially created as an opposition to the male bias found in ethnography and early anthropology, feminist anthropology permeated into not only social and cultural anthropology, but to the discipline as a whole (Geller and Stockett 2006). In this essay I will begin by briefly explaining how feminist anthropology has evolved over time in the context of sociocultural anthropology by outlining the three 'waves' of feminist anthropology, and the overall contributions they have made. The first wave concerns the notions of representation, perspectives, reflexivity and critiques on the idea of the self; the second wave the notion of the construction of gender and its difference to sex; and the third wave identity and difference across multiple aspects of society no longer limited to gender. Later on I will delve into the paving of several anthropologies that I argue owe their creation to the advent of feminist anthropology, including the anthropology of gender as well as the anthropology of men (that is to say, the study of maleness and masculinity).

At its core, feminism as a movement has been centred on the advocacy of women's rights and women's voices, and anthropology is no exception. The movement within the discipline, known as the 'anthropology of women' started in the 1970s as a way of critiquing the three tiers of bias centred around the misrepresentation of women (Lamphere 2006, Moore 1988:63). Most importantly, it details their fight towards gaining a voice of their own, as well as offering perspectives men might not have. The first bias is that of the anthropologist, whereby they bring in their own assumptions about the gender system of the culture that they are studying. The second bias is that of the culture being studied. Men from a particular culture may consider women to be subordinate and communicate this notion to the anthropologist, without any way for the women to properly object. The third bias is inherent in Western subculture; assuming any difference between genders to be marginalisation and oppression. These three types of biases, Moore argues, all contributed the 'muting' of women in the discipline; they were for all intents and purposes analytically invisible (Moore 1988:81).

The critique of the male biases allowed for a second perspective and the re-envisioning in anthropology - the perspective of women. Rather than focusing on men as mankind (now more appropriately, humankind), focusing on women as women allowed anthropologists to gain a new set of eyes on the cultures that they studied, debunking previous information analysed by anthropologists past. In her foreword of Feminist Anthropology: a Reader, Lamphere cites several feminist anthropologists shining the light on women and gaining important information about aspects of life (Lamphere 2006:x). Annette Weiner (1976, cited in Lamphere 2006) uncovered details about funerary exchanges between women in the Trobriand Islands, information missed by Malinowski (1922, cited in Lamphere 2006). Ellen Lewin also cites Jane Goodale's studies on the Tiwi and their kinship and marriage systems.

Goodale revealed that, from the perspective of Tiwi women, the marriage system was orchestrated and controlled by them (Goodale 1976, cited in Lewin 2006). By comparison, prior studies done claimed that women "were traded like commodities" and did not have a voice (Lewin 2006:15). Lila Abu-Lughod (1988) documents her fieldwork in a Bedouin community and focuses her ethnography on womanhood, morality and modesty. It can be assumed that due to her status as a woman, she would have been able to gain information that a male anthropologist may not have gained, quite possibly due to the second tier of bias (Abu-Lughod 1998, Moore 1988).

The second and first wave of feminist anthropology propelled the discipline even further in terms of theoretical framework thanks their critiques of the first wave, keeping it grounded while allowing it to further permeate through other aspects of anthropology. One of the main critiques was that feminist anthropology was doing the exact opposite of what it tried doing in the first place, that is, removing bias. The issue was primarily brought up by various minorities within the women's movement such as "lesbians, African-American women and 'women of colour'" who had different experiences from "white, middle class heterosexual women" (Abu-Lughod 1991:140). These women criticised female anthropologists for attempting to include the minority groups in the 'self' created by female anthropologists at the time. In essence it was backlash from lesbian and African-American women who opposed 'being spoken for'. Abu-Lughod argues that women who studied different cultures claimed to have a central point of view of what it means to be a woman (1991).

It is possible that this realisation paved the way for one of feminist anthropology's largest contributions - the creation of the theoretical framework surrounding sex and gender (Moore 1988:3951). The "sex/gender system" as coined by Gayle Rubin (1975, cited in Lewin 2006:18) refers to the idea that while sex is biologically determined, gender is a cultural construction that varies cross-culturally. Each culture's idea of masculinity, femininity and gender can differ. It is from this seminal work that anthropology now has the language to communicate new ideas and theories on sex and gender without the need to marry the two together. From the separation of the two, discourse on gender has become much more nuanced (Geller and Stockett 2006) and allows discussion on cultures that may not see sexuality and gender as dichotomous as Western-dominated anthropology once did. Gender is now touted as a social construction in the same way that race/ethnicity and class is considered a social construction. This can be seen in ethnographies undertaken by Western anthropologists studying cultures in which gender is not necessarily a dichotomy married sex or gender, such as several Pacific cultures; the Bugis in Indonesia, and berdaches in some Native American cultures (Alexeyeff and Besnier 2014, Davies 2007 and Roscoe 1998).

As a result of various grounding criticisms such as those made by minority feminist anthropologists, and criticisms that woman-studying-women was just as ineffective as man-studying-men, feminist anthropology (and by extension, anthropology as a whole) has maintained its forward motion (Anderson-Levy 2012) and has evolved into more than just studying women from women's perspective. Moore argues that feminist anthropology has moved beyond the 'anthropology of women' to now study gender and gender relations in the wider context of society such as race, class, age and sexuality (Anderson-Levy 2012, Moore 1988). This wider scope of feminist anthropology has influenced the emergence of other disciplines within social anthropology. One of these 'other' anthropologies is the anthropology of gender. According to Moore (1988:3949) the anthropology of gender is centred on "gender identity and the cultural construction of gender" and she argues that without the advancement of feminist anthropology, the anthropology of gender wouldn't have existed. Feminist anthropology, however has moved on from the study of women and the critiquing of male bias to its third wave, focusing not on gender and its cultural construction but "interpreting the place of gender in broader patterns of meaning, interaction and power" (Lewin 2006:20). It is through the third wave of feminist anthropology that the discipline has maintained a focus on identity and difference. Looking at women as all the same (as early anthropologists did) created a problem of primacy (Moore 1988:4124), which was unproductive in the sense that anthropology is about recognising cultural difference (Moore 1988:4102). By placing gender above other aspects of culture, one runs the risk of overlooking other aspects.

A form of anthropology that would not have proliferated without the advent of feminist anthropology is the anthropology of men. This is a somewhat reflexive category as it deals with the study of men and masculinities as men singularly, rather than as 'mankind'. In her lecture on engendering knowledge, Pat Caplan argues that masculinity needs to be problematized and studied in the context of gender (Caplan 1988). Feminist anthropology was the catalyst for the anthropology of men and masculinities, now a subset of anthropology in itself, and has a wealth of literature on different types of masculinities and surrounding themes (Besnier and Alexeyeff 2014, Cornwall and Lindis 1994, Connell 2005, Geller and Stockett 2006).

Over its history, feminist anthropology has made significant contributions towards anthropology as a whole, as well as to the broader social sciences (Moore 1988). In this essay, I have outlined the contributions to feminist anthropology as made specifically towards social anthropology, and explained their importance. The first wave of feminist anthropology, or the 'anthropology of women' sought to provide a women's perspective in what was at the time a very male dominated discipline. It also sought to remove and

deconstruct the three tiers of male bias associated with the social sciences. The second wave of feminist anthropology redefined the concepts of sex and gender. The former referred to biological differences of men and women while the latter referred to the cultural construction of gender, as definitions of 'man' and 'woman' varied across different cultures. Third wave feminism criticised the early views of first wave anthropologists, arguing that they had a similar bias. This kept the discipline grounded, and catalysing its expansion to the study of the difference between women and men across cultures, while maintaining gender as a part social life rather than the primary aspect. The broadening of the discipline allowed for study of men qua men, as well as 'other' masculinities that, without feminist anthropology, would not have existed.

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From Rhetorics to Writing

Jemma Dixon

The Rhetorics of Gendered Writing: A Technology that Restructures Feminist Consciousness

"To write, or read, or think, or to enquire,
Would cloud our beauty, and exhaust our time,
And interrupt the conquests of our prime,
Whilst the dull manage of a servile house
Is held by some our utmost art and use."

- Anne Finch, Countess of Winchelsea

In order to address the question of whether there is a difference in women's writing in terms of its rhetorical stance and writing practices, this essay seeks to explore this question through an analysis of women's writing against more general rhetorical traditions, both in theory and in practice. By drawing contrasts and similarities between the theoretical texts of Walter Ong's (2003) 'Writing is a Technology that Restructures Thought, Aristotle's Rhetoric (c.4th century BC), and with a contemporary interview by Megan Carpentier from Bitch Magazine 'Feminism isn't supposed to be fun' (2016), it becomes evident that there are differences in the ways men and women occupy the rhetorical stance. This is often revealed through the position the speaker or writer inhabits in relation to the reader or to the audience, and via the relationship they have with their argument. This essay will address Aristotle's ethical and sociological perspective of society in relation to more modern forms of women's writing, and consider Ong's recognition that our response to the rhetorical stance develops out of the technology of writing – leading us to realise that our consciousness is at once limited - and yet freed, by writing.

Further, I will briefly draw upon the work of Hélène Cixous, specifically engaging with her essay The Laugh of the Medusa, (and with the reception of her essay) to reveal that the cultural and political underpinnings that shape women's rhetoric and writing are similar, yet acutely different to the way men present a rhetoric that shapes culture, society, and politics. This is largely because, historically, rhetoric has influenced and imposed constraints upon the female body and voice. As Thomas Hardy's novel Far from the Madding Crowd articulates, "It is difficult for a woman to define her feelings in a language that is chiefly made by men to express theirs." Women's writing and the rhetorical stance, then, seeks to re-claim and re-assert agency and voice.

An essay by Laura Alexander, entitled Hélène Cixous and the Rhetoric of Feminine Desire: Re-Writing the Medusa, comments that Cixous' work The Laugh of the Medusa is a feminist advocation for women who are often conceived of as objects to instead be conceived of as subjects, not as voices that are mere "ends" or "parts" of a "self". Writing the self therefore insists that the 'actual' and the 'signifier' woman "transform both language and social constraints." This allows women to break free from linguistic objectification,

where women are written about and conceived in masculine rhetoric. Alexander emphasises that Cixous and other feminist writers like Luce Irigaray utilise female sexuality as a kind of modern feminine rhetoric, where feminism can be expressed culturally, politically, and linguistically. Furthermore, as Hélène Cixous writes of the woman rhetorician: "Writing is working, being worked; questioning (in) the between (letting oneself be questioned)"; the woman "is a whole... made up of parts... that are not simple, partial objects..." Cixous' comment of the women as the 'object' allows for the interconnection of theoretical and contemporary feminist text through an assessment of the politicised female body, emphasising Susanne Clark's concern that: "rhetoric has been suspect because persuasion seems separable from truth", but it is also "allied with strategies of domination, with hierarchies of male-female, master-slave... As feminism unsettles certainties, it also speaks from a position of commitment." This position is critically aware that, like the feminine body that is highly politicised and scrutinised, women's writing (about women's issues) is often undercut yet supported by a 'masculine' rhetoric in a way that can detract from the point of rhetoric or argument.

Carpentier's interview with Andi Zeisler, the founder of one of America's largest feminist magazines and author of We Were Feminists Once, makes an inadvertent contemporary analysis on the idea that feminist concerns are often undermined by a patriarchal rhetoric that re-directs our attention in order to reconceptualise feminism as being inherently tied with the body -- despite our knowing that feminism works best intersectionally and that feminism is noticeably linked with political identity. Here, Zeisler comments on the status of feminism whilst inadvertently highlighting the way in which rhetoric operates. Clarke insists that "Feminism can provide a model for rhetoric that addresses its doubly flawed relation to the history of modern reason." We see this very clearly in Zeisler's interview; she is asked how second-wave feminism induced the personal to become political, and comments that the ability to wax and wear makeup (past and presently), came to be construed as a political act that supposedly showed a submission to or rebellion against patriarchy.

Interestingly, whereas Aristotle's Rhetoric anatomises human behaviour by separating human emotion into categories by defining them antithetically, and by splitting argument into Pathos, Ethos, and Logos - in the modern world, we see the female body become an increasingly sexualised and politicised space that, too, is split, categorised and scrutinised. One only has to look at Jean Kilbourne's Killing Us Softly lecture series to see how the media, with its own codes and language of rhetoric, places socio-cultural and political expectations upon both men and women. This method of gendered media

is effectively shaping a consciousness by portraying the 'ideal' body as one that is represented in fragmentation. Whereas in Aristotle's Rhetorics, where we see aspects of human psychology and cognitive processes being played into in order to effect strong reactions from rhetoric to persuade, a modernistic reading of Zeisler's concerns of the state of feminism would emphasis Walter Ong's ideas that different mediums (such as film and media) shape the process of communication and consciousness restructuring. Thus, this impacts our cognition and reception to the ideas being communicated. Modernistically, the body can be read as a site of and for politics, and as a place that can be utilised to shape and then to direct political thought which will, in-turn, influence cognition regarding a rhetoric that is framed by the body. How much autonomy and agency do we have when we construct our own feminist identity, particularly if structural and systemic patriarchy and media is shaping the way we relate to our 'owned' feminism, sexuality, and identity? Can women's writing become the site of and for politics rather than our bodies? As the wonderful bell hooks writes, "As all advocates of feminist politics know most people do not understand sexism or if they do they think it is not a problem. Masses of people think that feminism is always and only about women seeking to be equal to men. And a huge majority of these folks think feminism is anti-male. Their misunderstanding of feminist politics reflects the reality that most folks learn about feminism from patriarchal mass media."

Zeisler's interview taps into bell hook's awareness by addressing the way in which women's bodies are written and politicised; inadvertently emphasising that female rhetoric tends to be silenced by centralising arguments around the body. Zeisler's humourous analysis where she writes: "The idea that we never see a man write a piece like 'Does My Back, Sack and Crack Wax Betray My Marxism?", becomes very revealing of the differences in the topic and reception of rhetoric and the rhetorical stance for men and women. The fact that we do not see men engaging in these bodily ideas in quite the same way suggests that women's writing, by necessity, must differ in its rhetorical stance, and even more so if the writing concerns feminist thought. Many readers of the above 'Marxist bodily comment' would likely laugh at this statement, myself included, but on closer inspection – it is a reality that altering the female body through waxing and makeup can be (very wrongfully) associated with betraying feminism – making it prudent for the feminist rhetorical stance to become dialectically stronger so that the audience can relate and connect with the rhetoric via content, ethics, and with the truth of the message – that feminism seeks to end sexist oppression; feminism doesn't care about hair or the lack of it.

On the other hand, the rhetorical stance of a constant need to re-affirm the legitimacy of feminist 'ideology' shows how the focalisation of the politicised female body detracts from both Ethos, Pathos and Logos, which directly impacts and detracts from the argument of feminist rhetoric in the first place. This realisation forces us to draw comparison to male politics and male argument in order to show how men and women's writing differs, and this difference is likely to arise as a result of men and women being perceived as different types of political beings. If the same rhetoric does not apply to men and women with representations of the body connecting with ideology (like with the loose definitions of Marxism or Feminism), perhaps this is an indication that persuasion can become separable from truth because of established socio-cultural hierarchies within the gender binary. As Zeisler notes, a nuanced analysis of feminism drowns feminist rhetoric in questions like: "Is Beyoncé a feminist because she's not wearing any pants 90% of the time?" which she says is not helpful in assessing why we need feminism, nor in establishing what feminism is. This kind of rhetoric is going to be heard the loudest, possibly because, as Aristotle would argue, these questions (like the enthymeme; a form of deductive argument or syllogism) appeals to what the audience wants to hear, read, or discuss. Coincidentally or not, our attention is being diverted and directed in ways that appeal to those who hold high positions of political power and who wield this power through the language of legislation and everyday sexism. Women's language and writing, however, differs from older rhetorical traditions in the sense that the topic of concern (such as feminism) has not commonly been represented in rhetoric as a 'Man's issue'. Women's writing shares the desire to articulate and express ideas in the same way that men's writing seeks to appeal to authority (ethos), pathos (emotion), and logos (logic). However, this rhetoric is often undercut by receptions of the argument becoming geared towards side issues that are not of direct relevance to the argument itself - as we have seen with the Beyoncé comment.

To refer to Walter Ong's Writing is a Technology that Restructures Thought, Ong makes it clear that our thought processes develop and grow from the technology of writing and media. Without it, our minds would not think the way they do, nor would they conceive of the world in the same way – particularly by association with the 'signified' (object) and the 'signifier' (word association). As Ong argues, technologies are manifestations of consciousness, not merely exterior aids. If we assume that writing induces and produces a state of mind where knowledge can manifest into an 'object' that is separate from the knower, this assumption certainly sheds light on the status of women's writing practice and its rhetorical stance, specifically with regards to how

women resist 'masculine' rhetorical landscapes and objectification by re-writing their own narratives of self-agency into a new rhetoric. This creates a means of communication where women can conceive themselves as more than just 'objects' to be written of; they can re-write themselves into subjects.

To return once more to Hélène Cixous' The Laugh of the Medusa, we see that Cixous makes comment on the woman as the 'object', as she places the woman analogous to the signifier, saying that "the signifier woman transform[s] both language and social constraints". If this is a statement that seeks to subvert and to re-claim the woman from object to subject, in alignment with Ong's predications and with Zeisler's feminist interview, this reaffirms Ong's metaphorical idea that human knowledge requires and demands both closeness and distance. Since writing is highly metaphysical in the way it distances the knower from the known, it can heighten consciousness at the same time as meaning (which shapes consciousness) can be lost in translation at the end of an utterance, or at the end of a dialogic chain of meaning. This is made obvious where Zeisler makes a generalised statement claiming that "men do not tend to have to defend their personal, physical or sexual choices as political ones", unlike women as we have seen through the parody of the body with Marxism. This statement thus distances the identified male from the speaker whilst it brings the connected female audience closer to the rhetoric. In doing so, it reemphasises Ong's conception that writing enhances abstract, detached, and logical thinking - ways of thinking that have stereotypically been associated with masculinity. Accordingly, we can infer that writing is gendered via associations and stereotyping.

Human writing can become gendered writing, and although the subject matter regarding feminism has historically been closer to women, modernistically feminism is for both genders, and we do see men engaging in discourse that shows that they too are impacted by patriarchy. Perhaps the question is not so much: "How does women's writing compare with older rhetorical traditions?", but more: "How far has a masculine rhetorical structure that has partially shaped language been subverted by women or gender non-conforming writers, and how does a resistance or alteration of an approach to rhetorical tradition impact the reception of an argument?" It is evident that there are similarities and differences in the employment and reception of rhetoric that are informed by rhetorical stance. Indeed, modern feminist discourse employs rhetoric that is akin to Aristotle's theorisation of what makes an argument persuasive. Moreover, Ong's argument that "writing exists in the context of struggle, in an unreal, unnatural (artificial) world" shows Zeisler's point – which is that rhetoric asks the (often unreal) 'what if' questions, and it is this rhetoric that separates people from understanding realistic interpretations of the communication. Women's writing, like all forms of writing, is a bid to communicate ideas

and rhetoric – it does so in ways that at once follow and subvert older rhetorical traditions because, naturally, the subject matter (the signified and the signifier) are fundamentally different issues to those of men's issues, especially in reference to feminist perspectives. As Hannah Woolley declares, "Vain man is apt to think we were merely intended for the world's propagation, and to keep its human inhabitants sweet and clean; but by their leaves, had we the same Literature, he would find our brains as fruitful as our bodies."

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Human Sexuality

Alex de Vries

Queer Studies in Anthropology: Challenging a Universal Western Queerness

Queer Studies is a growing area of scholarship that encompasses many different fields of the social sciences. Queer Studies has delved into what constitutes queerness, what shapes the queer experience and what value queer experiences can have in pluralistic societies. Boellstorff (2007) argues, however, that Queer Studies is fundamentally flawed by a number of its core biases and assumptions, primarily because it developed as a discipline through a distinctly US-Anglo-centric lens, which impacted the language used in queer scholarship (including the word queer itself), the direction and areas of research, and even who was allowed to conduct research into queer theory. This essay aims to explore Boellstorff's assertion and his demand for a more diverse approach to Queer Studies, expressing his notion that participant-observation, ethnography and methodologies are of strict importance in reshaping the discipline. This essay draws on research from China, South Africa and Australia to express how Boellstorff's argument is made concrete, expressing how different approaches to understanding queer experience help to shape and reshape our conception of queer realities. This provides a challenge to the hegemonic domination of the West in queer scholarship.

Boellstorff (2007) noted particular features of Queer Studies that resonated throughout the field in his landmark text Queer Studies in the House of Anthropology. In particular, Boellstorff (2007) was able to paint a picture of Queer Studies as being largely androcentric (focussed heavily on male queer experience) and also as being heavily influenced by the biases and assumptions of the English speaking world. The history of the discipline is of importance here. Queer Studies emerged as an offshoot of Feminist Theory, which challenged normative gender patterns and structures (Boellstorff, 2007). Perhaps the idea of Queer Studies emerged from the acknowledgement that non-normative sexualities exist within societies, and that this was a reality that ought to be studied. Furthermore, Queer Studies proved its relevance in challenging the gender binaries that dictate Western political discourse through the study of transgenderism (Boellstorff, 2007). However, Boellstorff (2007) picked up on an important flaw in the institutionalised approach to Queer Studies that limited the scope and validity of the research it produced; whoever conducted this research, what areas were researched and what perspectives were valued was almost aggressively enforced through the US-Anglo dominance in queer scholarship. The perspectives of theorists from outside this cultural sphere, who employed a different language of transmitting completed research, was generally relegated to obscure or unpopular publications. Consequently, the research that was conducted into other cultures' queer identities was largely shaped and informed by the US-Anglo conception of queerness. This disregarded the particular institutional forces (namely politics and economy), class, race and nation of different groups that shape their own unique idea of queerness,

a localised queerness of sorts (Boellstorff, 2007). Nonetheless, his article showed that there has been a significant movement away from this model; different cultural and language groups have stressed the importance of scholarship from their own perspectives and worldview to understand how non-Western lesbian and gay identities are "legitimate forms of selfhood" (Boellstorff, 2007 (22)). This scholarship also shows how globalisation allows non-local ideas of sexuality to be refashioned into different cultural contexts, and that sexuality and gender do not exist on their own but are intrinsically linked to race, class and nation (termed intersectionality) (Boellstorff, 2007).

In reinforcing Boellstorff's argument, Engebretsen (2008) identifies the role that ethnographic methodology plays in shaping anthropology's role in queer scholarship. Engebretsen (2008), like Boellstorff, criticises the idea that the West's ideas are universal ideas and expresses that gay identities are not homogenous. In her analysis, she contradicts the universality of the Western queer narrative of publicly coming out and identifying as a queer individual, particularly in her ethnographic studies in China (Engebretsen, 2008). She argues that a shift in scholarship will come about through accepting a diversity of methodologies and theoretical paradigms. This does not mean rejecting US-Anglo research approaches, but accepting the validity of approaches that do not conform to these institutionalised norms (Engebretsen, 2008). She stresses the importance of ethnography and participant-observation in coming to understand the particular social and cultural frameworks that shape a community's conception of queerness and queer identity, and to develop community-based narratives of queer experience as shaped by race, culture, politics and historical context, much like Boellstorff's stressing of the importance of intersectionality (Engebretsen, 2008).

Through her ethnography in China, she identified that in this particular community at this particular time, queer identity is shaped by a rapidly developing China, a political discourse on good citizenship, a past of state-sponsored violence and censorship towards queer communities and the traditional value of saving face in terms of family honour (Engebretsen, 2008). This is a markedly different convergence of circumstances when compared to US white, male queer identities during a similar period. Where in the West experience of self and identity are framed by a liberal philosophy, in this particular Chinese community, experience of self comes from a different philosophical foundation. Consequently, through ethnography and participant-observation, the Western narrative of queerness is disrupted by painting a picture from a very different perspective; it identifies that a different queer experience came to be constituted in a different way to that of the West, namely by the convergence of this multiplicity of factors.

Tucker's (2009) research in South Africa further reinforces Boellstorff's argument by examining a gay culture that appears inherently Western on the outside, but is shaped by a different convergence of factors than experienced in the West. Namely, a racially segregated history which led to the emergence of two distinct gay subcultures in Cape Town, divided by race and class. In the case of Cape Town, when the apartheid regime fell, the city tried to create an image of inclusiveness of all races and sexualities (Tucker, 2009). The reality, however, is that a racial divide exists within the gay community, made manifest by coloured men being denied entry into Cape Town's gay village, which is predominantly white (Tucker, 2009). In this article, Tucker (2009) explores the idea of the white, gay patriarch in the South African context, showing that it is distinctly different to that of the American context. Despite this phenomenon occurring in the US as well, the South African experience is distinctly different, even though both countries have a history of racial division. For South Africa, as Tucker (2009) argues, this phenomenon occurs due to a convergence of two factors – a historical class divide between whites and coloured, and the segregated conditions of apartheid South Africa causing two distinctly different manifestations of queer behaviour to emerge. In terms of class divide, under apartheid, coloureds occupied a liminal position between white and black, and were treated accordingly by the ruling white class (Tucker, 2009). Ultimately this created a lingering image of coloureds as being unclassy in general, and, in trying to maintain the reputation and up-market façade of the gay village, coloureds were generally not permitted to enter gay bars to preserve this appearance despite apartheid having ended (Tucker, 2009). Furthermore, with coloured people generally not having the same access to economic advancement that white people can attain, the gay village has marked up its prices to economically exclude the coloured community, thus creating an exclusive up-market queer culture that poorer non-white peoples cannot partake in (Tucker, 2009).

The second factor emerged through the racial segregation of apartheid. During apartheid, the white population lived in a highly regulated homogenous society which created an image of white masculinity as the preferred means of queer expression. The coloured population lived in a society diverse in religion, language and culture, allowing a more feminine queer identity to emerge, even to the point of cross-dressing (Tucker, 2009). In the coloured community, faced with such diversity, such a way of life was generally accepted. It is on account of this, too, that racial division within the gay community has emerged, as queer identities are not uniform, and two distinct subcultures have developed. In keeping with Boellstorff's argument, Tucker has shown vividly how power dynamics, historical context and a wider social psychology have helped to shape queer identities and division in post-apartheid South Africa, an insight that would not have been gained had these factors been ignored. The importance of considering these factors is

of intrinsic value to the advancement of Queer Studies as a discipline, and perhaps provide a means of checking the validity and universality of the following research by Wilkinson, Bittman, et al.

Through their research in the Australian gay community, particularly the online gay community, Wilkinson, Bittman, et al, (2012) argued that gay men use social media to build relationships beyond sex; particularly seeking friendship to create their own personal communities, by selecting friends who share class, gender, race and history. This helps gay men to constitute their own identity, as it is argued that gay men constitute their identity more through their friendships than through their family relations (Wilkinson, Bittman, et al, 2012). This paints a picture of gay men in the West as building their identities through their own personal communities that they themselves create, rather than through the social relations and institutions that they were born into. Where Boellstorff's article becomes relevant, however, is in addressing the extent of this research and its applicability to non-Western (and even non-Australian) societies. The study was conducted in Australia, a developed Western country, with only three subjects being non-native English speakers. Consequently, while this study proves useful in understanding a particular cultural construction of queer identity, it cannot be claimed to be universal, nor can it be claimed to reflect the construction of identity for immigrant communities in Australia. The study, as Boellstorff would argue, is limited in its assumption of uniformity amongst the English speaking world and universality of gay experience and identity construction. The study fails to consider the idea of intersectionality, which Boellstorff stresses as important, in understanding the various histories, racial backgrounds and classes of participants. By considering all of these factors, this research could have been greatly improved.

Boellstorff argues against the supremacy of the US-Anglo-centric approach to Queer Studies that has shaped the discipline from its inception, stressing the importance of considering the various converging factors that face various communities in constructing particular queer identities. This essay has effectively shown, through examples from China, South Africa and Australia, how building a universal narrative of queer identity is intrinsically flawed; factors such as class, race and power dynamics ought to be considered. Furthermore, this essay has shown that queer identities are not uniform even within a single society, as in the study on South Africa, which challenges the predominant discourse of uniform queerness. By stressing the importance of ethnography and participant-observation, this essay has shown how anthropology becomes central to developing Queer Studies. More importantly, it has shown how anthropology can express the value of diverse worldviews and methodologies in shifting the approach to Queer Studies as a whole, thus debunking the hegemonic Western domination of the discipline.

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Families, Labour and Love

Sharnika Leleni

Nostalgic nuclear family goals leading to the reality of diverse family forms.

In the last ten years same- sex relationships and ways of life have been at the height of discussion. The attention this issue has been given in New Zealand has allowed same sex couples to transform from having no legal rights in 1999 to being able to commit to their partner through the previously heterosexual celebration of marriage in 2013. Marriage, along with childbearing and childrearing by same sex couples, has significantly changed how we perceive the family form. Although it may take another fifteen years for same- sex families to become a prevalent family form, this essay will assert that same sex families, while trying to fit into the nuclear family are disintegrating it subconsciously. Allowing us to have a broader definition of what 'family' means outside of this one nostalgic form.

Continuous fight against heteronormative pressures in regard to same- sex marriage

Many academic sources have been written at and after the time New Zealand legislated the 'civil union', which allowed the formal recognition of homosexual couples. Many people voiced that this was of 'second class status' because of the difference to marriage (Baker & Elizabeth, 2012). Now that legislation has been changed to include same sex couples in the definition of people able to get married, it would be a realistic assumption that they now have equal status with heterosexual couples. Legally this may be accurate, however, socially, the older generations find it harder to accept and integrate this idea with their very holistic, traditional view of a marriage between a man and a woman. Through research a theme has developed that marriage stands as having a symbolic meaning for both opposite and same- sex couples (Baker & Elizabeth, 2014). Many couples "want to make public their already private commitment... in order to have their relationship celebrated and acknowledged as permanent by family, friends and the state" (Baker & Elizabeth, 2014, p. 395). Including same- sex into the definition of marriage is seen as a step forward but an issue that arises from this is that same- sex families are continuously trying to be forced into heteronormative ways (Baker & Elizabeth, 2012). The onset of this begins with marriage through the traditional, Christian means but continues on to childbearing and rearing reflecting the need for a nuclear family. Both of these aspects influence same- sex families to try to be as 'normal' as they can, but by trying to do this they are unknowingly changing the definition of normal in regards to the family. There is great legal recognition of same sex individuals in regards to marriage, however their social recognition is lacking.

Developing Individual and Secular society in regard to same- sex marriage

Individuals are continuously being seen as individualistic and no longer adhering to traditional or historic ways of behaving. I assert that the emergence of same- sex marriage is linked to this. The idea that 'standardised weddings were a thing of the past' was shown in studies and research performed by Baker & Elizabeth (2014, p. 399). Majority of weddings are no longer held in a church, have little or no Christian connotations and do not mention aspects related to the gendered division of labour (Baker & Elizabeth, 2012). The development of the marriage being a more secular ideal reinforces the trend in resources of the knowledge that marriage now has more of a symbolic grounding for both heterosexual and homosexual couples (Baker, 2010). The development of same- sex marriage in relation to trends is that they are seen to be more equal with heterosexual couples because the norms that they 'violate' are grounded in religion. As society becomes more secular, the deep-rooted idea that unorthodox sexual orientations are 'wrong' is diminishing. This creates a space for same- sex couples to have more social recognition as another acceptable way of life. The idea that homosexual couples have been having more choice in being able to marry and do it in a way suitable for them may encourage heterosexual marriages to have a rising trend. Over the last five years, many Western countries except Australia have legislated the right for homosexual couples to marry. Although there are limited resources on this possibility, it may become prevalent that this discussion of the high importance of marriage to homosexual people may re- light the flame to more heterosexual couples becoming married also. Therefore the progressing legal advancements of homosexual people are, through individualization, transferring into social advancements. This, in turn, could also place a deeper emphasis back on the marriage of parents in the family structure.

Media, Medical Science and whether the perceived nuclear family is a realistic outcome for same- sex families

Media has informed many same- sex couples that they are able to have children. Murphy (2013) noted that many individuals who were homosexual accepted the engrained stigma that they would be childless (p. 1113). However, through research it has shown the view that many of these individuals and couples were enlightened by media either reaching out to them or noticing adverts allowing them to envision that it was possible through medical means. Childbearing is being changed with the introduction of medical science. There are many scholarly debates whether this stigmatizes the need and want for a nuclear family, or force our meaning of family to advance past this nuclear family nostalgia (Baker, 2005). Same- sex families

do not conform to the 'nuclear family form' as there are not opposite sex parents. It could be seen that they strive to be still as close as possible to this 'norm' and the next plausible step is having a child. In other words, to have children also brings them closer to the 'normal' heterosexual nuclear family, which further normalizes their sexual orientation (Baker, 2005, p. 536.) Baker's argument as noted in her title is whether medically assisted conception revolutionizes and changes family or perpetuates the nuclear model. Within her writing it seems that many couples that try surrogacy or medically inflicted pregnancy are trying to gain traditional goals by contemporary means (Baker, 2005, p. 538). The emergence of same sex childbearing has highlighted the high threshold the historically entrenched 'ideal' nuclear family form encompasses. Individuals are willing to go to lengths to try and create this type of family form through non- natural means. Many sociologists (Albury, Franklin, Van Dyck) highlight that in this developing individualized world this medical endeavor creates more choice and flexibility of childbearing (Baker, 2005, p. 523). This aims to 'normalize' this type of reproduction technology even though it is clearly not the natural biological process (Baker, 2005). The level of persuasion the ideal of the nuclear family form has on the minds of individuals in society can be seen here as very, very influential.

However this hope for a nuclear, traditional family slowly seems more impossible and I assert it is only a matter of time before people 'wake up' to this realization and accept the family having plural forms with varying different shapes and sizes. Although Baker (2005) indicates views that the nuclear family is still becoming the prevalent goal of attainment for same- sex families there are alternate debates. Van Eeden- Moorefield et al (2011) retaliates this by stating "there is actually great diversity in same- sex relationships" (p. 562). This reinforces my thesis statement that although the nuclear family form may be the goal as enforced by Baker, it is not the realistic outcome. The consideration that homosexual people have different experiences therefore their families may be different than fitting the 'heternormative standards' is neglected by the rest of society and is bias (Van Eeden- Moorefield et al, 2011).

Acceptance of same- sex families equals acceptance of differing family forms

Social recognition of same sex families equals as social recognition of various family forms and acceptance of them. As social recognition of same sex families are increasingly becoming more acceptable they do not however conform to heterosexual norms such as the nuclear family as shown through my essay. Through research it seems apparent that blood ties are an

important indicator, and have been historically. Baker and Elizabeth (2014) exclaimed that it is not necessary kinship that is important but the physical resemblance in the child that is the needed connection between parent and child. This is an indicator of why surrogacy is a popular medical source of providing parenthood (Murphy, 2013). As same sex couples and individuals mainly use surrogacy, it is allowing heterosexual individuals who cannot biologically conceive to not be as stigmatized. Allowing the social recognition of same- sex families to be viewed equally with some heterosexual individuals here. This indicates that our understanding of the family being informed by same- sex families acknowledges characteristic traits being similar rather than whether the bloodline is continued. Goode, in Skolnick et al (2014), states that the family has been continuously disintegrating and the "family is on its way out" (p. 15). However it seems from Baker and Elizabeth's numerous writings that our understanding of the family is merely changing form due to ideals such as same- sex marriage and medically born children, rather than diminshing (2012, 2014). Goode (2009) goes on to discuss how since childhood the ideal of family is taught to us through socialization therefore it is normal to possess a need to conform to these norms (p. 15).

Marriage has operated as a site of discrimination and prejudice for homosexual people so it is important that we should not try and keep the definition of the family form as nuclear (Gerber & Sifris, 2010). This is further pushing people who have a 'different' sexual orientation into isolation from mainstream society. If society can come to a realization that our modern world will encompass different forms, same- sex couples and family will truly be seen as equal. Until then, same- sex families will still be regarded as outside of the four walls of the family institution.

Throughout literature it has been repeated that there is mourning for the loss of the potential "storybook perfect" life that one who is homosexual cannot have (McCubbin et al, 1999, p. 77). This being said, through Baker's work it is clear that although this 'storybook life' is hindered they are still adamant on trying to conform to norms. As they produce children who are seen as 'normal' they are creating families and a family form other than the norm. Although this may be a subconscious choice to depart from norms, it is nevertheless changing how we perceive family.

"The task of understanding the family presents many difficulties, and one of the greatest barriers is found in ourselves." (Skolnick et al, 2014).
We need to accept the ideal of more variety in the family form and conclude the nostalgia of the need for a nuclear, stereotypical family.

Throughout this essay I have found numerous themes appearing. Same-sex marriage may allow homosexual people to be equal in the law but this also poses the issue that society is trying to make them conform to heterosexual normative ways. Marriage that is held in high importance to many homosexual people may inflict a trend for a rise in marriage in mainstream society. The social recognition of same-sex families is being seen through the legal advancements of marriage and childbearing through medical means. Overall, our understanding of the family is influenced and instructed by these advancements as being a continuously changing, dynamic system. We are in a period of transition, a period of continuing acceptance and openness. Perhaps there is an indicator of what the future may look like through this research. I do not believe my children and their children will have a 'normal' family entrenched in their socialization any longer. The nuclear family nostalgia might, ultimately, cease to exist.

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Anthropology 321

Equality and Inequality

Maja Kubicka

Female Selective Abortion: A Dichotomy Between North and South India

"May he elsewhere afford the birth of a female, but here he shall bestow a man!"

Ancient Indian Proverb

Son preference is one of the strongest manifestations of gender inequality in Southeast Asia. Son preference is the underlying cause for female selective abortions (FSA) and childhood female neglect in countries such as India, Pakistan, China and Korea, where a growing distortion of sex ratios favouring boys over girls has been documented over the last century (Kumar, 2012). India is of particular interest as gender equality is dichotomized between the North and the South. Northern provinces have high rates of FSA and distorted birth sex ratios, whereas southern provinces have markedly lower rates of FSA and maintain biologically neutral birth sex ratios (Kumar, 2012). In this essay I will explore the contrasts in kinship systems and marriage customs between North and South Indian societies that lie at the root of son preference in India. I argue that in Northern India the traditional practice of marital exogamy, patrilocal residence and dowry payments are the main contributing factors to son preference and female selective abortions. By contrast in the more egalitarian Southern India, marital endogamy, nuclear family structure and bridewealth payments promote relatively greater gender equality and lower rates of son preference and female selected abortions.

The natural birth sex ratio as demonstrated in Western countries is approximately 995 girls for 1000 boys (Pande, 2007). Over the past century, Indian sex ratios have shown a continual decline from 972 girls in 1901 to 933 girls in 2001 (Pande, 2007). Whilst the natural balance of sex ratios has remained relatively stable in southern India, northern India is responsible for the vast majority of the national decline; provinces such as Punjab and Haryana have reached a striking ratio of 874 and 861 girls for 1000 boys, respectively (Kumar, 2012). The explanation for this phenomenon is two-fold. Firstly, the past few decades have seen a dramatic increase in FSA attributed to improved access and availability of ultrasonography (Kumar, 2012). Despite the 1994 Prenatal Diagnostics Testing Act which banned prenatal screening in India, profit-driven private clinics are rarely monitored and the practice continues to be widespread, particularly in the Northern provinces (Bose, 2006). Secondly, the imbalance in sex ratios can also be accounted for by the increased rate in girl childhood mortality, particularly in the 0-6 age group, as a result of reduced access for girls to food and healthcare services as compared with boys (Pande, 2007). "Northern India has the dubious honour of being one of the few regions in the world where under 5 mortality rates are higher for girls than boys in spite of their biological advantage" (Sengupta, 2002:318). Female selected abortions and female childhood

neglect are direct consequences of India's discriminatory preference for son heirs.

Medical terminations and sterilizations have been popular in India since the 1950's (Kumar, 2012). India legalized abortion in 1972 with the passage of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, allowing abortion of a foetus up to twenty weeks if foetal abnormalities were present or if the mother was at risk of physical and/or mental harm, including by process of rape and contraception failure (Bose, 2006). Ethnographic studies on contraceptive behaviour show that abortion is seen in Indian society in a relatively positive light as women believe that the practice of 'Safai' enhances the quality of future fertility and future children. 'Safai', the Hindi word for abortion, directly translates to 'cleansing of the womb' (Kumar, 2012:158). Particularly in the Northern provinces, women prefer abortion to contraception as a means of birth control. It allows them to space their children whilst avoiding the shame of intra-martial 'sex-talk' necessary for the procurement of contraceptive devices (Kumar, 2012). An estimated 5-7 million abortions are performed yearly in India, with most of these taking place under unhygienic conditions accounting for 10-20% of India's maternal mortality rate (Bose, 2006). With the introduction of prenatal ultrasonography screening in India, sex selective abortions have become a more widely accepted method of controlling family composition (Bose, 2006). Ethnographic studies demonstrate that a vast majority of north Indian women approve of sex-selective abortions; data from the late 1990's shows that more than 100,000 female selective abortions were being performed annually in India (Arnold, 2002).

North India

The dichotomous regional pattern of female selective abortions and birth sex ratios in India can be roughly divided into north and south by the contours of the Saptura hillrange (Dyson, 1983). The northern provinces of Punjab, Haryana, Gujarat, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh represent the lowest levels of female autonomy and highest prevalence of son preference in India, whereas the southern provinces of Karala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka represent relatively high levels of female autonomy and lower levels of son preference (Dyson, 1983). This regional division in gender inequality is primarily based on historical differences in kinship systems and marriage customs. Male dominance is rooted in north India's practice of patrilocal residence and marital exogamy (Derne, 1994). Brides are removed from their natal villages and enter previously-unknown marital households where they are expected to be subservient to their husband and parents in law. They have limited rights on household decision making, minimal control over economic resources and are excluded from property

inheritance (Sengupta, 2002). As in-marrying females from outside villages, brides are often viewed as a threat and thus their behaviour is strictly monitored. Female sexuality is rigidly controlled as family honour and reputation rely on female chastity (Dyson, 1983). The segregation of the sexes in daily life is strictly enforced. Women are generally restricted in their freedom of personal movement and may only engage in socially acceptable employment such as teaching in girls' schools or nursing in female wards (Dyson, 1983). 'Wife-givers' are often from more socially inferior groups than 'wife-takers' as this practice reinforces women's subordination to the husband's family (Dyson, 1983:44). Women are often married before the legal age of eighteen as this facilitates resocialization under the authority of the new household and increases the period of potential heir production (Sengupta, 2002).

As women are expected to maintain minimal contact with their natal families, parents receive little help from their daughters after marriage. This form of kinship structure reinforces the reliance of parents on sons. Lineage and inheritance passes from fathers to sons as women are prohibited from property ownership (Sengupta, 2002). A woman's respect among her husband's kin is improved with the provision of male heirs (Dyson, 1983). As women depend exclusively on men for their livelihood, the death of a spouse in the absence of sons can be catastrophic. Sons are considered essential for securing a comfortable life for parents in their older years, whilst daughters represent a financial burden on account of dowry payments at the time of marriage (Dyson, 1983). The transfer-out of daughters from natal groups into patrilocal households, the financial expenditure from dowry payments, and the invariable dependence on sons for long-term economic security are the underlying reasons for son preference in northern India. The consequences of son preference in northern India are manifested as growing rates of FSA and persistently high girl childhood mortality rates. Young girls in northern India have disproportionately less access to education, food and healthcare than boys (Sengupta, 2002). These structural factors have led to the growing distortion of sex ratios in favour of boys in the northern provinces of India.

South India

In contrast to the practice of exogamous marriages and patrilocal kinship organization in northern India, southern India is characterized by endogamous cross-cousin marriages and more flexibility in kinship structure, as evidenced by the formation of nuclear families and pockets of matrilineal households (Bose, 2006). This fundamental difference in marriage customs allows women to marry into households close to their natal homes, thereby continuing close relations with their natal families and thus allowing for

more access to resources (Dyson, 1983). Furthermore, as households are more likely to be organized around nuclear families, women have greater decision making capacity and are more likely to be self-reliant (Sengupta, 2012). Another distinguishing feature is that burdensome dowry payments in the North are replaced by bridewealth payments in the South (Dyson, 1983). Moreover, families in the South are more likely to share the costs associated with weddings, at times even agreeing to bypass the ceremony entirely if the spouses are closely related (Dyson, 1983). There is relatively less subordination of the bride to her husband's kin as families are usually well known to each other and the 'wife-takers' and 'wife-givers' come from similar social backgrounds (Dyson, 1983). Women's chastity is less prized which allows for more freedom of movement and less restrictions on occupational choice. Women in rural south India represent a large part of the workforce in rice paddy fields, making them more economically valuable than women in the north who are excluded from agrarian work and remain relatively restricted to domestic work (Sengupta, 2012). Women in South India can inherit and transfer property rights, another significant feature of improved gender equality (Sengupta, 2012). Overall, women in South India enjoy higher autonomy and social status than women in North India. Demographic studies comparing women from South and North India demonstrate higher rates of literacy, education, labour force participation, increased age at marriage, smaller family size and lower levels of son preference among women in the southern provinces (Bose, 2006). Not surprisingly, young girls in South India experience higher odds of survival than young boys (Sengupta, 2012). As women remain close to their natal families after marriage with rights to property inheritance and prospects of financial self-reliance, parents no longer need to secure their future with male heirs. Ethnographic surveys from South India found that parents rely relatively equally on both sons and daughters for future security (Sengupta, 2002). Accordingly, the 1999 Indian National Family Health Survey (NFHS2) demonstrated that son preference was exhibited by 45% of north Indian women and only 12% of south Indian women (Bose 2006).

The role of religion in relation to son preference as a manifestation of gender inequality in India has been found to be of minimal relevance (Dyson, 1983). Despite surveys demonstrating slightly lower rates of abortions among Christians and Muslims than Hindus and Sikhs, regional differences between North and South India are thought to be long-standing, predating any religious infiltration (Bose, 2006). The dichotomy in kinship organization and marital customs likely reflects ancient differences between the northern Aryan and southern Dravidian cultures (Dyson, 1983).

Gender inequality as manifested by son preference is widespread across Southeast Asia. The example of dichotomized India provides us with unique insight to the structural foundations underlying this specific form of gender discrimination. Differences in kinship systems and marital customs between North and South India that favour patrilocal residence and marital exogamy form the basis of cultural dependence on son heirs. Marital endogamy and nuclear family structures protect women from childhood neglect and female selective abortions. Contrasting sex ratios in northern and southern provinces reflect this dichotomy in son preference. Unfortunately, the future will likely bring a greater imbalance of sex ratios in Southeast Asia as modernization will invariably result in pressures to reduce family size among cultures that continue to value sons over daughters.

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Criminology 202

Contemporary Issues in Punishment

Sapna Ghanatha

The Scars of the Systemically Oppressed Gender

Historically, crime and punishment has been gendered in society. This has resulted in the pervasiveness of a gendered criminal justice reform and prison systems that have been built to facilitate the male population. The traditional roles and perceptions of the female population suggests a paternalistic view on female offenders. Labelling becomes a central focus in defining the characteristics of women and subjugating them to a submissive and moral position in society. Women have no agency and autonomy under crime and punishment. In some instances, women are disregarded in the criminal justice system because of the traditional view that 'women cannot commit crime.' This essay will discuss the structural marginalisation of women within the criminal justice system and its theoretical underpinnings.

The theory of intersectionality explains why incarceration rates are higher for women of colour. These women are doubly marginalised because of their race and gender. The ideals of women and their characteristics are considered alongside the crime they commit. Many women are subjected to this double deviance where the crime is not the only factor when dealing with women and punishment; a women's character is also considered when women are put through the criminal justice system. This is because a 'morally dignified' woman would not commit crimes of petty theft or serious crimes. The social norms placed on women are central in understanding the role of women or the lack thereof within the criminal justice system. The gendered institutions from judges to police officers are dominated by men, therefore disadvantaging women who go through the criminal justice process. Prisons are built in order facilitate the needs of the male population and thus does not cater to the needs of the female prisoner. Female offenders are not only being disadvantaged in terms of the prison infrastructure but are also sexually objectified. This is invariably perpetuated through traditional perceptions of women in society.

The social norms of women in society are immensely gendered and operate within the male dominated social order. Carlen (2002, 4) suggests that when women are put through the criminal justice system, the notions pertaining to punishment and crime changes. They become more gendered and this reflects within the criminal justice system. This idea that women are incapable of committing any serious crimes that may harm others does not fit the social and moral roles of women. Lempert (2015, 5) exemplifies the historical typification of criminal women under the male criminal typification of 'cold-blooded' and 'ruthless' to justify the occurrence of female criminality. This reinforces the mainstream roles of women as submissive, nurturing and morally grounded. Female offenders are regarded as deviant not only for the crimes they have committed but also because they have deviated from the social norms Carlen (2002, 4).

The social norm that women cannot commit crime reflects in the consequence of women being treated as misguided victims. The blame gets placed on the social situation which leads to a variation in sentencing when it concerns women. A man may face a different punishment for the same crime committed but because the social norms fit within his gender roles, he is judged solely on the crime and not any other factor. Female criminality is viewed not only for the crimes they have committed but for also deviating from the female social conventions Lempert (2015, 5). The rhetoric in female criminality is subjected to a double deviant standard which, essentially leads to gendered punishments within the criminal justice system.

Intersectionality theory highlights the discourse not only with women as a marginalised group, but also looks at race as another factor of inequality. Female offenders of colour are subjected to double marginalisation because they face sexism and racism when confronted with the social dominant order Ocean (2013, 471). The growth in incarceration rates in the United States peaked in 2007, with a prison population of 7.3 million Die et al (2015, 1). The growth in the incarceration rates after the 1970s has also led to an increase in the incarceration rates for women of colour Ocean (2013, 472). Criminal justice system operates within the guidelines of the social dominant order, which is white, male and heterosexual. Women of colour do not fit within this dominant social order, and therefore they are greatly disadvantaged. The subordinate nature of their gender and their race reflect the intersectionality within the justice system. Ocean (2013, 472) suggests that incarceration rates being higher among women of colour socially disadvantages them further. It leads to a displacement in their communities as a consequence. Limitation on social services and resources also effect women of colour by placing them in vulnerable positons, as prison systems and criminal processes are gendered, white and hierarchical. This is due to the historical implementation of a white and patriarchal system of law and order in society Lempert (2013, 5). These underlying concepts become hegemonic within the criminal justice system. This results in the social control of a population that does not fit the dominant social order. The representation of women of colour is higher than white women in prison population, meaning that race and gender is a significant discourse within the criminal justice system and its processes.

The sexualisation of female prisoners is another central argument within the gendered nature of prison systems. Lempert (2013, 6) suggests that media representation of women is sexualised in the femme fatale ideal of criminal women. People may not see this representation outwardly but consume these representations through programmes like ‘Orange is the New Black.’ Cuklanz (2013, 32) links violence to masculinity and victimisation to

femininity in United States media representations. This reinforces Lemperts (2013, 6) argument on female prisoners portrayed as femme fatale because these women do not fit the social roles and conventions of 'normal' women in society. The consequence of portraying women as the femme fatale and sexually objectified categorises them under female criminal roles. This relates back to the argument that women are only capable of committing crime if they are depraved or work in a morally questionable field such as prostitution. The focus on the representation of violence in mass media emphasises masculine and feminine roles. Statistically, femininity places women in the role of a victim Cuklanz (2013 ,33). Women who disunite from those roles are seen through the male representations of criminality, which projects masculine traits upon females in the justice system. Cuklanz (2013, 32) indicates that feminist scholars have argued that the objectification of women in media encourages people to perceive women in degrading terms. This pervasive sexualisation also supports the objectification of women; therefore they become represented as sexual objects in society. This image is sensationalised and heightened in mass media outlets, especially for female offenders.

Invisibility of women in the criminal justice system has been extensive, as the system does not cater to their needs and experiences as opposed to their male counterparts. Beals (2004, 237) suggests that the Integrated Offender Management (IOM) policy does not cater to female offender needs, therefore the experiences of women in the prison system varies. Female offenders are more likely to experience psychological distress, have dependent children outside of the prison or are pregnant during their time in prison. Statistically women make up a small number of the prison population in New Zealand, and the gendered prison system does not account for the needs of women (Beals 2004, 237). Under the IOM system in New Zealand prisons, the assessment on prisoners reoffending is dependent on computerised scores. The result of these scores can often be gendered, as statistics indicate that men are more likely commit crime. Reoffending risk rates for women are often low; therefore they are not prioritised during treatment. Media representation of women is another contributing factor in the invisibility of women. George Gerbner (as cited in Margaret Gallagher. 2014, 23) uses the term 'symbolic annihilation' to explain the invisibility of women in the media. Women are often underrepresented in Media and when they are 'visible' they generally perpetuate the social norms of the public Gallagher (2014, 23). The media content perpetuates a lot of stereotypes of women, therefore creating unrealistic expectations and ideas. There is no real representation of female perspectives or ideas within the media. This underlying issue of invisibility is also reflected in women and punishment. Historically women have never captured any significance because of the dominant patriarchal norms in

which society functions. The discourse on female criminality is a modern discourse which critiques female invisibility and non-representation. Gender infiltrates the crux of the criminal justice system and its processes, therefore influencing not only the female offender but also women working within the justice system. Female officers are subjected to the same gendered roles as female offenders within the same system Lempert (2013, 149). The correctional institutions are also heavily dominated by men while female officers are limited. In this context, women officers are subjected to the same processes and behaviours of male officers within the correctional institution. They have no choice but to operate within the patriarchal system of the criminal justice processes, which essentially requires them to project a more masculine persona in order to do their job well. Lempert (2013, 149) suggests this idea that women officers only have the power when they are wearing a uniform. If you remove the uniform, the control and power is also removed as opposed to when a male officer takes off his uniform. The uniform becomes symbolic in the relationship between the offender and officer. Power relations are indicative of female officers maintaining a sense of control only when they are seen within the patriarchal lens. Female officers become constrained within those patriarchal norms and have no choice but to operate within that system. The real power is placed on institutions, the patriarchal system and the processes. It gives no real agency to women in the context of their gender, but places significance on uniform and the structure of the correctional system to enable female officers to enforce and enact those power roles.

Gender-specific restoration programmes are becoming more common in the criminal justice system. Hodge et al. (2015, 184) indicates that girls are no longer invisible in the justice system and their needs are progressively being addressed. Delinquency varies between boys and girls, and the justice system addressing those issues and underlying social norms is a step towards understanding the reasons why women commit crimes. Gender-specific programming and policies respond to the needs and experiences of girls who go through the justice system. It creates a space for girls in the justice system and provides them with the appropriate services that cater to their needs Hodge et al. (2015, 185). These programs allow girls to be put into programmes that essentially deal with their problems rather than being put into programmes that specifically are designed for delinquent boys. Self-injurious behaviour is higher amongst female prisoners, therefore a more restorative approach benefits female prisoners far more than non-restorative programmes Wakai et al. (2014, 349). Programmes that allow people to engage in group discussions are taken up by female offenders more often than male offenders. Restorative programmes should engage a more gender neutral stance in order to encapsulate the needs for both female and male offenders.
Gender and punishment is a modern discourse that addresses the gendered processes of the criminal justice system. The underlying issues of gender and

gendered perceptions infiltrate the restorative processes and structures of the prison and justice system. Women are significantly disadvantaged under the system because of the underlying patriarchal structures. It forces women into a system that was essentially created to control the deviant male population. The typification of women and their gender roles is invariably perpetuated throughout society and reinforced through institutional structures. Women for a long time havebeen invisible within the context of crime and media representation. If visibility does occur in the context of crime and media representation, it often subjects women to gendered stereotypes therefore creating a narrow and generalised perception of women. Gendered roles and perceptions are widely proliferated through society. It reinforces the notion of an inferior gender whose voices and views are subdued under the conventions imposed on them by a patriarchal society. Women in the justice system have no autonomy or power because female offenders and females who work in the justice system are dealing with same dominant power structures set up by men throughout the years. It is a system created by men for men.

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THE PERSONAL

Identity is complex and multifaceted. This has become more apparent as the world has become more connected in the digital era. *The Paradox of Intersectionality* introduces us to intersectional theory, which recognises groups that have multiple identities and might otherwise be misunderstood. This piece suggests that the international community use the intersectional model in order to take an overlap of identities into account. Through this, it is argued we will be better equipped to achieve rights and equality for some groups.

Our next piece demonstrates how cultures can connect and develop over time due to external influences. *Buddhism's Significance in Fostering East Asian Relations 600-900 AD* presents Buddhism as a cultural connecter that fostered relationships throughout East Asia. Upon reading, you will discover that the religion connected Eastern Asia not only through trade, but also through ideas and values that shaped cultures over time.

Rethinking Māori Representation provides a case study on a recent failure to introduce a Māori ward in New Plymouth. This case study explores how liberal democracies treat matters that deal specifically with indigenous minorities. The essay advocates for reform, arguing change is necessary, especially in our multicultural society. Perhaps it is important to accept diversity as a strength rather than a threat and legitimising minority identities can be a step towards sufficient institutional protections.

In our globalised world, identities are fluid and often fragmented. We can easily cross borders and live among different cultures throughout our lives. Yet upon engraining ourselves in other worlds, there arise a set of identities we must navigate when interacting with different groups. The following four pieces are personal recounts from individuals that have lived among different worlds and experienced forms of cultural dissonance. *"Hey you, you wigga," Yellow and More, Four Glass Ceilings,* and *MAPAFIKA* are bold, honest, and complex. You are invited to experience an intricate array of identities that demonstrate the journey of learning to navigate cultural markers and groups as we make sense of our connected and interacting world.

Through the pieces presented in this journal, we have seen how the processes of globalization impact upon the wider society and as well as our personal lives. In the digital era, we are supposedly closer than ever. The world is at our fingertips, yet as humans we are distancing ourselves from other people, creating fragmented identities that can be moulded at will. We could seize the circumstances and benefit from them; on the other hand we could let them destroy us. It is up to us to balance the positives and negatives of our connected and globalized world.

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International Relations

Paula Lee

The Paradox of Intersectionality

In this essay I will argue that it is important we move away from a sense of identity as essential, primary, and cohesive because the emergence of more complex schools of thought has allowed us to see the multiplicity of the groups in which people belong. By doing so, the oppression of more groups of people can be noticed and mitigated. However, in saying this it is also crucial we come to understand that in some circumstances, pointing out all of the numerous identities that can exist may also prove to be detrimental- this is especially the case for large-scale social movements attempting to achieve equality for a particular group. To explore this idea, I will be analysing the theory of intersectionality which was reintroduced by Patricia Hill Collins to discuss black feminism. With Collins' work in mind, I will progress to a case study during the break-up of Yugoslavia to look at the prosecution of wartime sexual violence in international criminal tribunals in order to conceptualize the relationships between ethnicity and gender through a feminist lens.

French author Amin Maalouf (2001) believes that we are in need of a new way of seeing identity:

> *'In the age of globalization and of the ever-accelerating intermingling of elements in which we are all caught up, a new concept of identity is needed, and needed urgently. We cannot be satisfied with forcing billions of bewildered human beings to choose between excessive assertion of their identity and the loss of their identity altogether...'* (p.35).

Due to the rise of identity politics, the question itself and the relevant issues it raises are important because we are living in an era in which identity defines who we are collectively and as individuals, who belongs and who doesn't (Wibben, 2014). West-Newman and Sullivan (2013) commented that '...postmodern conditions emphasise the multiplicity and fluidity of selves constructed and experienced in the context of today' (p.113), and I believe that seeing identity as otherwise is harmful as it isolates different social markers, contributing to the justification of discrimination. Miles (as cited in Vodanovich, 2013) commented that race is ideologically inscribed; zeroing in on and defining other aspects of identity such as gender, class, and sexuality as essentialist distinctions in an 'us' versus 'them' situation. One of the problems with the idea of an essentialist identity according to Phillips (2010), '...is the attribution of particular characteristics to everyone identified with a particular category' (p.50). This implies that we must detach ourselves from the view of a stable, unchanging identity as we have learned it is no longer of service to us (Wibben, 2014).

The importance of intersectionality comes from the fact that it recognises particular groups of people who would otherwise be, as American legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw (as cited in Davis, 2015) aptly put it, "theoretically erased" due to an inability of others to comprehend the simultaneous possession of multiple identities (p. 209). The term 'intersectionality' was first coined by Crenshaw; Nash (2008) noted that it was used as a legal theory coming from the critical race studies movement and challenged the idea of the American legal system's ostensible 'colour-blindness, neutrality and objectivity' (p.2). Nowadays, intersectionality is even recognised in the ruling of international crimes involving women of ethnic minorities, in international criminal tribunals (Davis, 2015). W.E.B. Du Bois, who could be considered the 'intellectual father of intersectionality', had what he described as his 'outsider within' or 'island within' approach and this greatly influenced Patricia Hill Collins' definition and application of it in discussing black feminism (Hancock, 2005). For Collins, intersectionality is about oppressions associated with particular identities that cross paths and subordinate groups of people (Wibben, 2014). Rather than believing identity to be essential, intersectionality looks at the interconnections or intersections, if you will, of dimensions of the self and rejects the notion that these elements can be independent of each other (Davis, 2015). As Phillips (2010) said, "When a category that applies to billions (like women) is employed, even the most rigid of essentialists will of course anticipate exceptions." (p.50). Without the diversity, global politics would not properly function, nor would oppressive powers be effectively disrupted and the adversity suffered by many would go unnoticed.

Despite all of this, my opinion holds that the theory of intersectionality has a rather paradoxical nature. Although it may help to draw attention to those whose identities and oppressions may be shadowed by a 'large, familiar category', subcategories can continue to emerge in a never-ending flow. We can think of it as one can of worms opened after another as they start 'clamouring for attention' (Delgado, 2011, p.1263). According to Ramachandran (2006), intersectionality brings about a 'catch 22' situation, in which '...monolithic and stereotyped understandings of identity... lead to erasure and ignorance of their circumstances." She goes on to say that these incoherent conflicts can "expose our own presumptions and unfairness to the light of day" (p. 340). Furthermore, by dismissing the idea of essential identity and attempting to include every group, Delgado (2011) explains that 'intersectionality can easily paralyze progressive work' and compares this with packing luggage for a trip and having someone repeatedly point out the items you have forgotten (p.1264). Some identities and discriminations could also cross-cut, grating against each other (Ramachandran, 2006). This could prove counterproductive for political agendas and social movements such as feminism, slowing down the achievement of global gender equality.

Recognising numerous identities and interconnected hierarchies of oppressions is important in achieving equality and rights for some groups. In 2015, Davis saw that some international laws were viewing 'women who are members of a racial or ethnic minority as variants on a given category', thus effectively incorporating intersectionality to some degree. He believes that by creating a system further promoting this '... these women's identities will be more fully recognized, opening up the possibility for more representative women's rights discourse, and remedies for human rights abuses that better address the scope and nature of the violations.' (p.205). Just this year, at the United Nations international war crimes tribunal in late March, the former Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, was found guilty of crimes during the 1992-95 Bosnian war which saw the slaughter, imprisonment and expulsion of thousands of Croats and Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) as well as the establishment of punishment and rape camps (BBC News, 2016). The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) recognised the legal importance of these accusations as it was the first time that the examination of sexual assaults by themselves had been prioritised over other wartime ones. Three ex-Bosnian Serb soldiers were indicted for crimes against humanity and the laws and customs of war (Chinkin, 1997; The ICTY, 1996).

In the period of time after the Second World War, it was dismissed that women were specifically targeted for gendered acts of violence on top of being civilians in areas torn apart by conflict; feminist scholars and activists wanted to point out that there were other intersecting factors such as religion, race and ethnicity that resulted in harm particularly towards women, 'made possible in large measure by violence and inequality in so-called "peacetime".' (Buss, 2011, p.413). We can use the lens of intersectionality to explain the victimising experiences of these women in former Yugoslavia. Dirk Ryneveld, the UN prosecutor in the case against the three soldiers, told the panel of judges at The Hague: 'This is not just a rape case like those in national jurisdictions. These crimes were committed during an armed conflict and were widespread and systematic. What happened to the Muslim women of Foca [a town in Bosnia and Herzegovina with a Muslim majority] occurred purely because of their ethnicity or religion, and because they were women.' (Black, 2000). Davis (2015) explains that by employing the theory of intersectionality to cases such as Foca and Prosecutor v Kunarac, in which women were attacked on the basis of their ostensibly inferior identities, the Trial Chamber was able to deduce 'rape as a unique crime that encompasses more than just the manifestation of rape as part of ethnic discrimination.' (p.236). This is a harbinger of the international community starting to take the overlap of identities into consideration, using intersectional models to investigate, conceptualise human rights, and to stop dropping women into a single box; another step towards worldwide feminism, albeit a small one (Bond, 2003).

We must keep in mind that there are two sides to every coin. Feminist scholars have also brought other gender-based conditions of violence to the fore such as the idea of exclusively female victims, exclusively male offenders and rape being put first or considered worse over other harms (Henry, 2016). In Buss's (2011) perspective, 'The international criminal prosecution of sexual violence may be an important feminist goal... but it has its limitations and costs.' (p.423). These issues are what Hyde (as cited in Phillips, 2010) calls 'inflated claims of... difference,' and 'These claims reflect and produce damaging... stereotypes.' (p.51). Intersectionality appears to support only equality for all by allowing us to more deeply comprehend the ordeals of those who became targets due to aspects of their identities. Yet it simultaneously allows us to understand the background behind perpetration:

> *'It is crucial that perpetration be analysed not solely as an isolated individualized phenomenon but also as part of a collective mentality around masculine entitlement and perceived superiority on the basis of interlocking forces of classism, racism, and sexism. An intersectional model thus treats wartime sexual violence as fundamentally about complex webs of power.'* (Henry, 2016, p.51).

To me, intersectionality revolves around recognising difference for the most part: different groups with multiple selves; different experiences of oppression that need different ways of earning social justice. But it is a paradox that requires some support of essentialism. Essentialism is, very broadly defined, the application of certain traits to a certain group (Phillips, 2010). Intersectionality has been described by many scholars as being an anti-essentialist theory but Wong (1998- 1999) has identified that one of essentialism's problems in regards to feminism is 'privileging a particular group of "woman".' (p.277). Would that not be the essence of intersectionality, in some way? Smaller categories within a larger category fighting to show the discrimination they go through, as Delgado (as cited in Davis, 2015) proposed, leading to 'the creation of subcategories ad infinitum.' (p.214). This in turn, somewhat resulting in the attainment of rights for that subgroup at the cost of those of the entire group itself? In some circumstances, I believe that identities need to be seen, simply in a primary sense if social movements are to make substantial progress. For instance, the LGBT community's victory in the US Supreme Court's gay marriage legalisation may not have been achieved if the many other groups within the category had rallied for their own recognition.

Feminist interventions and intersectionality's employment have played great roles in international tribunals but they still need to be better implemented in other elements of the human rights/ feminist movement. Perhaps it would be

more effective to apply these with other issues first such as global gender and racial pay gaps, or the effect of colonialism on the treatment of indigenous women by their own ethnic minority groups and the colonisers themselves. We must figure out how to do this whilst remembering the importance of seeing identity as a complex and many-faced social marker, and that we 'evaluate the possibilities and pitfalls of "inclusive" thinking.' (Nash, 2008, p.4).

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Asian 100

Images of Asia

Caitlin Thomas

Buddhism's Significance in Fostering East Asian Relations 600-900 AD

Tansen Sen claims that the establishment of Buddhism in China influenced an influx of religious and cultural changes not only between India and China, but throughout Eastern Asia.[1] Buddhism was highly significant in fostering relations between China, Japan, and Korea over the period of 600-900 AD, shown by individuals, ethnic groups, and the global position of China. Despite historians recognising Buddhism's importance, it did have limitations. These examples shall be used to evaluate the extent of the significance of Buddhism during this period.

One of the clearest examples of Buddhism's role in fostering relations was through monks, who were able to travel overseas and return with new ideas and technology. For example, Hyep'yon was the first Korguyo monk recorded to be active in Japan (dated around 584)[2] while Hyeja reached Japan in 594, and was recorded to have educated Prince Shotoku on a range of Buddhist texts including the San-lun.[3] Others like Ennin, from Japan, spent years in China.[4] These exchanges all held relevance to Buddhism. This trade was so common that historians describe "the period over two centuries from the year 630 [to mark] the high point in Sino-Japanese relations." [5]This is further suggested when in the late 800s, the Japanese monks Kuukai and Saichon "returned from China with texts and practises that... entrenched Buddhism even more firmly into Japan's political, economic, and spiritual life."[6] In this way, Buddhism is significant for increasing relations between these countries. Monks also held significance as intellectuals through founding schools.

The impact of Buddhism upon education affected its development, inferring the significance of Buddhism's role during interactions. According to Jeong-Kyu Lee, "from the viewpoint of Korean educational history, the Korean people developed a traditional elite education that generally conformed to the ancient Chinese educational administration system based on Buddhistic and Confucian studies."[7] It was through this following of "Chinese intellectual trends"[8] that led to the development of Buddhist schools in Korea, and Korean interpretations of 'Son' and Esoteric Buddhism over 669-928.[9] This impacted education by influencing literacy and language in both Korea and Japan, as a writing system was required to pass on religious texts. Lewis R. Lancaster refers to this as "reception of Buddhism and adoption of a writing system"[10] which holds significance today as Korea and Japan initially used the Chinese writing system. In this way historians perceive religion as a key educational carrier. For example, from the words of 'A brief history of Chinese and Japanese Civilizations' "As in China, and indeed Christianity in the West, Buddhism was the cultural carrier in such vital areas as medicine, physiognomy, geomancy... yin-and-yang theory, the calendar... and history... State building went hand in hand with church building..."[11]

[1] Sen, Tansen. Buddhism, diplomacy, and trade: the realignment of Sino-Indian relations, 600-1400. University of Hawaii Press, 2003 P1.
[2] Lancaster, Lewis R., and Chai-Shin Yu. Introduction of Buddhism to Korea: new cultural patterns. Vol. 3. Jain Publishing Company, 1989
[3] Ibid, PP8-9
[4] Ebrey, Patricia, and Walthall, Anne. East Asia: A Cultural, Social, and Political History. Third edition. Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2014
[5] Fogel, Joshua A. Articulating the Sinosphere: Sino-Japanese relations in space and time. Vol. 11. Harvard University Press, 2009 P17.
[7] Lee, Jeong-Kyu. "Religious Factors Historically Affecting Premodern Korean Elite/Higher Education." SNU Journal of Educatio Research
[8] Ibid, P5
[11] Schirokauer, Conrad, Miranda Brown, David Lurie, and Suzanne Gay. A brief history of Chinese and Japanese civilizations. Cengage

However, in the same way this individual exchange interacted with Buddhism, it also interacted with other factors at this time, including Confucianism. Lee refers to Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism as the "ideologies amalgamated into Korean culture which became main areas of Korean traditional and religious thought."[12] Since these ideas were also adopted, Buddhism was not the sole factor of significance in fostering relations between East Asian nations. Buddhism contrasted with Confucian ideals;[13] it encouraged people to become monks – pledged to celibacy - which contested with Chinese family ideals. In contrast to this, Lee also states that Buddhism was "a key institution [dominating] all of Korean society and culture, whereas Confucianism [was] a minor institution for formal elite education [diffusing] the political-ethical values to the upper class."[14] Confucianism still had impact on Korean life, including through the education system. However, Buddhism, out of all significant religious factors at the time, was most significant in fostering relations between East Asian countries.

Ethnic groups also exemplify Buddhism in fostering relations, as Korean ethnic groups interacted with Japan and influenced cultural development. The primary example of this, according to Micheal Como, are Japanese "kinship groups that claimed descent from the Kingdom of Silla."[15] Groups such as the Kamitsumiya and Shotoku cults were influenced not only by Buddhism, but by Korea.[16] Como states that "the political structures and the ideological underpinnings of the new system [Nara Japan] had deep roots in the political and religious discourses of the Korean peninsula and Chinese textual tradition"[17] which is supported by Tamura Enchou's argument that "the development of Buddhist culture in [this era] could only be understood in context of... the political and cultural developments on the Korean peninsula."[18] This ultimately suggests that Buddhism was relevant to cultural development and fostering relationships due to these kinship groups. In accumulation, these Paekche and Silla kinship groups showed evidence of cooperation through promoting Buddhism, and Buddhist culture[19] as they "were responsible for the introduction and diffusing of writing and continental technologies of governance to the Japanese archipelago."[20] This shows Buddhism's significance in fostering relations during this period working as a cultural 'connector' leading to interactions between Japan and Korea through these ethnic kinship groups, which increased relevance of Buddhist culture and aided the development of Japanese Buddhism.

This idea of Buddhism as a 'connector' suggests a shared culture. This relates to the expansion of Tang China, which was considered to have reached a "high level of social, political, and cultural sophistication"[21] allowing for the fostering of "spheres of influence over other regional cultures of Asia."[22] This shows partial significance to how East Asia is perceived today. The

[12] Lee, Jeong-Kyu. "Religious Factors Historically Affecting Premodern Korean Elite/Higher Education." SNU Journal of Educatio Research.
[13] Wright, Arthur F. "Fu I and the Rejection of Buddhism." Journal of the History of Ideas (1951): P34.
[14] Ibid P28.
[15] Como, Michael. Shotoku: ethnicity, ritual, and violence in the Japanese Buddhist tradition. OUP USA, 2008 P4.
[19] Ibid, P22
[20] Ibid, P14.
[21] Sen, Tansen. Buddhism, diplomacy, and trade: the realignment of Sino-Indian relations, 600-1400. University of Hawaii Press, 2003

idea of Buddhism as part of a shared culture shows the high extent to which Buddhism played a role in fostering relationships. Tansen Sen describes that "the establishment of Buddhism in China triggered a profusion of religious exchanges between India and China, and, at the same time, stimulated trading relations between [Korea and Japan]."[23] It is clear that Buddhism not only connected the countries through trade, but through ideas and culture which they grew to share.

Despite this, by looking at Japan and Korea today it is clear that while there are similarities with China they are still separate cultures – China itself being built up of hundreds of cultures and ethnic groups. It is possible for an historian to reject the idea of a 'shared culture' because of how elements gained through Buddhist exchange were not only adopted, but adapted, like Zen (Japan) and Son (Korea). In addition, it could be argued that the idea of a shared culture is still relevant, no matter on the differences between the countries. For example, the multiple cultures and ethnicities located within China – as Chinese – under the umbrella of Chinese culture. China is a country of great diversity, so it would be unnecessary to reject the idea of a shared culture between China and Korea, or China and Japan due to differences when China itself is so vast.

With China being such a vast country, it was almost inevitable that trade grew to such a large scale. China's position in global trade was crucial to Buddhism's significance in fostering relationships. Buddhism, like Confucianism, was "associated with the high culture of China"[24] which aided in making it a desirable element of Chinese society to other countries' view of the 'radiating' Tang dynasty. It had been recognised since Han period China that countries near China held interest in close relationships, as shown by structures like the tribute system. China, at this period, was one of the global heads of world trade. It was – and is – large, and considered to be 'central' under heaven. This became a factor in Buddhism's significance by inferring the desire for developing countries fostering relationships with China existing prior to this period, and the increase of relations display Buddhism's role in forming connections. This desire to become more like China not only allowed Buddhism to aid in fostering relations, but in making these relationships significant in the long-term cultural history of these nations.

Despite the interest to join China's powerful society, it could be argued that existing structures played a role in limiting Buddhist significance, which meant the flow of Chinese ideas came into contact with native ones such as Japan's Shinto. Richard C. Foltz states that "once Buddhist presence was established in China, the silk road offered a natural conduit by which Chinese Buddhist influences could later travel westbound again through central Asia."[25]

[24] Yoshinori, Takeuchi. Buddhist spirituality: later China, Korea, Japan, and the modern world. Motilal Banarsidass Publishe, 2003 P144
[25] Foltz, Richard C. "Religions of the Silk Road." New York: St. Martin's Griffin (1999) P51.

This was similar in regards to trade in East Asia. In this way, the existing factor of the silk road could also be described as having significance in fostering relations, as this was what allowed the flow of ideas to occur. However, other factors prior to the time do not limit the significance of Buddhism in this circumstance; an historian could argue that they merely cross paths in the ultimate scheme of East Asian cultural history.

Sen records that aside from Marxism today, "Buddhism stands historically alone as the only foreign system of thought that transformed Chinese belief and practise en masse."[26] However, there were limitations to the internal acceptance of Buddhism. There is evidence of "anti-Buddhist intellectuals... attacks on the foreignness of Buddhism"[27] as well as the "Book of the Precious Purity of the Exalted Great Tao"[28] (dated around 750) which "borrowed heavily... from Buddhist scriptural sources, yet it was fiercely anti Buddhist and anti-foreign... the work can be seen as the predecessor to the anti-Buddhist writings of the late Tang period which in turn laid the ground work for the persecution of Buddhism of 845."[29] Buddhism still "clashed with the traditions of Chinese state and society"[30] as it was "contrary to orthodox teachings"[31] which limited Buddhism in fostering relationships because of the backlash in acceptance.

Ultimately, the most crucial limiting factors to Buddhism would be pre-existing structures, which led to internal backlash against Buddhism and impacted Buddhist foreign relations. Despite this, the evidence overall suggests that Buddhism was highly significant in fostering relations between China, Korea, and Japan over the period 600-900. The most significant way we recognise this is through the trade and exchange between the three countries, especially through monks as academics due to their impact when returning home and further developing Buddhism in their own states, increasing the relevance of the idea of a 'shared culture.'

[26] Sen, Tansen. Buddhism, diplomacy, and trade: the realignment of Sino-Indian relations, 600-1400. University of Hawaii Press, 2003 P1
[27] Jidong, Yang. "Replacing hu with fan: A Change in the Chinese Perception of Buddhism during the Medieval Period." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 21, no. 1 (1998): P167
[28] Schipper, Kristofer. "Purity and strangers shifting boundaries in medieval taoism." T'oung Pao 80, no. Fasc. 1/3 (1994): P63
[29] Ibid
[30] Wright, Arthur F. "Fu I and the Rejection of Buddhism." Journal of the History of Ideas (1951): 34
[31] ibid

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Politics 209

Modern Political Thought

Anna Zam

Rethinking Māori representation

New Plymouth District Council recently failed to introduce a Māori ward, having been opposed by a citizens-initiated referendum. Popular resistance against Māori wards, or other special representation for an indigenous minority group, demonstrates that even electing formal representatives can be difficult. Questions immediately arise once one deems current representation of Māori perspectives insufficient. To what extent can liberal democracies protect indigenous minorities?[1] And even if polities are ready, willing, and able to, what reasons justify affirmative changes to strengthen Māori representation in particular? This essay advocates for reform. Changes, it is submitted, are warranted on three distinct grounds: justice, indigenous self-determination and the need to reflect both New Zealand's multicultural society and bicultural history. Arguments in favour will be illustrated, where appropriate, with analysis of Māori involvement in local government. A representation model where Māori have equal decision-making power, at least in relation to issues of self-governance, would uphold tino rangatiratanga.

New Zealand examples reveal that democracies are not always conducive to indigenous group rights. Māori are under-represented in local government or not represented formally on some local authorities at all.[2] Hence, changes are needed for a fair and just society. At the same time, it can be argued that 'the will of the people is the basis of the authority of government', and if the majority determine no need for formal representation of an indigenous group, then so be it.[3] Although this argument has some merit, a number of qualifications need to be accounted for in Aotearoa's context. The Crown must robustly give effect to its commitments to the Treaty of Waitangi to protect Māori.[4] It is not unreasonable for Māori to expect New Zealand's constitutional arrangements to provide them with an equitable share of power and influence over internal affairs.[5] While there is no denying that the will of the public could legitimately outnumber an indigenous group, a lack of institutional protections for minorities can create manifestly unjust results. Formal representation serves to protect minorities should they be threatened by the whims of an unfriendly majority. A blanket application of equal rights might not produce equitable outcomes. Specific rights are needed in order to ensure mainstream decisions do not undermine their viability. Kymlicka calls this 'true equality'.[6] In this sense, there is a redistributive element to rights allocation, necessitating different treatment to meet different needs. As Sullivan pleads, "how can Māori retain the Māori language and exercise Māori custom, for example, if the non-Māori majority does not support their right to do so?"[7]

[1] D. Ivison, V. Patten and W. Sanders, Political Theory and Indigenous Peoples (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1.
[2] Augie Fleras, "From Social Control towards Political Self-Determination? Māori Seats and the Politics of Separate Māori Representation in New Zealand," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 18, no. 3, (1985): 552.
[3] United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, Article 2.
[4] Article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi.
[5] Maria Bargh, ed., Māori and Parliament: Diverse Strategies and Compromises (Wellington: Huia, 2010): 167.
[6] Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1995): 113.
[7] Ann Sullivan, "Democracy and Minority Indigenous Representation," in Weeping Waters: The Treaty of Waitangi and a Constitution for Aotearoa New Zealand, ed. M Mulholland, and V. Tawhai, (Wellington: Huia Publishers, 2010): 154.
[8] Maria Bargh, ed., Māori and Parliament: Diverse Strategies and Compromises, 173.

The corollary of this lends itself to critique that separate Māori wards, councils or bodies, constitute reverse discrimination. In other words, it is unjust to differentiate on the basis of any 'race'.[8] Arguments against formal representation generally claim that giving Māori preferential representation could have negative consequences such as furthering resentment against Māori, and contributing to longer-term political instability. This allegation that separate representation is socially and politically divisive can, however, be challenged. Any claims of discriminatory disadvantage for non-Māori misrepresents the wider significance of substantive Māori representation. A better view appreciates that supporting a political domain in which Māori can self-govern might lend itself to beneficial outcomes such as accountability, sustainable socio-economic development and meaningful relations between Māori and other cultural groups. However, a harder proposition to counter is the claim that proportional representation measures in electoral politics no longer produce obstacles for Māori within the existing political structure. Therefore, on this basis, there is no justification for 'special treatment'. This would largely be an empirical assessment, and unlikely at present to be true since Māori do not feel their representation is adequate.[9] The Crown, with irregular Māori input, currently assumes decision-making authority, for and on behalf of Māori, across local governments.

The current formal representation of Māori views or perspectives is inadequate because Māori cannot exercise tino rangatiratanga. As a signatory to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP), Māori have a right to establish indigenous representative processes according to principles of their own electing.[10] By virtue of that right to self-determination, Māori should freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. However, according to Durie, democracy and Māori tikanga are not incompatible.[11] Self-governance for Māori at the local level would not challenge democratic practices. To do so would fundamentally contest the dominant liberal political structure; the consequences of which are uncertain. But this suggests that Māori are unable to make decisions for themselves unless they are held accountable under state-defined structures of local governance rather than indigenous forms of tikanga. If non-domination is the ideal of democracy, then Māori should exercise agency to decide what self-governance would entail. The issue unfortunately is more complex. Even where formal representation may be present, the shortcomings of the Independent Māori Statutory Board (IMSB), adopted by the Auckland City Council, is an example of how indigenous representation can still be lacking. Traditionally, rangatira had to maintain the confidence of their people otherwise they lost mana and their leadership would be nullified.[12] But the relationship between the IMSB and Mana Whenua iwi and hapu is unclear.[13]

[9]Alan Ward and Janine Hayward, 'Tino rangatiratanga: Māori in the political and administrative system', in Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Australia, Canada & New Zealand, ed., Paul Havemann, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): 387.
[10]United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Article 3.
[11]Mason Durie, Te Mana, Te Kawanatanga: The Politics of Māori Self-determination, (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1998): 238.
[12]Ibid., 239.
[13]Kim Margaret Summersby, "Does Māori Representation Matter?: An Analysis of the Relationship between Māori Descriptive and Substantive Political Representation in Parliament and Local Government", (doctor of philosophy thesis, University of Auckland, 2009): 211.

Māori representation through advisory councils is likely to exacerbate conflict (both between Māori and non-Māori and between Māori themselves) rather than resolve disagreements.[14] Instead, Maaka and Fleras propose a model of "constructive engagement" to "foster relative yet non-coercive autonomy without necessarily falling into the trap of secession or confrontation".[15] If we agree that change is warranted on the grounds of justice and self-determination, we are left then with an outstanding issue. How should formal representation of Māori be composed in order to avoid these pitfalls? The scope of potential answers is beyond this essay, although a possible first move is to admit that the current framework of liberal rights theory is difficult to apply to indigenous groups.[16] An individualistic rights framework obscures the collective nature of self-determination, and is blind to a modern society where non-state actors and treaties constrain state sovereignty. Changes to formal self-governance models by Māori themselves need to recognise that groups are not homogenous. Rather, they may have shared interests or concerns that allow one leader to fairly represent others. Changes should prioritise the Crown's fiduciary obligations to cooperate with indigenous representatives bodies in policy decision-making. This would avoid essentialising Māori advisory councils or wards through individual elected Māori descendants who may or may not be representing Māori interests. To contribute, meaningfully, to indigenous self-determination requires a need to reformulate the prescribed representation of Māori views and arrangements of political power in New Zealand. Maaka and Fleras therefore argue that supporting Māori tino rangatiratanga acknowledges indigenous rights as a legitimate source of soverieignty.[17] While debate surrounding a new constitutional order has yet to materialize, there is increasing consensus on the need for discussions to take place in the future.

Finally, negotiations of political power will be important for indigeneous groups and non-indigenous groups alike as Māori become a more culturally, economically and internationally significant group. Increasingly, Māori authority is no longer based on the Treaty. Formal representaiton of Māori views should emphasise the strategic place of tangata whenua within the constitution of New Zealand, moving away from solely monetary reparations based on historical injustices. A shift from Māori formal representation within existing political structures to self-governance would be a step in this direction. Geddis notes already that Māori seats have largely a symbolic role.[18] If changes were permitted at the local level, this would recognise that Māori input is important and desired.[19] Allowing Māori to set up formal representation however appropriate and feasible will initiate 'intercultural dialogue'.[20] New Zealand's multicultural political discourse creates additional challenges for Māori to "advance, as Māori, and as citizens of the world."[21] Aspirations for Māori, recent immigrants, or Crown interests for instance,

[14]Maria Bargh, ed., Māori and Parliament: Diverse Strategies and Compromises, 177.
[15]Roger Maaka and Augie Fleras, "Engaging with Indigeniety: Tino Rangatiratanga in Aotearoa" in Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ed., Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton and Will Sanders. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 89.
[16]Duncan Ivison, 'The logic of aboriginal rights' Ethnicities, page 324
[17]Maaka and Fleras, "Engaging with Indigeniety: Tino Rangatiratanga in Aotearoa", 90.
[18]Andrew Geddis, 'A Dual Track Democracy? The Symbolic Role of Māori Seats in New Zealand's Electoral System' Election Law Journal, 5, no 4. (1985): 568.
[19]Ranganui Walker, "Māori Sovereignty, Colonial and Post-Colonial Discourses." In Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Australia, Canada & New Zealand, ed., Paul Havemann, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): 108-22.
[20]Duncan Ivison, Paul Patten and Will Sanders, Political Theory and Indigenous Peoples, 10.
[21]Durie, Te Mana, Te Kawanatanga: The Politics of Māori Self-determination 246.

need not be competing. An ideological shift from viewing diversity as a threat to the political stability of a given social order to viewing diversity as an asset, supports the view that ensuring Māori kaupapa in local decision-making processes might generate considerable benefits for all New Zealanders.

Moreover, changes from formal representation to a more substantial self-governing model would help to better inform not just Māori-Crown relations but relations also between increasing numbers of Non-Māori in New Zealand. Yet the New Plymouth example shows that indigenous demands are fraught with opposition from interested majority groups unwavering on power sharing. Change should be viewed against a greater context of progress away from assimilationist and intergrationist policies of the past. Current formal representation is unsatisfactory. Not discounting the positive impact which members within the IMSB have, any exercise of tino rangatiratanga at the local level is nevertheless compromised. Though answering the complex question set in a constrained space limits in-depth interrogation, this essay does open up an area for more research: how might the reasons that justify affirmative changes to formal Māori representation, also be reasons that non-Māori have?

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Ethnicity and Identity

Rosa Gavey

‘Hey you, you wigga!’ An Auto-Ethnographic Analysis of the Building, Dismantling and Rebuilding of my Racial, Ethnic and National Identity

Identity construction does not occur at one single point in time, but rather our identities are constructed through a series of events, choices and experiences. One’s identity is never fixed or stagnant but is fluid and always developing. As a 7th generation Pakeha, my ethnic and national identity might seem obvious and uncomplicated in a New Zealand context. But through the analysis of two memorable events in my life I will show the ways my identity has been “built, rebuilt and dismantled over time” (Cornell & Hartmann 2007, 75). Through these experiences and my reflections on them, I have come to understand my racialised and privileged position in society and in doing this I have come to actively identify as a Pakeha New Zealander.

Experience 1: Racialization

Brooklyn, New York, USA, 2008 (12 years old): my family and I were living in Brooklyn for 4 months and while we were there I attended a local school. In my entire school, the ‘Urban Academy for Arts and Letters’ (UAAL), there were only a small handful of other white students. I remember one day in particular when, during recess, a boy called out to me “hey you, you wigga, come over here”. This social ascription, wigga, was by no means a one off incident and over time came to be a term of endearment. I was visibly different to all my coloured friends but I was still a part of their group. One time a boy explained to me that, no, I couldn’t (in return) called him a nig#%[2], only Black people could call each other that, and I was after all only a wigga. At the time Barack Obama was running for President. Race was particularly salient in public discourse and this was evident at school. To middle school children it wasn’t his politics that were getting people out on the streets, calling for hope, calling for change. It was the fact that he was Black. I vividly remember on the night of the election telling my family that I wouldn’t go to school if Obama didn’t win. My whiteness would have (negatively) stood out like a sore thumb. Thankfully I could go to school the next day and celebrate that historical moment with everyone else.

My experience in Brooklyn highlights how I began to discover my own racial identity. Through analysing this experience I am able to reflect on how race theory has impacted my life. Race theory classifies and groups together people according to skin colour. Race discourse is said to be under erasure, as it is considered to have no factual foundation but it still has social effects today (Miller 2008).

Growing up in an upper-middle class suburb of Auckland, I was almost always part of the majority group (Pakeha) at my school and in my neighbourhood. Living and going to school in Brooklyn was a dramatic change. This was the first time that I had a prolonged experience of being positioned as the

[1] A wigga (or wigger) is a colloquial word ascribed to a white person who attempts (sometimes unconsciously) to emulate cultural behavior and appearance often associated with Black people.
[2] To avoid the use of offensive language this word will not be written in full.

'Other' (racially). Here, my white identity was constructed in a setting of difference. This can be seen as representing aspects of the constructionist approach to identity (Cornell & Hartmann 2007): in particular, the idea that our identities are constructed in relation to certain circumstances that we experience. Nado Aveling (2004, 66) explains this further when she says that the women in her study only came to recognize their own whiteness during "experiences that temporarily positioned them as the 'Other'" and that this often occurred overseas. (Bell (1996, 148) makes a similar point in relation to the development of an "ethnic consciousness"). Similarly, Stuart Hall (1996, 4) refers to this process when he discusses the 'constitutive outside' – whereby identities are constructed through difference.

My experience also highlights the invisibility of whiteness in New Zealand (Clarke & Garner 2009, 2). That is, the way in which whiteness is seen as a normative backdrop, so that everyone who is not white is seen as the 'Other'. A consequence of this is that white people tend to view themselves as "outside of 'race'", and this works to "maintain their position at the top of the racial hierarchy" (Bell 1996, 148). This creates a space that fosters white privilege.

Peggy McIntosh (1988, 3) describes the term white privilege as an "invisible package of unearned assets which [white people] can count on cashing in daily". My experience of school in Brooklyn highlights aspects of my white privilege as before this experience I was never forced to see myself as a racialised being. For most of the children at UAAL, race was never something they could escape. It was with them from birth and constantly something that they had to think about and mediate the effects of. Not only was I never conscious of my 'race' before this point, but I was also able to forget about my whiteness after that experience (as it is not something that negatively impacts on my daily interactions). It was only apparent when I was a minority 'race' in a setting of predominantly Black children. This privilege can be seen in terms of having the luxury to be able to choose when I want to think about my 'race' but, without exertion, always having a cloak of whiteness around me, granting me certain privileges.

The term 'wigga' was not something I chose myself, but rather it was something that was socially ascribed by my peers, based on the colour of my skin. In this setting my whiteness was associated with outsider status. "Hey you, you wigga" can be seen as an instance of Althusser's concept of interpellation, through which this social ascription occurred. Through this process of interpellation, "ideology constitutes people as subjects" (Purvis & Hunt 1993, 482). The interpellated subject's recognition of this process is central to this concept. Not only was I 'hailed' as a wigga but I also internalised

this and in the process I recognised my own, previously invisible, whiteness. When I reflect on the impact this experience in Brooklyn had on my identity, Cornell and Hartmann's (2007, 85) distinction between thick and thin identities is relevant. Thick identities are said to be more comprehensive and affect all areas of one's life, whereas thin identities are less comprehensive and therefore only impact on some areas. Arguably my whiteness impacts every aspect of my life but the recognition and the internalisation of that whiteness only plays a thin role in my identity formation. This is related to the points mentioned above about whiteness being 'unconscious' and normative.

This experience in Brooklyn changed how I position myself within the context of power relations in New Zealand society as it gave me insider knowledge of what it feels like to be labelled an 'Other'. I am not, however, suggesting that my experience equates to that of groups who cannot escape their 'Other' identity. Rather, this experience heightened my awareness and understanding of power relations and Maori issues in New Zealand. This, in turn, dismantled and unsettled of my sense of national and ethnic identity.

Experience 2: Ethnic and national identity

Perigueux, France, 2012-13 (17 years old): For 6 months, during year 12 at high school, I went on an AFS student exchange to France. I lived with a French host family and went to a French lycée. For Christmas (and nearing the end of my time in France) I gave my host family gifts from New Zealand. I gave my host father a Maori wooden carving. His reaction to this present was somewhat unexpected. He was undoubtedly grateful but he also expressed confusion as to why a person of European heritage would give a Maori gift as a way of representing their national identity. He questioned what New Zealand culture was and what it actually meant to be from New Zealand. This unsettled and "dismantled" my sense of national identity. It continued to play on my mind and led me to rethink how I was positioned in relation to this Maori artefact. This, in turn, caused me to question and rebuild my ethnic identity - am I a European New Zealander or am I a Pakeha?

National identity refers to a sense of belonging to a particular place, which is often described as natural and can be linked to notions of birth, blood and belonging (Kiely, Bechhofer & McCrone, 2005). My experience in France dismantled my sense of belonging to New Zealand because it challenged what I saw as my culture and also the authenticity of my claim to national identity. Originally, before my experience in France, I thought my national identity as a New Zealander came from the fact that I was born here. After this experience, I understand that a claim of national identity is much more complicated than this. Bell (2009) considers whether and how Pakeha

have legitimate claims to national identity in New Zealand. She looks at this in terms of the settler's dilemma between recognising the authenticity of Pakeha identity and balancing this with the recognition of Maori indigeneity. My host father's question about my gift highlights his assumptions about my national identity. Because of my ancestral background he assumed that my culture would be similar to that of the British (and in some ways it is) but it would be incorrect to say that this was my sole cultural heritage. This perspective does not recognize the cultural environment that I grew up in and the effect place has on one's identity. Settler identities, and therefore my identity (as a descendent of settlers), can be seen as a form of "human-hinge" (Morris, cited in Bell 1999, 122) because I am neither authentically British or indigenously a New Zealander.

In many respects my French host father's unintended challenge to my national identity built and strengthened my understanding and sense of my ethnic identity. Reflecting on this experience I came to understand the important distinction between Pakeha and European New Zealander identities (Bell 1996, 145). And in doing this, I rebuilt my sense of ethnic identity as a Pakeha. Bell states that the tensions that exist between these two ethnic labels demonstrate their discursive significance and the fact that "language is not innocent" (Bell 1996, 145).

An ethnic group, according to Eric Wolf, is a "social entity that arises and defines itself as against other social entities also engaged in the process of development and self-definition" (Barber 1999, 34). Although definitions vary, Spoonley succinctly defines Pakeha as: "New Zealanders of European background, whose cultural values and behaviour have been primarily formed from the experience of being a member of the dominant group of New Zealand" (Spoonley cited in Bell 1996, 147). Implicit in this definition is the recognition that Pakeha, as an ethnic group, only exists in relation to Maori (Bell 1996, 147 and Barber 1999, 34). That is, Pakeha only becomes an ethnicity when considered against Maori, because without Maori there would be no Pakeha. Many academics have emphasised the significance of the term Pakeha, both culturally and politically (Bell 1996, 145). It is argued that the term Pakeha acknowledges the history of colonialism in New Zealand and in doing so it also recognises the legitimacy (in some form) of Maori claims to sovereignty (Larner & Spoonley 1995, 52 and Bell 1996, 146). Bell termed these two results the "dual project of Pakeha identity" (1996, 147).

While my experience in Brooklyn led me to recognise my whiteness, my French experience led me to self-ascribe as a Pakeha. This is because of two main reasons. Firstly, it is an attempt to distinguish myself from Europeans by placing myself into a category in which I can claim authenticity.

Secondly, it is a way of recognising my relationship with Maori and also the historical injustices that occurred towards Maori and that still exist within the Eurocentric framework of New Zealand society. Bell (1996, 153) argues that Pakeha identity "displaces white New Zealanders from their position of discursive exnomination as the (normal, ordinary) New Zealander" and that this, discursively, allows for white hegemony to be undermined.

Conclusion

This essay analyses two overseas experiences by using concepts such as white privilege, interpellation and authenticity. It attempts to unpack and understand these out-of-the-ordinary life experiences and show how my racial, ethnic and national identity was built, dismantled and rebuilt. It is important to note that this essay shows how I was only confronted by my whiteness and the 'pack of unearned assets' that go with it, in exceptional circumstances. Yet I reap the privileges of whiteness daily. This auto-ethnography has shown that through the recognition of my whiteness and inherent privilege in a colonial context, my ethnic identity has been rebuilt as a Pakeha. And through this Pakeha identity I am better able to understand my position within the unequal power relations in New Zealand society.

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Ethnicity and Identity

Erica Lee

Yellow and More: Exploring Racial, Ethnic and National Identity as a 1.5 Generation Korean New Zealander.

"I am a Korean New Zealander. I have spent the first half of my life in Korea and the other half, including my adolescent years, in New Zealand. I speak both languages fluently, and English like any other Kiwi with no detectable Korean accent. I don't look typically Korean because of the way I do my make-up. My social circle consists mainly of caucasian friends. All of this translated to a state where I have felt for the longest time, that I did not fit into either of the cultures. I could see that a bicultural space existed, but that sphere was complex and diverse in its own right. I could not find a significant community of people who I shared my life experiences with. I visualised myself floating above cultural boundaries, in a grey, murky space where I could not see anyone else." (Lee, 2014, n.p)

The preceding quote is an exerpt from a blog post I wrote in 2014. This autoethnographic essay continues and explores my long standing curiosities about my own racial, ethnic and national identity. Throughout the essay, I narrate a story from the past then analyse the experiences using key concepts of identity discourse to gain a better understanding of the past. First, I examine my racial identity using social ascription and meaning to make sense of it's construction. Second, my ethnic identity is analysed using Cornell and Hartmann's constructionist approach as well as an observation in my own discourse shift from essentialism to hybridity. Lastly, my national identity is analysed using ideas of ethnicity based nationhood and transnationalism, along with a critical interrogation of my asserted and assigned position within the power relations of ethnic and national identity in Aotearoa New Zealand. I conclude the essay by relating Stephen Maturin's quote on identity to my own sentiments about the dynamic nature of identity construction.

Racial Identity: A Rude Awakening

I came to realise my own 'racial identity' when I first moved to New Zealand at the age of eleven. I was walking home one day when a group of Maori girls began shouting at me 'ching chong ching chong, ni hao, konnichi wa'. They gestured the slanted-eye face and squinted at me as they laughed. I tried to say something back but it had only been 6 months since I had moved and I didn't have the words. I stuttered and mumbled with my face bright red from rage and they cackled even more saying 'what a fob, she doesn't even know what to say! Go back to your country, you Asian!' When I got home, I burst into tears. I wasn't sure why I was upset but I knew then that 'Asian' was a dirty word and looking the way I looked was something to be ashamed of in this new place.

The rude realisation of my own stereotyped racial identity highlights the power of social ascription and meaning. Social ascription denotes a process of identity construction where other people or external circumstances make claims about a subject in question (Cornell & Hartmann 2007, 83). The subject is passive in being 'made' or assigned a certain identity. In my experience, I was assigned the identity as a 'Fresh Off the Boat' Asian i.e. a 'fob' Asian. Lowe (2016, 244) explains that the Asian identity is often only brought into consciousness of the subject under an oppressive experience where the circumstances construct the subjects as outsiders to New Zealand. It is important to note here then, that the meaning attached to the assigned labels is also significant in identity construction. In my case, the inherent meaning behind what was said to my 11-year old self was that my identity, as defined by my race, was different, inferior, something that could be made fun of and most of all, unwelcomed.

Another interesting aspect to explore in this specific experience is that the assignment of my racial identity was by a group of Maori students. In retrospect, I find it rather unusual that another minority group, let alone an indigenous group, so cruelly bullied me, as they too have experiences of racialization. Lowe (2016, 244) uses the work of Hall and Ip to propose that during the 1990s, Maori and Pakeha formed a sense of solidarity against the "alien Orientals" (2016, 244) in response to the threat of diminishing local identities via influx of Asian immigrants. The Maori led this alliance as they had more to lose from the erosion of the recently established bicultural New Zealand identity, which acknowledged their indigenous status.

Ethnic Identity: Beyond a Binary

In my high school years, I thought I could either be Korean or 'white' but not both. In an attempt to stay 'authentic' within each culture, I led a dual identity life where in each identity I refused to acknowledge the presence of the other. I was what I would call an 'ethnic drag queen'; switching between what I thought were two mutually exclusive ethnic identities by putting on certain attires and personalities. At home, I was Hye-Ji (my Korean name); a barefaced Korean who spoke Korean, ate Korean food and dressed like a 'fob' in big baggy clothes that covered most of my body. Out in the world, I was Erica; full face of 'Western style' makeup, spoke English without a trace of Korean accent, ate salads and sandwiches and dressed in skimpy trendy clothes. My personality amplified hugely into a loud, opinionated girl who had no problem speaking out about taboo topics like sex and drugs. I actively participated in underage drinking just to prove to the world I wasn't 'Asian' i.e. a fob, but a 'Cool Asian'. I felt that I could only be one or the other at a time, in order to avoid being questioned about authenticity.

My perspective of identity binary was soon challenged, as the ethno-drag didn't quite pan out the way I had hoped. My goal was to have a complete sense of belonging in both cultures yet I ended up feeling like I didn't belong anywhere. When I was in drag, I felt like I belonged with the Western culture but I wasn't quite white enough to be white and certainly not Korean enough to be Korean. When I wasn't in drag, my cultural values were too 'white-washed' to be Korean and I was just another invisible Asian to the Caucasians. I began to realise that the experiences that shaped who I was were vast, built layer upon layer and continuously expanding whilst containing everything from the past. I wasn't made up of many little identities but of many experiences that could conjure up almost infinite different identities in response to various settings. I could be a full-blown 'fob' Korean with my family, a Kiwi amongst my friends, or a bit of both with other kids of immigrant backgrounds. It was a matter of choosing what I believed was my identity at specific moments.

The 'drag' and 'non-drag' ethnic identities I created capture the heart of Cornell and Hartmann's constructionist concept of identity variation along two axes: asserted to assigned and thick to thin (2007, 85). 'Asserted' entails that the identity is self-ascribed; people choose to define it in their own terms through interaction with socially 'assigned' labels i.e. social ascription, a concept earlier discussed in the analysis of my racial identity. 'Thick' or 'thin' entails the extent to which the identity influences and shapes social life (2007, 77). When I am not in drag, my identity is assigned as 'Asian' by New Zealand society. This identity is thin because the term Asian doesn't take into account the specific practices I carry out as a Korean as it blanket terms all Asians. When I am in drag, I assert my identity as 'Cool Asian'. The identity is thick because it is the identity I actively choose to practice out my daily life in. It is important to note here that this asserted identity is somewhat paradoxical as the term 'Cool Asian' was a relatively less derogative term assigned to me by my Caucasian friends. I nevertheless asserted this identity because it was a form of resistance and retaliation to stereotypes of Asians.

Another interesting aspect of my ethnic identity navigation is the shift in discourse from essentialism to hybridity. Essentialism sees identity as static, biologically determined 'being'. It denotes that outer appearance and particular set of cultural practices determine how a person is identified culturally. For instance, I believed that putting on a 'drag' was essential in order to claim a specific identity. Hybridity, on the other hand, sees identity as a dynamic, choice-based process in which multiple identities can exist at once with the capacity to hold contradictions in one place (Papastergiadis 2000,14-5). This holds true to my experience when I realised that I could negotiate and assert the identity I believed in, in response to changing environments, relationships and circumstances I faced.

National Identity: Transnationalism

Having experienced an array of identity dilemmas, I struggled with the lack of conviction in claiming my nationality as New Zealand during my early adult years. Whenever I travelled abroad, returning to New Zealand was returning 'home' simply because this was my place of residence. I didn't feel a sense of belonging to what I understood as New Zealand national identity, a community of rugby-loving, outdoor-oriented Pakeha and Maori people.

The first time I felt a true sense of belonging was in 2014, when I came across an online publication called Audrey. The articles commentated on Asian, American and Asian-American popular culture from Asian American women's perspectives. Asian women were portrayed in a medium I was familiar with, on their achievements and merits rather than for just being 'Asian'. They weren't the stereotypical depiction of overly submissive, mute women nor were they the hyper-fetishized sexual beings. Their About Us page read, "The stories in Audrey help our readers navigate their identity, relate to other Asians, and feel connected to a community. We emphasize real and multifaceted portrayals of the modern Asian woman, ones that reflect the ethnic, cultural and generational diversity of this demographic" (Audrey Magazine, n.p). This little paragraph ensured me I didn't have to be American to belong here but that I just feel connected. I felt so empowered. I felt like I had finally found my own people. I finally felt at home.

The lack of conviction I felt in claiming New Zealand as my national identity can be explained by the exclusive nature of New Zealand nationhood. As I have expressed in my own experience, New Zealand's national identity is bound up with the majority ethnicity of Pakeha (Murphy, 2003, 49). As of the 1980s, government policies to rectify the colonial destruction of Maori rights have re-shaped the nationhood as a Pakeha-Maori bicultural community (Spoonley, 2003, 41). Where then do I fit in this bicultural nation? Significant power in New Zealand national identity politics lies in the hands of the dominant majority, Pakeha, who do not widely accept Asians as New Zealanders (Murphy, 2003, 65). We, the Asian New Zealanders, are positioned outside of how nationhood is defined and often suffer second-class status (Murphy, 2003, 65). The Maori hold relatively more power than Asian New Zealanders to define who gets to claim the New Zealand nationality. With this knowledge, I see myself not below, but alongside the Maori through self-assertion of my incomplete but present New Zealand identity as an Asian New Zealander. As DeSouza proclaims (2011, 229), I, too, feel compelled to support Maori in their self-determination to ground New Zealand in the founding principals of the Treaty of Waitangi, in hope that this will open up a space for a multiethnic national identity.

Moving on to the deep sense of belonging I felt to the Asian American women voices online, Appadurai's work on modern subjectivities in the virtual, transnational era explains my experience (as cited in Epstein, 2006, 148). He argues that the increasing networks created through electronic media and modern travel challenges geographically bound ideas of ethnicity and nationhood. New identities and imagined communities are created in the virtual space where people feel a sense of primary belonging to the virtual transnational community. For instance, Asian women of various immigrant backgrounds in Western countries such as US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand probably share similar struggles in navigating their ethnic and national identity. By coming together on a platform like Audrey Magazine, they are united beyond their geographical borders through shared experiences such as the frustration I expressed towards stereotyped portrayal of Asian women in media. I think it is in these virtual spaces that the most authentic, unfiltered, multifaceted hybrid identity representations and navigations occur and give rise to new age transnational identities.

Conclusion

This essay has used concepts of social ascription, the constructionist approach to identity construction, essentialism, hybridity, ethnicity based nationhood and transnationalism to make sense of my racial, ethnic and national identity experiences. Stephen Maturin aptly summarises my sentiments about identity; "There is nothing absolute about this identity of mine" (as cited in Cornell & Hartmann, 2007, 76). As a person whose identity lives beyond assigned labels, the dynamism of identity construction is an empowering process. I no longer observe myself blurrily floating in a cultural no man's land but rather, confidently weaving my way through vast cultural experiences. What my own experiences gifted me was a multi-access pass through various cultural boundaries. Therefore I conclude the essay with this: Sure, I am yellow; but I am yellow and more.

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Sociology 100

Issues and Themes in Sociolgy

Katrina de Joya

Four Glass Ceilings: Understanding Gender Norms, Racial Stereotypes and Identity

I am a young woman. I am an immigrant woman. I am a young, immigrant, Filipina woman.

With these categorical identities, there are many issues that I face today. This essay will analyze how sociological concepts such as gender norms, racial stereotypes and the dramaturgical approach to identity have shaped and continue to shape my life. Personal examples are used to further assert that the three concepts are present and identifiable in our own realities. By exploring these three concepts, we are able to question traditional gender, racial and cultural issues.

Gender Norm: The Maria Clara and New Woman Ideal

As Simone de Beauvoir stated: "One is not born a woman, but rather becomes one." (De Beauvoir, 1949). This statement claims that instead of 'women' being a biological, natural notion it is, in fact, a social construction. This idea of gender is learned through a 'recitation' of actions that reinforce gender norms. (Morison & Macleod, 2013). Gender norms - values that show us the appropriate and acceptable way to do gender - come from a number of sources, most specifically cultural (Gere & Helwig, 2012). I was born in the Philippines and lived there until I was thirteen. As a young girl, and up to today, the feminine ideal was to embody the Spanish colonial ideal - "religious, charitable, demure, chaste and strictly located in the domestic sphere" (Roces, 2015). This ideal was also known as Maria Clara - a fictional character in Jose Rizal's Noli Mi Tangere - a novel that sparked the revolution of the Philippines against Spain. As a young girl, every woman that I looked up to (whether it be my family or the actresses on television) strove to be a Maria Clara. Unable to question it yet, I followed this pattern of gender socialization. Subduing women's sexuality was a deep-rooted part of the Filipino cultural construction of femininity (Roces, 2015). Thus, I have never been kissed, never been in a relationship and still have conflicted opinions about having sex before marriage. As most traditional gender norms are rigid and unchanging through time (Simonds & Brush, 2005), Maria Clara lacks the empathy to change through a different social context, further strengthening the 'ideal' way to do socialization. Traditional norms, specifically traditional gender norms, while positive in ensuring our identity is not lost in a fast-paced globalized world, funnels and narrows our understanding of circumstances in their wider context (Maramba, 2008).

The Filipina (Filipino woman) ideal has changed enormously since the arrival of the Americans in the 1900s (Maramba, 2008). This saw the creation of the New Woman ideal, who was defined as independent, educated and career-orientated (Roces, 2015). With women earning more than men by 13%

as of March 2016, the appointment of two female presidents and women getting a tertiary education more than men by 4.6% (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2016), the image of Maria Clara as an ideal to Filipinas seems to have disappeared in the 21st century (Roces, 2015). However, strong-held cultural and gender specific traditions cannot just fade away. The Filipino media continues to reinforce the image of Maria Clara subtlety through the portrayal of women characters and actresses in the entertainment business (McFerson, 2011). Maria Clara and the New Woman are both unrealistic and paradoxical ideals for Filipinas (Maramba, 2008). Women such as I are praised for getting a job in correlation to the New Woman ideal, but are condemned for getting a job, say, in the construction sector in relation to the Maria Clara ideal (Maramba, 2008). The struggle for Filipinas living up to these two unrealistic ideals of femininity continues to increase with age; as individuals mature, they feel a greater responsibility to represent their family and do 'right' by them. (Gere et al., 2012) Gendered actions, and whether individuals abide by said gendered norms like Maria Clara and New Woman, do not only have significant consequences to themselves, but also to their family.

Racial Stereotypes: The Mail-Order Bride

Stereotypes are not necessarily untrue; they just merely do not tell the whole story. Walter Lippmann in his book Public Opinion (ed. 2012), defines stereotypes as "an ordered more or less consistent picture of the world, to which our habit... our hopes have adjusted themselves." (p. 52). Reducing individuals to boxes and categories renders our sociological understanding of ourselves and the people around us ineffective, as it does not properly reflect the complexity of individuals. Stereotyping harms the individuals as they internalize such terms and become the basis of who they should be (Matthewman, West-Newman, Curtis, 2013). For example, I have always known that Filipinas like myself had an ongoing stereotype of being a 'mail-order bride'. The mail-order bride at its harshest can be described as "men in industrialized nations to procure wives from developing countries through agencies that specialize in marketing available women" (Lee, 1998). However as there are now legislations in the country such as the Anti-Mail-Order Bride 1990, getting a mail-order bride is now illegal. Today, the mail-order bride stereotype has been transformed to mean Filipinas who have managed to 'snatch' a Western man. These Filipinas are seen in Filipino culture as lucky, privileged and beautiful. (Del Roasario, 2005). Due to this stereotype which has been embedded deep into Filipino society, women, like me, are encouraged to date Western men. My grandparents and friends from the Philippines who I talk to on Skype often ask if I have gotten a date from a 'white guy' and if it 'was cool'. The stereotype has been so deep

rooted that I unconsciously find myself observing other Filipinas who have a white boyfriend or husband. I judge and consider their credibility to get 'such a man'. For me, these socialized actions are automatic (Matthewman et al., 2013). Young Filipinas have been indoctrinated to view white, ideally American men as a better choice to date than a man who has the same ethnicity as us, merely because we consider them more handsome and successful (Velasco, 2013). Living in New Zealand, where the population is dominated by Europeans, this stereotype of Filipinas preferring to date white guys is intensified because we are critically judged for not being beautiful enough when we are not in a relationship with a white man (Misajon & Koo, 2008). While I understand that stereotypes are needed in the everyday to simplify the complexity of life - it closes the process of learning about others as individuals. Stereotyping destroys a person's uniqueness and distorts the connections between human relationships. Stereotypes can create self-fulfilling prophecies which can limit the opportunities for Filipina women (Velasco, 2013).

Dramaturgical roles: Adapting to Changes

In a multi-cultural society such as New Zealand and the ever increasing globalization of the world through social media, identity can never be an unfixed, unmovable concept (Smith, 2007). Indeed, we carry multiple identities - changing and being acted upon depending on the social situation (Matthewman et al., 2013). This concept is known as the dramaturgical approach theory. It was developed by Erving Goffman, who used dramaturgical jargon of actors, audiences and stages to present that identity is made of various roles to play. The main objective for social actors is to present and maintain various roles to their different audiences (Smith, 2007). Leaving the Philippines for New Zealand did not change the roles that I am supposed to play but merely added to them. For my parents, I must maintain my culture in any way possible, specifically by still upholding the Maria Clara ideal of a woman and not a Western one. I make sure that when I am with our Filipino relatives in New Zealand, I am dressed conservatively, I don't talk to elders unless I am asked and stay close to my parents. Even with my New Zealand Filipino friends, I am more formal and conservative as dictated by what is wanted from me. I cannot act this way with most of my New Zealand friends, who are also multi-cultural themselves and generally uphold Western standards of femininity. Thus, when I am with my friends in New Zealand I uphold Western values of the ideal woman. I am more informal and open in my speech and the topics I talk about and dress more liberally. Indeed, because my two groups of friends are from different environments, they talk and behave in different ways (Schimmelfennig, 2010). In order to 'fit' in both groups, I alternate different roles to suit my audience and maintain

impressions. Sometimes one role might overpower the other causing conflict between me and my parents. Indeed, immigrant individuals, especially youth, must constantly check to make sure that they're balancing each role, and one role is not taking over the other.

To summarize, an analysis of gender norms, racial stereotypes and the application of the dramaturgical approach theory shows how these concepts can dictate and form an individual's life and upbringing.

The polarizing images of the Maria Clara and New Woman continue to haunt many Filipina women who try and most of the time fail to live up to such high standards. The racial stereotypes of women being seen as mail-order brides have transitioned from an industry to a more acceptable norm that is relationship based. However, the same meaning of the mail-order bride exists, Filipina women still believe that they are seen as more privileged being with Western men. Furthermore, the dramaturgical approach proves that the duality does not just exist in the gender sphere; it also exists in the racial and identity spheres. Filipino immigrants have more roles to play in their adopted societies than their native ones.

These dichotomies do not just apply to immigrant Filipinos; it is a reality of many immigrants in any country. By delving into concepts and issues of gender, race and identity, we are able to see the social structures that are embedded into society and understand its significance.

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Ethnicity and Identity

Ryan Macallister

MAPAFIKA - An interconnected identity

MA-PA-FIKA is a term coined by my Aunty as a positive, holistic expression of an otherwise disparate identity. It represents my Maori, Pakeha, and PasiFIKA ancestry. Although it is a useful term to describe my identity, the presumption that it is a flowing, undisturbed entity requires interrogation. This essay will explore each of my ethnic identities separately. This is because I assert, conceal, and negotiate each part of my ethnic make-up in different ways. I will attempt to show how I experience each 'part' by utilizing the theoretical concepts of 'thick and thin' and 'social and self-ascription'. In doing so, I hope to highlight how feelings of anxiousness can arise when walking 'between' worlds, and how this changes depending on which identity I am committing to. I also acknowledge the privilege associated with a hybrid identity, but highlight a consideration of never being able to truly fit in.

"MA" – The Black Duckling (Doing)

The tale of the ugly duckling is a well-known one. It follows the life of a black duck that is ostracized by other yellow ducklings due to its undesirable features. 'MA' in Maori can mean black, which fits this section of the essay perfectly. I have felt like a 'black duck' in my life, feeling excluded because I have been unable to live up to the idealised form of what being Maori is supposed to be. What is important to highlight is that while I tend to think that others (people, family, society) will challenge my identity claim, upon reflection it is actually myself who tends to think that I am not 'Maori enough'. Cornell and Hartmann (2007, 76) argue that this process of social and self-ascription is key in formulating an identity. In this case my 'Maoriness' is not just being tested against externalised social ascription; it is also my internalised self-ascription of what 'I' think it means to be Maori that prevents me from engaging with my Maori identity.

Despite acknowledging this process, my apprehension remains. One significant example of this is my hesitance to enter the Nga Tauira Maori room on the University campus. I view this room as the pinnacle of what it means to be Maori – steeped in notions of traditional expectations. Hirini Meads (cited in McIntosh 2006, 78) articulation of what it means to be Maori conveys these ideas, which emphasises not only being Maori, but 'doing' or performing it too. Broadly speaking, these qualities she defines are: Knowing whakapapa; meeting cultural obligations; and how often one visits their Marae (McIntosh 2006, 81). Inability to conform to these criteria acts as a basis for my self-ascription, which McIntosh argues can promote ideas of being inauthentic (McIntosh 2006, 81). Like person D interviewed in Emily Keddell's study (2010, 52) who felt they couldn't join the Samoan students association "because [they weren't] a 'real' Samoan" I feel a similar way, as if the Maori students might view me as 'plastic' or fake.

McIntosh (2006, 75) in response to Mead, provides an alternative, sympathetic view arguing that defining Maori in traditional terms can marginalise Maori who have never been exposed to their Whakapapa, Te Reo, or Iwi/Hapu. It also raises barriers as there are presumptions of what Maori 'should' know 'naturally' (McIntosh, 81). Keddell highlights one reason why Maori identity is raised to such high expectations is to prevent the exploitation of indigenous identity (2010, 48). Due to the social context of New Zealand's colonial history, this period was crucial in shaping any emerging identity. Timothy McCreanor highlights the primitivist discourse both in the past and present, which depicted this emerging Maori identity as 'noble savages' who were "at once beastial and innocent" (1997, 38). This is important as despite knowing and being able to recite my Whakapapa, due to the socio-historical and cultural landscape people may assume I'm being 'plastic' or superficially Maori. In other words, I feel like I don't know enough to be seen as 'legitimate', and may also be viewed as a 'bad' Maori.

Keddell (2010, 47) asserts sites at the Meso level like schools perpetuate and reinforce notions of this dichotomy, where 'good' Maori traits like the Haka are celebrated yet simultaneously denying the learning of Te Reo which is viewed as 'bad' or unnecessary. This is the lasting result of colonisation, an attempt to secure the 'death' of the indigenous culture. By normalizing stigmatic views of Maori it would make people who had Maori blood more likely to reject the identity. Another important site that this belittling of Maori occurred was with my Pacific family, who actively joked and portrayed being Maori as a negative. Balibar (as cited in Augie and Spoonley 1999, 92) highlights the neo-racism of my Pacific family, which was not "based on biological heredity but [rather] based on cultural differences." Both of these also played a significant role in shaping my resistance to a Maori identity.

Unlike the black duckling, I acknowledge that my hybrid status affords me certain privileges, like being able to apply for Maori scholarships. Also, any anxiousness I felt in being unable to claim my Maori identity was alleviated by being able to 'fall back' on my Pacific identity, to be explored in the 'FIKA' section. My 'thin' Maori identity, which Cornell and Hartman (2007, 76) define as "having a small impact in shaping [my] social life" will with time and effort on my part hopefully grow someday to be 'thick' (having a larger role). This section was important to explore as it highlights marginality as a key theme, and the way in which self and social-ascription play a key role in identity claiming.

"PA" – The Brown Pakeha (Looking)

"But how can you be Pakeha if you're Maori?"
There are multiple ways to read this question. One way is 'how can you be Pakeha, if a Pakeha is someone who is a non-Maori?' The second is 'how can you be Pakeha if you're brown?' Both of these views are what I often encounter when I say I have Pakeha ancestry. The idea of having to 'be' a certain way links to the "MA" paragraph, but differs because authenticity in this section is based on physical characteristics as opposed to cultural expressions.

Fleras and Spoonley (1999, 83) highlight speculation about an evolving Pakeha ethnicity, and the role it plays in New Zealand. Their explanation of 'being Pakeha' is largely theoretical in nature, and is aimed at highlighting what Pakeha should be in relation to Maori. This dichotomy intimately links these two identities – not together, but as two parts of a separated whole. What Spoonley and Fleras don't explore is which identity is asserted if you happen to be both Maori, Pakeha, and an additional different ethnicity. This can create a site of unease and highlights specific relationships of dominance and subordination, in terms of what ethnicity is valued and which isn't.

As stated by Keddell (2010, 49), identity has historically been based on essentialist or racialised "phenotypical features and the meanings we give to those features". Unsurprisingly, assertions of national identity in New Zealand place Pakeha and not Maori as the central people. Michael BIllig's (1995, 65) concept of Banal Nationalism is useful to deconstruct the taken for granted and presumed heritage we share. "Kiwi" for example is an expression assumed to mean "All New Zealanders" but the reality is it represents Pakeha first and Maori as an add-on. Related to the "MA" paragraph, this continues to colonize Maori, effectively 'othering' them and creating a boundary that disconnects them from their position as Tangata Whenua while also securing the dominance of the Pakeha hegemonic identity.

What is significant is that while I do not actively assert my Pakeha identity, I rather 'perform' it. I am often told I "speak white" by both my Pacific family and friends. Having established that 'White' is a biased concept but presumed to be neutral, what I assume my friends/family are telling me is that I speak 'intelligently'. This promotes a contradictory identity; how can I speak 'white' and 'be' brown? It also highlights racial connotations – that speaking intelligently is a realm solely for white people. This is another obvious power play, one that continues to be replicated in sites such as schools, University and other organisations. Assertions of Pakeha identity are complex, because of the social and political way identity is formulated. In line with ideas suggested in Avril Bell's chapter (2004, 129) about Maori-Pakeha hybrid

identities, I would have to simultaneously acculturate and seemingly reject my brownness to be seen as a legitimate Pakeha.

My Pakeha Identity is difficult to stake a claim to because despite acknowledging my "Pakeha" ancestry, there is always anxiousness of an expected response of friends and society broadly rejecting my claim. As Cornell and Hartman (2007, 81) argue, the meaning assigned on first instance will never be "Pakeha" because of my brown skin. Grace Taylor (2011) and Kiri Pihana-Wong (Maraea, 2014) both make strong claims to their Samoan, Chinese and Maori identities. What is important to note is that because of their fair (light) skin colour, their claim to being Pakeha is not likely to be challenged in the same way mine is. This is not to say they don't have issues when expressing their identities where I would have an advantage (of being brown in cultural arenas) but highlights the intimate way a "Pakeha" identity is still based on skin colour. As opposed to my "MA" identity, my "PA" identity could be seen as thick, because despite not looking Pakeha, I am able to stereotypically 'act' as one in important arenas like University and at work. This component of my identity was important to explore as it highlights boundary making, marginality, and the exclusive nature of identity claiming.

FIKA – Pasifika home and gendered expectations (Being)

In contrast to my feelings in the 'MA' section of this essay I feel no anxiousness in and asserting my Pacific identity because I have grown up in a 'Pacific' environment. In relation to the 'PA' section I am never told I 'don't look' Polynesian. These are important to identify as questions of my authenticity in this world would be answered with confidence, because I know the protocol and thus can respond to these challenges.

Despite viewing my Pacific ancestry in a positive light, only upon reflection and with interrogation do sites of anxiety arise. While my claim to Pasifika identity is strong, upon analysis I have realised that I don't always fit in. Thomas King's (2005, 48) experience with a socially assigned identity describes my anxiety clearly – however, instead of being 'Indian' it is rephrased as "You're not the [Pacific Islander] I had in mind." There are two important points to this comparison. The first is that there are specific ideals of what being a Pacific Islander is meant to be. The second is how this meaning is socially ascribed.

To highlight these two points, challenges to my Pacific ethnicity don't happen at a cultural or physical level. Instead, these challenges occur in subversive ways in relation to gender, as Pacific culture is highly gendered and the corresponding gender roles are clear. Chris Brickell (2007, 204-

205) expresses that the way we 'do' gender is informed by culture, and then adopted, resisted, or modified. Being a Pacific male comes with expectations of hyper-masculinity: playing sports, a low voice, certain behaviours. Because I don't fit in any of these categories, my idea of fitting in rests purely on my claim to 'know' Pacific culture.

As a result of this social ascription and silent 'raised eye brows' or frown-faced challenges when I introduce myself to other Pacific males, being able to 'weave in and out' of cultures is essential. Krebs (as cited in Tupuola, 90) states this idea of edgewalkers as "[...] resilient to cultural shifts and able to maintain continuity wherever he or she goes, walking the edge between [...] cultures in the same persona." This is useful for me to avoid challenges to my Pacific identity. Although I have strong links to my Pacific identity, my inability to conform to the gendered expectation means that 'crossing' into another realm, and staking claims in my Pakeha or Maori ancestry provides ways of alleviating this anxiousness. Interpreted critically, these are what I use as 'excuses' for my lack of hyper-masculine qualities, as I say that "I do well in school" which to others likely means I prioritise school over sport.

This notion of having to appease others is a new site for my exploration, as I had never consciously thought about my exclusion as it is a site of uncomfortableness. The notion that I may not fit in to the place I so closely associate with 'home' has prevented me from meaningfully engaging with this area. Daniel Miller's (2008, 352) ethnography about his experience of being treated differently in higher education is reflective of my experiences too. Where he felt that he was always a legitimate member of society that was excluded on race, my feelings of exclusion stem from not meeting gendered expectations. Importantly, despite being and identifying as a Pacific person, due to the way I 'act' ("speaking white") as stated in the 'PA' section, I normally have to 'prove' my membership of being a Pacific Islander in other ways.

This aspect of my identity is important to explore because although I relate and view my Pacific identity as a site without problems, the reality is that my authenticity is both questioned and negotiated to fit the perceived ideas of what being a Pasifika male means. Although I think I am asserting a unique and holistic Pacific identity, much like my 'MA' and 'PA' paragraphs, I unconsciously fall back on both of them to alleviate any challenges or problems in my 'FIKA' identity. This highlights the mobile nature of individuals with a hybrid status, able to as Tupuola (2007, 88) expresses "weave within multiple ethnic cultures with relative ease". The implications of this will be discussed in the conclusion.

MAPAFIKA – A Connected Identity

I started this essay examining my ethnic identities separately. The reality is that they are all interlinked. My hybrid identity affords me the ability to both walk between and as an 'edge walker' of each world. This interconnectivity is important, as it highlights the hybrid identity as an evolving, continuous process where individuals are agents to decide their own fate and not static. What is important to recognise is the pressures from family, friends and society in shaping the way we behave or act and the role identity politics has in deciding what identity is relevant or not. This essay has forced me to examine just how reliant I am on all my ethnic identities. Also realising that despite associating closely with my Pacific identity first and foremost, it was important for me to recognise that it is also a place where I also have the potential to be seen as an outsider. The benefits of a hybrid identity must be weighed against the expectations of all worlds we are forced to traverse, and both of these should be considered when spoken about in academic literature.

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