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
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Interesting Journal

Construction and Consumption

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Editors' Note

Interesting Journal is compiled of 15 essays from the Faculty of Arts at the University of Auckland. The essays are independent academic works that have been written by undergraduate students in Semester Two 2016 or Summer School 2017. The material is presented to you in the form of a story. The works of Edition 5 explore how we simultaneously construct and consume our identities. Our authors look at identity in terms of violence, punishment, gender, and curiously, diet.

Through the lenses of construction and consumption, we can understand how modern media impacts our political decisions amd our identities, mobilising us to take political, or even violent, action. The pieces in this chapter showcase the ways construction and consumption are employed to explain political phenomena, intrinsically linked to power and identity. From contrasting uses of media to the construction of a utopian future, this chapter explores the processes by which we become political subjects through news media, social media, religious, political and race-based ideologies.

Bradley's analysis of post-truth politics examines emotionally driven rhetoric in the context of the 2016 US election. Political consumer habits have changed with the ubiquity of social media, and Bradley addresses the role that Facebook has in shaping political views. Distrust of the media, Bradley argues, is a pivotal determinant in the post-truth era. Attempts by the media to fact-check and characterise Donald Trump did little to deter voters and in fact propelled their sense of disenfranchisement. Consumption of political media therefore hinges on trust, and regaining the trust of the public is no easy feat. Bradley argues that returning to core journalistic virtues would help reconcile the media with the public; but for the meantime the post-truth era is a political climate in which feelings trump facts.

Taking a contrasting view of social media, Middleton and Neilson delve into the incorporation of digital space in Māoridom. Online, Māori have a distinct voice and uninhibited freedom to construct meaningful communities in a somewhat decolonised space, yet this does not come without its challenges. There are elements of indigenous knowledge that are to be handled delicately, and when members of the community are separated geographically despite being connected digitally, communicating these ideas proves contentious. Nonetheless, the value of digital space for Māori is undeniable. Middleton and Neilson present their case with an emphasis on maintaining iwi and whānau connections, as well as liberating Māori voices from the scrutiny of Pākehā. Where Māori now live in Pākehā-dominated societies, the internet provides a safe space to deliberate rights and responsibilities. Despite geographical isolation, digital media fosters a sense of community.

Maier-Gant's take on construction, however, is a question of power. It is well known that history-making is an exercise of power, and the very essence of this lies in the construction of a narrative. There is a marked disparity between the way incidences of violence are labelled when perpetrated by Muslims as compared to white supremacists. Here, the narrative is shaped by a white dominance that controls the rhetoric around race relations. Maier-Gant finds that acts are only labelled terrorism when committed against the politically powerful in society.
Constructing a narrative is taken a step further by Tay, who politicises the construction

of an ideal future. Here, consumption of identity is a subscription for religious or political ideology, yet the construction occurs in the imagining of a political utopia: a vision worth fighting for. These utopian visions give purpose during uncertain times, and motivate violence in pursuit of these aims. ISIS used social media to communicate this vision to people in states of uncertainty throughout the world. Channelled through media, the simultaneous construction and consumption of identity is a means to mobilise people and incite violence.

Going forward, this chapter represents the process of politicising media and violence, offering a perspective of power at various levels. Central to each of these essays is the concept of identity, assumed by consumption and shaped through construction. We hope this chapter challenges your understanding of media and politics in our lives, and the ways in which we too can be influencers.

FTVMS 318
Journalism in Practice

Ferris Bradley

In 2016, the term "post-truth" came into prominence. Use of the phrase increased by two thousand percent, was selected by Oxford Dictionaries as the word of the year, and captured a collective mood amongst critics for a political cycle that will be remembered for its tremendous populist upheaval (Smith, 2016). In 2016, post-truth politics manifested itself in the US presidential and Brexit campaigns. The movements were fronted neither by empirical evidence nor rational argument, but by misinformation and rhetoric that spoke to voters emotionally.

Post-truth Politics

The notion of post-truth politics refers to the replacement of verifiable evidence with demagoguery that appeals to electorates by way of visceral, demonstrative and, above all, emotional argument. Laybats and Tredinnick (2016) characterise the post-truth phenomenon as a "wilful blindness to evidence", "a mistrust of authority," and "an appeal to emotionally based arguments often rooted in fears or anxieties" (p. 204).

The post-truth era does not signify that we are in a post-modernist period in which there is no objective fact or truth, rather it signifies a socio-political climate in which evidence, rationalism, and plain facts are no longer highly regarded by the general populace. As Haddad (2016) explains, the prefix "does not mean a chronological state after the truth as its absence", but "its being downgraded to a level where it becomes irrelevant and secondary to the act of emotionally appealing to deep grievances and a sense of insecurity and loss". It has generated a political landscape in which politicians can appeal to the baser human instincts of emotion and fear, instead of policy and facts (Haddad, 2016).

Such demagoguery was widely practiced in 2016 by populist anti-establishment politicians. Most notably, Donald Trump and his victory in the U.S. presidential election, as well as Nigel Farage of the Brexit campaign that saw the United Kingdom vote to withdraw from the European Union. The Brexit campaign claimed that "$437m was sent by the UK every week to the EU and that each transfer is enough to build a fully-equipped hospital back home" (Haddad, 2016). This fact was never checked: it was incorrect. Even if it were correct, it still disregards that half of the transfer is returned to the United Kingdom in the form of subsidies for agriculture, education and business (Haddad, 2016).

On the other side of the Atlantic, Politifact data conveys that 70% of Trump's statements over the last 5 years were false or mostly false, with 15 percent half-true and 15 percent true (Accessed 2017, Jan. 19). The harmful nature of some of these falsehoods is perhaps epitomised by Trump's racist endorsement of the birther conspiracy by which he assertively suggested that president Barrack Obama was not born in the United States. In 2011, on ABC's The View, Trump claimed that "I want him to show his birth certificate, there's something on that birth certificate that he doesn't like" (Schwarz, 2011). Trump used emotional rhetoric in an attempt to delegitimize Obama's presidency, proving the

significance of emotions over facts in the post-truth era.

Voter Sentiment and Anti-establishment Populism

The socio-political context that enables post-truth politics to function rests on the disenchantment of the working class in regard to the status-quo, the political establishment, and a perceived liberalist ideology of political correctness. Gross (2017) attributes the popularity of post-truth demagogues to "social progress directed at helping minorities", which has generated a new middle class in the developing world but threatened the social security of workers and employees in the west (p. 1-4).

Lichtenstein (2016) denotes the movement as populist, a term used to aggregate "unorganised and atomised anti-elite sentiment of any sort" (p. 235). Lichtenstein (2016) clarifies that this is not like the labor movement, in which workers rallied against the elite by way of trade unions and organised leadership. In this case, Trump harnessed a disenfranchised white working class that lacked any form of engagement with "organised politics" or "self-conscious interest groups" (Lichtenstein, 2016, p. 240). Formisano (2016) generally defines populism as the belief held by the working class that "the system is titled against them, that they have lost control of their lives, and that self-serving elites have taken control of the "people's" government" (p. 282). Brewer (2016) deconstructs the elements of American populism to a "championing of the common people", with "rural roots", "anti-elitism", "anti-intellectualism and anti-government views" (p. 249).

This widespread anti-establishment sentiment generated the populist tsunami that encouraged the practice of post-truth political rhetoric, propelling a billionaire reality star to presidency (Formisano, 2016). Gross (2016) normatively describes the post-truth phenomenon as an apparent "U-turn" from two centuries of intellectual rationalist progress since the Enlightenment which has seen radical social progress, from the abolition of slavery to equal rights for homosexuals.

The Facebook Bubble

Social media services exasperate the circulation of fake-news and post-truth rhetoric by way of the Facebook filter bubble. Facebook and other social media sites act as echo-chambers, in which algorithms aggregate user activity though clicks and likes and in turn determine the information and ideologies that will be displayed in the newsfeed (Laybats & Tredinnick, 2016, p. 204). This creates a circular bubble in which a particular user will receive information and perspectives that they want to see. For online communities of a populist, anti-establishment nature, fake news regarding the political elite proliferates with ease.

To proliferate the post-truth notion further, Facebook's aesthetic formatting has a flattening effect. This makes it visually difficult to distinguish between credible sources

and rogue variants (Lewis, 2016). As such, posts from "Make America Great" appear in users' newsfeeds with the same framing and weight as carefully researched and verified investigations from The New York Times or The Guardian (Lewis, 2016). "The internet has had a flattening effect," says Brian Stelter, host of "Reliable Sources" on CNN (Lewis, 2016). "My mom's opinion on Facebook looks the same as a thoroughly sourced story. One man's blog looks the same as the The New York Times," says CNN's Reliable Sources host Brian Stelter (Lewis, 2016). Furthermore, fake-news with sensationalist or clickbait headlines is likely to receive clicks and views from even discerning readers (Laybats and Tredinnick, 2016, p. 205), exasperating the proliferation of fake-news across social media (Gross, 2017).

The Pizzagate scandal was a conspiracy theory connecting Democratic Party members to a fake child-sex ring operating out of family restaurants. Pizzagate went viral throughout online communities that value or pursue sensationalist anti-establishment stories. I personally did not once notice the Pizzagate scandal in my own Facebook bubble as, of course, I am also confined to my own social media echo-chamber and such a conspiracy is not something my online community tends to share.

So, with the rise of post-truth rhetoric increasingly spouted from politicians, anti-establishment sentiment growing and social media echo-chambers exasperating the post-truth anti-establishment climate, we turn our attention to journalistic verification.

Journalistic Verification

Kovach and Rosentiel (2014) consider the lifeblood of journalism to be the discipline of verification: striving to arrive as close to the truth of the matters at hand as seemingly possible through, even idiosyncratic, processes of verification. It is rigorous and systematic methods of testing and providing information that allow journalists to come as close as practically possible to the truth (Kovach & Rosentiel, 2014). This is of course essential to the democratic process when reporting on serious issues of public interest such as war, politics, and education.

In *The Elements of Journalism*, Kovach and Rosentiel (2014) characterise reportage as a science of verification by way of five key intellectual principles: "never add anything that was not there originally; never deceive the audience; be as transparent as possible about your methods and motives; rely on your own original reporting; and exercise humility" (p. 111-112).

To counter the post-truth tsunami, the mass media could have better utilized two virtues of verification: transparency and humility. The "spirit of transparency" encourages journalists to be as honest as possible with their audiences regarding sources, methods, and motives (Kovach & Rosentiel, 2014, p. 114). The virtue of transparency also embodies "one's respect for the audience" (Kovach & Rosentiel, 2014, p. 114). This helps affirm a public interest motive for journalism and creates trust between the journalist and

citizen (Kovach & Rosentiel, 2014). Similarly, the virtue of humility enables journalists to question not just the facts, but also their own ability to know what the 'facts' really mean (Kovach & Rosentiel, 2014). Humility means an acknowledgement of the limits to one's knowledge and the "power of one's perceptions" (Kovach & Rosentiel, 2014. p. 125). Humility and transparency, as I shall discuss, could have helped create a journalism of verification that valued the views and feelings of disenfranchised voters, rather than merely alienating them.

Verification amidst Populism

In the wake of a post-truth avalanche, the surface level - reductionist and seemingly failed - answer appears to be formulated as verification-by-fact-checking. Surely, as long as the mass media are fact-checking candidates to the nth degree, their 'lies' of truthiness will be exposed to voters? But of course the opposite happened; the mass media fact-checked and were demonised as a result. The media were characterised as being a part of the establishment that populist leaders Trump and Farage stood vehemently against.

It seems that amidst a climate of anti-establishment sentiment, by ignoring the journalistic virtues of transparency and humility, the media did not squash post-truth politics but unintentionally bolstered and qualified the anti-elitist rhetoric of Trump and Farage. Simultaneously the media denoted themselves as the establishment, creating a gulf of distrust between the populace and the media, ultimately discrediting themselves as a viable source of information for populist voters. I am of course not talking about Fox News, but the likes of the more liberal CNN, The New York Times and The Guardian. These anti-media sentiments are then further exasperated by social media echo-chambers.

Media Failings

Haddad (2016) explains that the media plays an ongoing role in the "suffering of the middle-class … now-famous ordinary half-educated white man" who is damaged in his own sense of masculinity by feminism, LGBT, and political correctness. In response, conservatives created an alternative public space, propelled by social media, for networking and sharing ideological values that were anti-mainstream (Haddad, 2016). "Anti-media belief" became a "rhetorical shield" for Trump supporters alienated by the perceived pro-liberal mass media (Haddad, 2016). Findings from the Pew Research Centre show that 47% of conservatives receive all their news from a single news source: Fox News. Furthermore, these individuals "distrust more than trust 24 of the 36 news sources", and are more likely to see their own political views reflected back to them on Facebook (Mitchell, Gottfried, Kiley & Eva, 2014). More radical conservatives turned their attention to the likes of alt-right conspiracy websites such as Breitbart News.

Editor of Politico Susan Glasser (2016) explains that the "media scandal of 2016" was not about what the media failed to reveal to the American public, but in what was revealed "and the fact that it didn't seem to matter". Glasser (2016) acknowledges that the media reported stories that ought to have "killed any other politicians". From evading federal taxes and lying about charity donations to his misogynistic attitudes and alleged sexual assaults, journalistic reporting did not prevent Trump from flourishing amongst voters and ultimately winning the presidential election (Glasser, 2016). Not even fact-checking could damage Trump. As Glasser (2016) explains, "the more news outlets did it, the less the facts resonated."

Glasser (2016) claims that the election cycle generated opportunities for "aggressive reporting" that "produced terrific examples of investigative, public service-minded journalism at its best". All in vain, the press dug up Trump's "long and checkered business past", "habit of serial lying", and of course "voluminous and contradictory tweets" (Glasser, 2016). It was journalistic transparency, according to Glasser (2016), "without the accountability that was supposed to come with it". Trump's past was exposed yet he bore no consequences. 'Aggressive' reportage about a candidate, with the benefit of retrospect, perhaps further alienates the disenfranchised populace who support him. Had the mainstream media been more transparent that the stringent reporting was of genuine public interest to the disenfranchised voters, the aggressive reporting may have been more effective. Furthermore, moral piety from the press did not engage the populace, but perhaps Kovach and Rosentiel's virtue of humility could have better earned the trust of America's disenfranchised working class.

During the presidential election season, BuzzFeed took 'verification' one step further. Instead of objectively fact-checking and weighing up arguments, the online platform declared BuzzFeed staff could call Trump a liar and a racist (Lewis, 2016). Ben Smith (2015), editor-in-chief, in a memo to his staff declared that "BuzzFeed News's reporting is rooted in facts, not opinion; these are facts … There's nothing partisan about accurately describing Donald Trump." Factually 'verifying' that Trump is indeed a racist, while it may be accurate, does nothing to help inform disenfranchised voters. As it played out, this unorthodox style of verification only alienated them further. Smith considers Trump to 'objectively' be a liar, and so attempted to verify his character rather than only what he said and did. This kind of verification does not embody the values of transparency and humility that are essential for news sources to earn the trust of disenfranchised conservative voters.

The New Yorker's Evan Osnos argues that Trump should have been rigorously verified and exposed earlier, yet verification was put on hold at the beginning of the election cycle in return for cheap and easy ratings generated by the novelty of a reality star running for office (Lewis, 2016). Osnos argues that "it was a mistake to allow him to go on television month after month", and that "for many months there were reporters who were still too light-hearted" about Trump (Lewis, 2016). For Trump supporters, seeing their candidate

being presented as a joke further alienated them from the mainstream media (Lewis, 2016). Importantly, Osnos states that at the beginning of Trump's campaign, "reporters were not aware enough of the level of anxiety, fear, and frustration among voters" (Lewis, 2016). However, while this statement does bear truth, the instant reaction from journalists perhaps ought not to have been to shame Trump instantaneously, but to get on the ground level with the disenfranchised voters that supported him and find out more about their worries and concerns. Osnos' stance might be augmented by suggesting that a humble approach to verification could have been adopted, instead of only starting the aggressive fact-checking at an earlier time.

In an opinion piece detailing how the liberal media failed working-class Americans, Sarah Smarsh (2016) explains that the mainstream media opted for a condescending approach when analysing how and why the white working class could possibly support the demagogue Trump. Smarsh (2016) credits this "blind spot" within the media to a lack of socioeconomic diversity within national media outlets, as "few people born to deprivation end up working in newsrooms or publishing books." CNN's Brian Stelter (2016) echoes this media blind spot in the 'Acela Corridor Bias', by which he questions; "how many media elites can honestly say they know Trump voters personally?"

After the recent presidential inauguration, Frank Bruni (2017) of the The New York Times wrote that Trump is "a braggart beyond his predecessors" which "says something sad and scary about the country that elected him… with Trump we enter a new age of arrogance." While Bruni may be correct, this kind of polarising discourse may only serve to further alienate Trump supporters, rather than healing a divided nation. However, it must be acknowledged that commercially, such discourse sells well to The New York Times' audience.

Verification that Connects

Smarsh (2016) offers a view of how journalistic verification could have looked, in the form of Alexander Zaitchick who spent months on the road across six states conversing with working-class Trump supporters. Zaitchick wished to convey the "human complexity" and nuance that the mass media missed in their generalised summations of the white working class (Smarsh, 2016). Zaitchick wrote that he was fed up with news "written by people living several time zones and income brackets away from their subjects" (Smarsh, 2016). This is a verification of humility and transparency that saw journalism placing humans at the centre, not merely generating partisan commentary. Zaitchick's transparency acknowledged that he did not actually know or understand the complex and nuanced personal experiences of disenfranchised American voters.

Lidberg (2016) claims that the post-truth climate makes "real journalism more important than ever", reinforcing the journalistic principles of "gathering, critically assessing and presenting information" that is relevant to the public interest and democratic process.

Lidberg (2016) goes on to suggest that media outlets should aim to "seriously engage with its audiences as part of a strategy to build greater trust." Furthermore, Lidberg (2016) notes that social media services like Facebook need to "step up and assume the responsibility of the publishers that they are", and in doing so, "clearly label fake news, and start a serious discussion on how to support real news and journalism".

Rebuilding Trust

I would like to suggest that the virtues of transparency and humility culminate in a humanisation of the mass media. In order to rebuild trust, the disenfranchised populace must feel that they are hearing from a media that is empathetic and compassionate. The disenfranchised need to know that the media have the integrity and dedication to visit small town America and the Rust Belt states rather than sticking to the large, and fairly liberal, urban centres. The mass media ought to be for the masses, not just the intellectually elite, if the gulf between journalist and working class citizen is to be repaired. However, of major salience and unable to be considered in this essay, are the obstacles that commercialism will place in the way of this idealist reinvigoration of the journalist-citizen relationship.

Conclusion

In summation, post-truth politics amidst anti-establishment populism, exasperated by the Facebook filter effect, has created an environment in which journalistic verification-by-fact-checking further alienates polarised voters, which in turn generates a distrust in the media. While there are still a number of other views to consider, I have shown that the solution for journalism is a holistic formulation of verification that embodies the virtues of transparency and humility that would ultimately see media outlets connecting with the disenfranchised on a grass roots level. Of course commercial pressures will present significant obstacles, yet it is paramount that the media rebuild trust with the disenfranchised if we wish to see demagogues truly held to account in this post-truth era.

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Māori 271
Māori and the Media / Te Ao Paho

Susie Middleton & Imogen Neilson

He aha te mea nui i te ao? He tangata, he tangata, he tangata (Glossary of Māori Proverbs and Sayings, n.d.).

Since early post-colonial urbanisation, Māori have been pulled away from their traditional community structure. This essay will explore how various facets of online life contribute to the sense of community and Māori identity that exists today. The Internet is unique among media. Websites are cheap to produce, content can be unmediated, and readers can be anywhere in the world. For Māori, the Internet offers an alternative to Pākehā-dominated mainstream media. Advantages of the Internet for Māori include the ability to create unmoderated content, using social media to connect with others who are not physically close by, and creating a space in which Māori can be themselves in their own culture. Māori can also use it to promote Māoridom positively, for example by encouraging one another to retain cultural values while engaging in a Pākehā-dominated society. Because content on the Internet does not have to conform to Pākehā norms, it can be used to challenge mainstream perspectives and to decolonise Pākehā. While powerful, the Internet's use is limited in this aim, since content must be sought out by the reader. Disadvantages of the Internet include its open nature, which can present challenges to those who are concerned about the inappropriate use of Māori knowledge. Māori choosing to use the Internet to publish their views and to have relationships with others must strike a balance between these concerns and the advantages of using online media to its full extent.

A combination of characteristics make the Internet different from all other media. Unlike television or newspapers, the Internet is a bottom-up media. This means that, compared to other forms of mass media, it is cheaper and easier to produce content, so almost anyone can do so. Like television, media on the Internet can be easily reproduced. This differs from newspapers or magazines, which require additional copies to be made if readership increases. However, unlike television, a website is available to the reader whenever they want it. There is no need to check schedules or set a specific time aside to consume the content. These are important features to note when examining the use of the Internet by Māori.

The relative cheapness of producing web content allows Māori who may not have access to much funding an opportunity to publish their own voice (O'Carroll, 2013a). Because almost anyone can create a website, Māori can use the Internet to create content which they control, content which is not subject to often biased reframing by third parties. The unmediated nature of the Internet allows voices previously ignored or misrepresented by mainstream media to make themselves heard on their own terms. The global nature of the Internet allows previously isolated indigenous communities to communicate (O'Carroll, 2013a). The sharing of ideas and experiences can act as an impetus for indigenous protest against colonising powers, as indigenous peoples come to see that they are not the only community attempting to assert their rights and correct historical injustices (O'Carroll, 2013a). This can be a reinforcing process, as the successes of one group spur the actions of another which can lead to further successes (O'Carroll, 2013a).

However, use of the Internet is constrained by its infrastructure, often the same infrastructure that makes it so powerful. The most obvious example of this is in the use of social networking sites such as Facebook. Since most people use Facebook in favour of other social media platforms, Facebook has close to a monopoly over social media because its value comes from its ability to connect with many people. This leads to a natural monopoly as there is little point in using social media if you cannot connect with your whanau. Since social groups are not distinct – people can be a member of many different social circles – a single platform comes to dominate social media. As such, Māori choosing to use social media must decide whether to use an established site such as Facebook, or opt for less popular websites, or create their own. The problems with established sites are a lack of control over content, and privacy issues. The disadvantages of using smaller platforms or creating an exclusive platform is that it is harder for people to find you online, and others are less likely to join given the relative convenience of established platforms.

In order to attract iwi members, Facebook groups are often public, encouraging members of the iwi, and other interested parties, to join in on the conversations and to share information in these groups. However, it opens up the possibility of people joining these groups in order to harass or offend the membership. To avoid this, a "secret" Facebook group for an iwi, hapū, marae fitness or similar collective would have to be set up, which would require the administrative team to have extensive knowledge of those who should be invited to the Facebook group. Other options would require people who ask to join a group to be subjected to scrutiny in order to ascertain their legitimacy to membership of the group (O'Carroll, 2013b). This is inconsistent with Māori traditions of self-identity and inclusivity. The moderation power of Facebook can potentially reduce offensive comments on Māori Facebook sites (Waitoa et al., 2015). However, moderation can also take away the power of discussion and free speech from Māori who would normally have been free to participate if it were a non-Internet-based setting (Waitoa et al., 2015). Facebook is a Pākehā construct and therefore moderation power is predominantly held by Pākehā. Māori authority and self-determination is not guaranteed if the moderators were to protest a topic being discussed. This is a risk Māori must take when using Facebook and other social media – that Pākehā authorities will challenge Māori social media use.

Social media is not the only platform people can use. Creating one's own websites has the advantage of near-complete control of uploaded content, but the disadvantage is that this content can be used by anyone once published. Of course, this is true of any published media, but is especially problematic online as copying digital information is much easier and cheaper than reproducing physical publications or television programmes.

For Māori, the issue of privacy and content control is of particular importance (O'Carroll, 2013a). Some knowledge shared by Māori is intended only for a select few, those who understand the responsibilities of the information and have a right to it (O'Carroll, 2013a). Furthermore, there is a concern that once published, this knowledge may be misused by people who have no right to it (O'Carroll, 2013a). In addition, many Māori elders fear

that changing the sacred processes by which information is shared – usually through traditional oral communication – may result in a loss of the sanctity of the proceedings, and of the nuance of the information passed on (O'Carroll, 2013a). Social media also opens Māori knowledge up to being compromised, changed or misrepresented through sharing (Waitoa et al., 2015). Sharing is particularly easy on social media sites like Facebook, which makes it much easier for people who do not understand the structure of the website to accidentally share information with people who have no right to it. Māori must therefore weigh up the advantages of publishing content, which include reaching whānau who cannot physically visit, with the problems of publishing sacred knowledge.

It is clear that Māori who publish content online understand this conflict. The "Communications" page of the Ngāi Tahu website states that the tribe prefers to communicate in the traditional face-to-face way, but recognises that this can be difficult as members are spread out across the world (Communications, n.d.). They choose to embrace some aspects of modern media to better cater to their whānau in the modern world (Communications, n.d.).

This is but one example of the use of the Internet to promote traditional Māori culture while adapting to the modern media landscape. While some may see the amalgamation of Māori and Pākehā cultures as a positive step – and indeed in some cases it may be – it is also an indication of the necessity of Māori tribes to adapt for their continued survival. This is a sad reflection of the dismissive attitude of colonising powers, as many aspects of Māori culture are well ahead of Pākehā in their relevance to contemporary issues. For example, the Ngāi Tahu iwi write about their work protecting natural resources, a concern for Māori dating back centuries (Rūnanga, n.d.). Environmental protection has only recently become an important value to the West, starting with the mainly middle-class Green movements of the 1970s. The same iwi writes about providing financial capital and building up strong governmental institutions (Rūnanga, n.d.). This demonstrates to both Māori and Pākehā readers that Māori culture is not out of date and irrelevant, as the mainstream media often portrays it, but is compatible with Western values, and often ahead of them (Barnes et al., 2012). Unfortunately, it does not challenge the assumption that Māori values must be compatible with Pākehā values, rather than the other way around.

In some cases, websites make it clear from the outset that they are seeking to challenge mainstream narratives about Māori irrelevance. The Te Arahanga ō Ngā Iwi website clearly states on their front page that Māori should strive to reach their "full potential in modern Aotearoa" in a way that "complements … Māori values" (Mihi, n.d.). This sends a positive message to Māori readers that they can hold onto Māori values without ceasing to be an active member of the wider New Zealand society. It also sends a message to non-Māori readers that the Māori way of life is an essential part of New Zealand culture. It challenges the mainstream assumption that there is a choice between Māori culture and modern society.

The messages directed at Māori are examples of what Barry Barclay calls "talking in" (2015). By "talking in", Barclay means producing media whose first audience is those from the culture it portrays (2015). Concepts that are familiar to Māori are not explained, and non-Māori who do not understand learn about the different culture by absorption (Barclay, 2015). This is in contrast to "talking out", whereby the media is intended for those unfamiliar with that which it depicts (Barclay, 2015). Media which talks out explains concepts rather than allowing the audience to pick them up as they consume the media (Barclay, 2015).

An example of talking out is seen in the Rangitāne website's piece on their conference centre (Rangitāne Conference Centre, n.d.). It is written to appeal to a mainstream audience, with phrases such as "Architecturally designed to capture plentiful natural light and create a comfortable ambience" and no mention of Māori history or culture (Rangitāne Conference Centre, n.d.). However, it should be noted that the conference centre is not on a marae, so this is not necessarily an indication of the website discarding Māori values in favour of appealing to a Pākehā audience.

In their section on their guiding principles, the Te Arahanga ō Ngā Iwi website gives an excellent example of talking out. The authors have given definitions for ten Māori words, such as Manaakitanga (defined as making people feel valued) and Kotahitanga (upholding unity and avoiding division) (What Guides Us, n.d.). Since most Māori people are likely to know the meaning of these words, this section is clearly aimed at the non-Māori audience. Not only does this reinforce the value of Māori culture in all aspects of society, including non-Māori society, it also challenges mainstream framing of te ao Māori. Mainstream media often portrays Māori culture in a negative light (Barnes et al., 2015).

Similarly to how iwi Facebook groups allow Māori to present information in a Māori way, the Rangitāne iwi's page on whakapapa is a clear example of talking in (Whakapapa, n.d.). The page consists of a diagram that is entirely in te reo, with no English translation (Whakapapa, n.d.). It is unintelligible to someone who does not speak te reo or understand Māori culture (Whakapapa, n.d.). This demonstrates that while websites are available to everyone, it is possible for the creators to direct content exclusively at Māori.

Some of the most "liked" iwi on Facebook operate like a business, such as Ngāti Kahungunu Iwi Inc. which has 9,069 "likes" at the time of research (Kahungunu, n.d.). Interest group the NWoO Iwi-Hapu Marae Weightloss Challenge has a significant membership of 85 members from Ngati Whatua Orakei all working together (NWoO Iwi Hapu Marae Weightloss Challenge, n.d.). These online communities demonstrate that large numbers of people show investment in their iwi affiliations on iwi Facebook websites. In this part of the Internet, Māori identity is presumed, and unlike mainstream social media, there is no need to explain Māoridom to users. This is an example of

talking in to other iwi members, and Māori with different iwi backgrounds. Members share positive stories and express regret that they missed iwi events, evidence that helps to refute the idea that urbanisation has destroyed iwi identity. Members of iwi pages comment and post in both te reo Māori and te reo Pākehā and it is the responsibility of the reader to find a translation from Māori if they need one. It is not expected of the author of the post to translate from Māori to English. This is a clear example of talking in. The online Facebook Māori communities are an example of decolonisation, as Māori reclaim their conversational community structure in a convenient way.

Another advantage of the Internet is that it can reach Māori who cannot physically visit their whānau. O'Carroll notes that 18% of Māori reside overseas, and social networking sites are one of the few ways that young Māori are able to reconnect with and retain relationships with their overseas whānau (2013b). In 2008 it was reported that 65% of people who used the Internet had more contact with others than they otherwise would have (O'Carroll, 2013b). This is easily transferable to discussions about the benefits of an online form of "communications marae", as those who are restricted by distance are able to participate in online communities (Barclay, 2015). A communications marae is a concept introduced by Barry Barclay (2015). A social space that retains the welcoming atmosphere combined with the unique Māori culture which makes a marae so valuable can be considered a communications marae. Facebook and other social media sites, for iwi, hapū, and smaller interest groups in the Māori communities, can be a communications marae. They incorporate a Māori-as-normal baseline rather than the Pākehā-as-normal assumption of mainstream New Zealand social media groups. Māori, and even some Pākehā visitors can enjoy talking in a Māori way, where issues are framed within a Māori context and the Maori world view. Māori are able to connect and reconnect with marae, whānau, hapū and iwi (O'Carroll, 2013c). Discussions on iwi Facebook sites are very similar to the way the same people talk to their friends on Facebook, despite it being unlikely that all one thousand or more iwi members who are on the site are close personal friends. The sense of community retains some of the traditional Māori community feel that does not happen in other Facebook interest groups, and this emphasises the historical marae community.

An online virtual communication space is one way of challenging mainstream narratives. The Internet can be used to achieve this aim directly. Such narratives include the dominating idea that Pākehā is the norm, that ensuring Māori can exercise their rights is giving them privileges, and that Māori culture is backward or irrelevant (Barnes et al., 2015). Another assumes that issues surrounding the Treaty of Waitangi should be defined on Pākehā terms, rather than as Māori see them (Barnes et al., 2015). It would be uncharitable to suppose that these problematic portrayals are a result of a deliberate effort by the mainstream media to undermine the Māori voice; nevertheless, the effect is felt irrespective of the intent.

The "About" section of the Rangitāne website states that "Non-exclusive and shared

occupation and use rights in these areas [the land shared between the Rangitāne iwi and others] were governed by whakapapa connections and customary protocols between the iwi." (History, n.d.). Not only does this refuse to engage in mainstream discussion about Crown control of Māori land, but it also challenges the Western assumption that land must be owned either privately or publicly, a narrative that has long caused misunderstandings about Treaty claims. Māori tradition has land owned collectively, which is neither fully public (since it is not shared with all other New Zealanders), nor fully private (since it is not exclusively owned by one person).

On the Ngāi Tahu's page about relationships, almost the first thing the reader sees is a statement that "the Treaty of Waitangi is the foundation of an intergenerational relationship between Ngāi Tahu and the Crown." (Relationships, n.d.). This completely upends the mainstream portrayal of the Treaty, which is framed as an old document, relevant only because the Māori keep bringing it up (Barnes et al., 2015). Mainstream media rarely delves into why Māori might keep talking about the Treaty, but rather insinuates in subtle ways that the issue would be solved if it were not for Māori complaints (Barnes et al., 2015).

This ignorance of and refusal to communicate historical context is another feature of the mainstream media that Māori can challenge through the Internet. Māori websites often have detailed histories featured prominently, and the framing of the history gives a more accurate representation of events, and contradicts the implicit understanding portrayed by the mainstream media. For example, the Ngāi Tūhoe website refers to the southern Waikaremoana land being "confiscated", and to the Crown "invad[ing]" Maungapōhatu in 1916 (Our History, n.d.). The website also notes that the land was not confiscated because the Māori had fought the Crown, but that tribes were confronted, and attempted to defend their land (Our History, n.d.). These words – confiscated, invade, and defend – assert Māori rights to the land, and to tribal autonomy and integrity, and act to counter-balance mainstream framing of the Crown "returning" land to Māori through current Treaty processes.

This use of the Internet serves the purpose of challenging the mainstream hegemony that dominates discussion on Māori rights and colonisation in New Zealand. It is limited in its effectiveness in a way that mainstream media is not, because readers must choose to access websites. Conversely, mainstream media producers have a greater ability to reach people who may not be seeking alternative narratives, as they can include the Māori perspective in their reporting. However at present few appear willing to do this. In spite of these limitations, the Internet can still act as a counter-balance to mainstream media narratives for Māori and for sympathetic Pākehā (since they are the most likely groups to be accessing these websites).

Another advantage of the Internet's availability is that it can help to "decolonise the coloniser" (Abel, 2013). This is the idea that in order to address the ongoing impact of

colonisation, the colonising peoples must be taught to understand the historical injustice and how it relates to society today (Abel, 2013). With regard to the Māori and Pākehā people, this means ensuring an understanding of the Treaty of Waitangi as a living agreement, rather than an important but outdated document. It also means challenging the mainstream framing of Māori issues, so that Māori values can be presented accurately, rather than allowing them to be defined on Western terms. The websites mentioned in the essay are all available to Pākehā; the Internet can help to teach non-Māori about colonisation and its lasting effects.

The openness of the communications marae especially when talking in, paves a way for the promotion of te ao Māori. It can be enabled through the increased communication that comes from online communities. The Internet can be used to encourage Māori to keep their cultural values while living in a Pākehā-dominated society. By speaking out for themselves on their own terms, Māori use the Internet to challenge the mainstream media. Māori websites and social media groups act as a decolonising entity, and promote Māori identities despite some privacy concerns and concerns about the sharing of the taonga of wānanga.

Waiho i te toipoto, kaua i te toiroa (Whakatauki, n.d.).

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Politics 200
The Politics of Extremism: From Fascism to Terrorism

Daniel Maier-Gant

A Threat to National Identity: Inconsistent Public Responses to Islamist and White-Supremacist Terrorism

Terrorism, by its very name, denotes an event with particular political potency. In recognising this, we also recognise the need to apply a heightened scrutiny to discussions of terrorism and the manner in which we react to different incidents. This essay explores the different public reactions to white-supremacist terrorists and Islamist terrorists in the United States. Firstly, I will analyse Chomsky and Herman's Propaganda Model and outline why it fails to fully explain why public reaction humanises white-supremacists to a greater degree than Islamists (Herman, 2013). I will then analyse the media and political reactions in 2015 to the Islamist Chattanooga shooting and white-supremacist Charleston shooting, through the lens of Race Theory, as outlined by Gordon (2010). Through this, I will argue that the racial identities of the attackers and the identities of their victims lead to the differentiated response. The national conversation about white supremacy is slow to label incidents as "terrorism", and tends to focus on the personal characteristics and mental health of the attacker. Contrastingly, Islamist terrorism is quickly labelled terrorism and there is a strong focus on identity and ideology. This is not just because Islamist terrorism threatens state interests, as asserted by the Propaganda Model, but also because it targets and is targeted by symbols of white American identity, such as the army and Republican Party. Correspondingly, white supremacist terrorism is downplayed because it tends to threaten marginalised communities, such as the African American community in Charleston.

A significant critical theory regarding media and political responses to incidents such as terrorism is the Propaganda Model (Mullen and Klaehn, 2010). I address this model because it is the strongest contemporary challenge to a traditional theoretical assumption that public discussion is independent and that our institutions are designed "to hold elites and in particular governments to democratic account" (Herring and Robertson, 2003, p.554). The Propaganda Model argues that states act in their strategic interest, and our perceptions of events are shaped through public institutions to justify the way that we have treated the groups involved (Herman, 2013). Muslims have been devalued in America to justify Western incursion in the Middle East in the early 2000s, which shapes our response to perceived acts of terrorism by those actors (Herman, 2013). I would concede that the outcome described by Herman and Chomsky has eventuated, as Muslims have been systematically alienated in US society. The identity of Muslim-Americans is perceived to be unstable, and Muslim-Americans are often socially alienated and discriminated against on the basis of their religion (Selod, 2015). However, while much more persuasive than an assumption of impartiality, I do not think this model fully explains the difference in public reactions to white-supremacist and Islamist terrorism. I expand the model in two ways, with reference to Race Theory. Firstly, the public reaction to the identities of the attacker is not just shaped by state interests, but also the interests of white American institutions and identity. Secondly, the identities of the victims are highly relevant; when a marginalised community is targeted, public reaction is less extreme. I will address these ideas through the lens of two case studies: the June 2015 Charleston shooting by white-supremacist Dylann Roof, and the July 2015 Chattanooga shooting by Islamist Muhammed Youssef Abdulazeez.

I have picked these two examples because they share key similarities. They occurred in a similar time scale and political climate; both were young men who struggled with drug and mental health issues; each killed between six and nine people (Sanchez and Payne, 2015; Shoichet and Tuchman, 2015). Both were self-radicalised, but motivated by online propaganda (Williams, 2015; Kinnard, 2016). There are two relevant differences that correlate with my conclusions. Roof was a white-supremacist, whereas Abdulazeez was a radical Islamist; furthermore, Roof attacked a symbolic African American church, whereas Abdulazeez attacked a military installation. (Sanchez and Payne, 2015; Shoichet and Tuchman, 2015).

Despite the similarities between the attackers, media and political reactions to these attacks were very different. It is important to analyse this because political parties and media are the primary instruments of the general population in public discussion. I have chosen the reactions to be discussed because they represent the two news organisations with the widest reach in the United States, as well as the positions of mainstream Republican presidential candidates (Taibi, 2015). In terms of the media coverage, the differences are apparent. Fox News, by far the most widely consumed news-source in the United States, chastises the Obama administration for not labelling the Chatanooga shooting as 'terrorism' quickly enough (Taibi, 2015; Fox News, 2015). However, their early coverage of the Charleston shooting frames the shooting as an attack on Christians, rather than against African Americans (Wemble, 2015). They do so despite Roof's clear white-supremacy (evident in material he published freely on the internet) and the complete lack of evidence supporting their claim (Sanchez and Payne, 2015). Fox News is often criticised for their handling of racially charged incidents, but differences in tone are also reflected in less partisan news coverage. In their overview articles about the two shootings, CNN focuses on Roof's drug use and refrains from describing his action as terrorism, while mentioning terrorism eight times regarding Abdulazeez, failing to mention his drug use, and focusing on his tangential links with the Middle East (Sanchez and Payne, 2015; Shoichet and Tuchman, 2015). Political reactions seem to be guided by similar biases. While responses from the Democratic Party were cautious, mainstream Republican Presidential candidates expressed their views candidly. In an interview on NewsmaxTV, Rick Perry denied that the Charleston shooting was terrorism, focusing strongly on the role of drugs over that of ideology (Siddiqui, 2015). In contrast, Bobby Jindal was very clear to call the attack terrorism and promise retribution, frameing the Chattanooga shooting in a Breitbart exclusive as the continuation of a war between the West and "Radical Islam" (Boyle, 2015). The differentiated response does not seem to be limited solely to far-right activists or small media outliers.

The first trend I will analyse is the public reaction to the identities of the attackers. Political and media reactions make ideology and foreign connections central to their response only when that identity is perceived as un-American. To be un-American, in this case, is not simply defined by the state, as the Propaganda Model suggests. Rather,

Race Theory would argue that it reflects white power structures such as Fox News and the Republican Party (Gordon, 2010). American identity is distanced from violent individuals who are white by framing them as outliers who are unrepresentative of an identity or ideology. This is reflected in the way coverage focused on Roof's mental health and drug taking behaviours. On the other hand, radicals who do not resemble white, suburban America are alienated by their very identity. Abdulazeez had lived in the United States since he was six years old, but media focused strongly on his links to Jordan (Shoichet and Tuchman, 2015). This fixation on the Middle East reflects a racialized approach to people of Middle-Eastern descent, even when the terrorists have very weak links with those countries (Ivison, 2010). Conversely, Roof openlvvy identified with Rhodesia and Apartheid South Africa, yet this was rarely explored by mainstream media (Sanchez and Payne, 2015). There is little focus on the way his identity and connections shaped his ideology or radicalisation.

The second trend I will analyse is the role of the victims. The Propaganda Model would argue that state interests are threatened more by Abdulazeez attacking military installations than a church shooting in Charleston, and that this explains the more extreme response to the attack. Race Theory would argue that the race of the victims is important in public discussion, and it goes beyond a calculation of state interests. I find Race Theory compelling because terrorism has long targeted minority communities, yet has not attracted the same public interest as terrorism against politically powerful groups (Friedersdorf, 2015). American political consciousness tends to separate black people and white people; in-group/out-group has been repeatedly applied to the disenfranchisement of African-Americans, for everything from voting rights to housing (Levesque,1972). While Race Theory has previously mainly been applied to the identities of the attackers, I would argue that the exclusion of African American voices from these political and media structures mutes the public reaction to acts of terrorism, such as in the case of Roof (Gordon, 2010). Furthermore, it is difficult for institutions that are driven by white identity to downplay the prevalence of systemic racism while also recognising that a racist ideology had led to the death of the nine people at the church in Charleston. Organisations such as Fox News have been criticised for understating the impact of racism, and deflecting the conversation away from ideology and towards issues such as drug use or anti-Christian sentiment is a clear reflection of their reluctance to address racism as a cause of violent extremism (Ironside, 2007). Race Theory and the Propaganda Model have some common ground, however; where state interests are constructed along racial lines, both have explanatory value. Abdulazeez targeted strategically important military installations during his attack, but also fed the ideas of a racial war against radical Islam that we heard previously from Bobby Jindal. Where the foreign policy goals of the state are not threatened, the public response lacks the same protective urgency; yet, the interests of white American structures may reduce scrutiny on attacks inconsistent with their underlying racialized philosophies.

It is clear that the public response to acts of terrorism reflect complicated and contested

areas of national identity and inclusiveness. However, there is a nuance beyond state interests: the interests of a broader civil society which tends to reflect the interests of its palest citizens. White elites should not be able to dictate a harsher response to brown terrorists and a weaker response to black victims. This debate is significant because policy should not be formed on the basis of narratives shaped by white power structures sustained by racism, but rather by assessing the threat of certain ideologies to all groups, especially the marginalised. As Friedersdorf affirms in his excellent Atlantic article, the language of terrorism is very rhetorically powerful (Friedersdorf, 2015). Even-handed political and media responses are required to lend this persuasive energy to the areas where it is most required, and to address the root causes of violent extremism.

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Politics 200
The Politics of Extremism: From Fascism to Terrorism

Janna Tay

Where Heaven Brings Hell: Utopian Visions and Extremist Violence

Utopian visions criticise the present and venerate an ideal future. Where there is dissatisfaction with current situations, there is uncertainty. The literature suggests that utopian visions can lead to extremist violence in providing a coherent worldview that people, in their uncertainty, pursue and defend. Karl Popper (1986) and Keith Taylor (1982) have drawn links be-tween utopia and violence, but I argue that their theories need to be supplemented with psychological views surrounding uncertainty. Through my examination of ISIS and late nineteenth-century Spanish anarchism, I hope to show my hypothesis can be supported, subject to refinement.

Hypothesis

Barbara Goodwin defines 'utopia' as a vision of perfect society (16). In envisioning an ideal future, the concept of utopia criticises the present situation, and advocates for a radical solution. Constructive utopia encourages action towards establishing the vision, which offers solutions to existing defects and thus incites people to action (Taylor 120). These solutions are the political ends that Karl Popper argues are conducive to violence within utopia's structure. Popper characterises utopia as built around emotionally-rooted ends. Since these ends are emotional, they cannot be determined rationally. For utopianists to implement their vision, they must persuade or crush the opposition (Popper 6). By Popper's account, utopia must thus be implemented through violence.

Popper (1986) picks up on an important point: in establishing an ideal, destroying existing structures will likely be necessary. However, his purely structural analysis fails to account for nonviolent strategies within utopia, as well as utopia's allure. Why are people attracted to utopia? Why kill for utopia? In Keith Taylor's view, utopian visions respond to specific social, economic, and political problems (122). The dissatisfaction leading to utopianism derives from oppression, alienation, and threats from socioeconomic upheaval or opposing groups (138). Utopia thus provides certainty where people feel uncertain.

In uncertainty, people seek a worldview that provides certainty (Hogg and Blaylock xxiii). As Michael A. Hogg argues, these worldviews tend to be grounded in moral absolutes that simplify the world (Hogg 26). Proponents of the worldview claim the ability to rectify wrongs and create stability. Utopian visions do exactly this. Establishing a perfect system incites dissatisfied people to action. Devotees to the worldview then commit violence with greater ease, finding moral justification in the vision. Psychologically categorising oneself as a group member is also a powerful way to reduce uncertainty (Hogg 22). Individual identity shifts to collective identity (Staub 266). An 'us-them' mentality dehumanises the opposition, making violence an easier task (Waller 186).

Case Studies

ISIS and Spanish anarchism focus on utopian visions that require the destruction of existing institutions. Spanish anarchist factions disagreed about how and when violence

was used, while on the other hand ISIS have used brutal violence consistently for an effect. I will look at the turn to violence within both ideologies, examining the role uncertainty plays in attitudes towards violence, and the degree of brutality.

ISIS

ISIS's utopia derives from Salafist ideology, which criticises present-day Islam for deviating from the righteous path towards God. Salafism is a revivalist movement seeking to return Islam to glory by establishing a Muslim state through jihad. Jihad, which roughly translates to "striving", refers to the undertaking to follow God's path (Sageman 1). Popper's (1986) structural analysis would argue this utopian combination of criticism, future vision, and planning results in the necessity of violence. However, jihad is twofold: greater jihad is peaceful devotion, while lesser jihad advocates violence (Sageman 2). Repression by modern Muslim states led some Salafists to question how effective the nonviolent methods were (7). This dissatisfaction generated uncertainty about whether the vision would be established. Sayyid Qutb, a leading Islamist theorist of the twentieth century, thus endorsed violence through jahiliyya. This justifies using violence against any society—including Muslims—that does not submit itself to God (12-13).

ISIS is unique in its brutal jihadism (Warrick 7). Other groups also draw from Salafism, but ISIS has endorsed violence that al-Qaeda deems "repulsive" (185). Where Al-Qaeda's vision remains long-term, ISIS demands immediacy. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi – a Jordanian jihadist said to be the founder of ISIS – insisted on quickly establishing a caliphate: an Islamic state (7). Zarqawi grew up troubled. He turned to drugs and crime until he began attending religious classes (50-51). Zarqawi's anger became hatred towards those he viewed as Allah's enemies, particularly Shiite Muslims and secular Arab regimes (22). Abu Mutaz, of the Jordanian intelligence agency, has suggested that Zarqawi possessed an intense guilt that prompted his extremism (60). He seemed to be purging himself through combat (52-53). By contrast, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the present leader of ISIS, seeks destiny (244). He shares Zarqawi's vision, but his savagery has been a way to capitalise on the Syrian chaos and reinvigorate a weak and dying ISIS (250).

ISIS has also attracted foreign fighters due to grievances. Second-generation Muslim immigrants in Europe experience Islamophobia and xenophobia, while also being alienated from their cultural origins (Hafez and Mullins 963). This uncertain self-identity finds community within purist Salafism. As Hogg argues, thinking of oneself as a group member greatly reduces uncertainty. Thus, the attraction of ISIS lies not only in the caliphate, but in the community that common striving provides. People also turn to ISIS against failed establishments in the Middle East, such as during the de-Baathification in Iraq (Stern and Berger 233).

Spanish Anarchism

Anarchism aimed at dismantling the government, and its utopian vision comprised greater justice for workers (Jensen 118-119). While anarchism gained small followings in most countries, it became a mass movement in Spain in the 1880s and 1890s. This was partly due to the way it defined Spanish class identity. Spain's "working class" was an amalgam of artisan, agricultural, and industrial workers. Anarchism allowed them to define their relationship with other classes, thus establishing clear opponents (Esenwein 6).

Despite the common vision, anarchist ideology had many competing factions (Esenwein 6). The role for violence was particularly contentious. Neither Pierre-Joseph Proudhon nor Mikhail Bakunin, the two thinkers who spurred the European anarchist movement, supported assassinations or terrorist bombings. Proudhon sought to decentralise governments and to order society around local communities and small economic groups. Bakunin helped to spread Proudhon's ideas, which he saw as necessary for social revolution, to Switzerland, Italy, and Spain. Though Bakunin envisaged future revolts, he focused on destroying property and institutions rather than people (Jensen 122). However, once his strategies began failing and the police became repressive, "propaganda by the deed" developed to revive the movement (124). In Spain, periods of government and police repression prompted many to join the anarchists and become militant (Esenwein 65-66). As with Salafism, violence grew in importance once other tactics seemed ineffective.

The Spanish anarchists adopted "propaganda by the deed" because they believed violence was crucial for revolution. Propaganda by the deed was an agenda of committing illegal acts aimed at revolting and instigating revolution against institutions, and proponents saw it as a necessary measure since verbal and written propaganda had achieved little (Jensen 125). Propaganda by the deed was, however, variously interpreted depending on different views of the utopian vision. Insurrectionists believed in an imminent large-scale revolution, seeing propaganda by the deed as collective revolt. Terrorists rejected imminence and saw propaganda by the deed as waging class war, thus endorsing group and individual violence. Against both were syndicalists, who believed in organising unions and gaining legal recognition to improve conditions (Esenwein 70-71). These factions were regional—syndicalist factions dominated in areas with well-established trade unions, while insurrectionists and terrorists originated from places with weaker union associations (74). Although the use of violence depended on ideological interpretations, the support for violence was also influenced by its value as an option.

Analysis

For both case studies, the turn to violence increases in likelihood where there is any uncertainty, including ineffective nonviolent strategies and dying movements. This

happened in the turn to violent jihad and propaganda by the deed. However, a singular concept of uncertainty seems unable to completely explain why ISIS remains more united, while Spanish anarchism was fragmented. What the case studies clarify is that uncertainty is linked to two distinct concepts: uncertain self-identity and uncertain situations. Those in the former category seek a stabilising worldview and are more ideologically inclined, while the latter favour the group dynamic surrounding the worldview. If the hypothesis is framed in this way, it can capture the principled adherents who truly believe in apocalypse and utopia, those who join the movement as they have nowhere else to turn, and even those who were inclined towards violence and are simply seeking any outlet.

It is important to analyse the potential reasons why anarchism, as a movement generally and within Spain, has fragmented, yet ISIS has not. The fragments of anarchism were fine-grained, going beyond even the differences between ISIS and al-Qaeda. One explanation is the nature of the ideology. Islam is a way of life (Sageman 11). Salafism thus provides a worldview that can ground self-identity, as seen in Zarqawi's fervent turn to Islam. By contrast, anarchism was a strategy to achieve political justice. This strategy could change: the militant faction in later years, while still directed towards revolution, also used nonviolent strategies, including integration with trade unions (Esenwein 212). Where a utopian worldview also resolves uncertainty self-identity, faithfulness to the vision and violence in its service is more likely even if there are other options. Where a utopian worldview primarily resolves uncertain situations, faithfulness and violence will depend on whether other options are viable. This is where the hypothesis needs modification to more fully account for the attitudes that anarchist factions had towards violence. Consideration of circumstances and regional variables may need to be added.

This hypothesis is also unable to account for how ideological structure emphasises violence, as it focuses on the vision as providing certainty. Zarqawi's guilt shows, at least for religious utopia, that the striving itself can provide certainty. This is utopia as redemption: the very process of establishing the vision becomes a source of certainty. This may have made Zarqawi's utopia and surrounding worldview more inclined to violence. By contrast, anarchists seemed to use the most efficacious strategy, attaching no special significance to violence beyond its effectiveness. Although uncertainty may help explain why violence arises and when, it cannot wholly account for doctrines that attach moral relevance to acts of violence. This speaks to ideological traditions beyond theory.

Conclusion

Overall, the case studies support the hypothesis that uncertainty makes extremist violence in utopian pursuit more likely. ISIS and anarchism arose in uncertain times, offering solutions and strategies for action. This hypothesis is more robust when it is applied to contexts that produce uncertain self-identity and uncertain situations. These distinctions help to better explain ISIS's brutality and appeal, as well as Spanish anarchism's factionalism, and is useful because it can shape strategy in suppressing these

utopian movements. Where a utopian vision attracts followers in its ability to resolve uncertain self-identity, such as ISIS, we should ask what causes such uncertainty and seek to reduce it. For example, European countries should work to lessen Islamophobia and xenophobia for second-generation Muslim immigrants. For a utopian vision that exists primarily to resolve uncertain situations, we should look at the un-derlying motivation, such as political justice for the working class in anarchism, and create viable nonviolent options. The hypothesis requires additional consideration of circumstances and ideological traditions to explain the specifics within ISIS and Spanish anarchism. On the whole, these case studies provide substantial evidence that this hypothesis is a robust starting point with the potential for further modification and greater explanatory power.

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Punishment Through Constructed Identities

It is important to recognise how an identity can be used negatively against an individual. Anyone who has read the work of Durkheim or Goffman will recognise how an identity can be used as a label, and in turn stigmatised and alienated. The work by these authors highlights how certain labels can punish, isolate, and create the opportunity for unjust treatment. Yet they also show how identifiers can be used to shed light on the issues faced by marginalised communities.

We open with Sare's discussion on the treatment of mentally ill offenders within the criminal justice system. As Sare argues, the label of "madness" can become a punishment itself: but is the stigma punishment enough for mentally ill offenders? The author forces us to question why we punish offenders and what we are aiming to achieve using institutions such as prison. Furthermore, she pushes us to consider whether we need to be 'kept safe' from mentally ill offenders or whether we also uncritically buy into the stereotype of the 'crazy criminal'.

While Sare encourages us to question how and why we put people into prison, Cammell argues for a reformation of the prison system. This piece looks at the disproportionate number of Māori in New Zealand prisons and asks whether a Western-based prison system is an effective, restorative, and rehabilitative system for Māori offenders. Furthermore, the discussion encourages us to consider whether Māori offenders are punished twice: once by the system, and then again by identifying as Māori within an imposing Western system. Cammell argues that we need to look into alternative systems, founded in tikanga and mātauranga Māori, in order to provide fairer, more coherent justice.

Greig's work takes a step back, and looks at how we define (or 'find') criminals. Specifically looking through the case studies related to global terrorism, Greig discusses the use, benefits, and critiques of using profiling post 9/11. Much like Cammell, who is concerned the identity of Māori offenders provides extra punishment, Greig questions whether simply identifying as a certain ethnicity become grounds for punishment in some cases. This essay raises many ethical debates regarding how we respond to terrorist threats in the context of recent history.

Finally, Palsenbarg looks at how history is constructed, and in turn informs our understanding and reproduction of identity. The historiographical discussion regarding American slavery leads us to look at who is recording and constructing the histories of the marginalised and what we can do to ensure history is recorded accurately. Culture is largely informed by collective values and social memories, yet as Palsenbarg explains, "human experience is entirely subjective", and may be separate from collective memories: leaving us with an intriguing dilemma regarding how we record history authentically.

These pieces ask us how we construct identity, and how our many identities can impact our experiences differently. They also force us to recognise that within our current power structures, not all identities are treated equally. Stigma, stereotypes, marginalisation and disempowerment affect the lives of certain groups: leaving individuals vulnerable to labelling, imposed values and misrepresentation. However, a label or identity can also be a source of empowerment - they can constantly encourage us to tackle existing power distribution, and listen to voices we may not always hear.

Criminology 203
The Criminal Mind: Crime and Individual Differences

Melissa Sare

Madness: Punishment enough for violent crimes of the severely mentally ill

Ralph Tortorici, a man diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, received a maximum prison sentence after taking a group of students' hostage and injuring several while experiencing a psychotic break. After alternating between general population and a special prison unit designed for those with severe mental illness, he eventually committed suicide (Erikson & Erikson 2008, 50-55). This particular case highlights the two distinct ways in which a madman is sufficiently punished by their madness. All those with severe mental illness are punished primarily by the direct consequences of their madness. Whether, like Tortorici, by delusions and paranoia, or through isolation, loneliness, and criminal behavior, the madman is continually punished by the emotional and social costs of their illness. In addition, the madman suffers indirect punishments of their madness as a result of being labeled mentally ill. The perceived vulnerability associated with madness subjects the mentally ill to higher rates of victimisation, especially for violent crimes. Moreover, the societal understanding of madness as dangerous and criminal means the severely mentally ill are marginalised. Attitudes of the police and criminal justice system are overwhelmingly negative and skeptical about mental illness, resulting in higher rates of arrest, harsher convictions, and lengthy imprisonments for madmen. Incarceration however is a cruel and inhumane punishment because it does not address the psychological issues causing the criminal behaviour, and frequently results in twice as much suffering and punishment as non-mentally ill people (Johnston, 2013).

The madman is punished daily by the direct manifestations and consequences of their mental illness. Described by patients as "a descent to hell", madness is characterised by immense suffering, exclusion, shame, loneliness, pain, and fear (Kaite et al. 2015, 458). The symptoms accompanying schizophrenia, post-traumatic stress disorder, and bipolar disorder result in a diminished quality of life for the madman. Particularly punishing consequences of madness may include the experiences of neglect and abandonment by family and friends, the struggle to accept their illness and discover their identity, a loss of credibility in society, and the relinquishment of goals and aspirations (Teplin et al. 2005; Kaite et al. 2015). These effects are most upsetting because the social, psychological, and biological factors responsible for madness are rarely under the sufferer's control (Erikson & Erikson 2008, 10). Defects in brain connections, ineffective support networks, disturbed thinking, high-crime environments, and social stigma are often major causes of the abnormal, manic, and criminal behaviour associated with severe mental illness (Chaftez 1996; Marzuk 1996). Stigma is perhaps the most damaging aspect of madness because hurtful comments, as well as the persisting attitudes that underlie them, contribute to low self-esteem, low job-prospects, homelessness, and feelings of incompetence (Marzuk 1996, 481; Kiefer 2001). These direct consequences inherent to severe mental illness lead to reduced functioning in all aspects of life, particularly work and study, often culminating in suicide (Chafetz 1996, 30; Hamilton 2004, 1000). They create an internal mental prison in which madmen are confined, isolated, and misunderstood regardless of their criminal history.

In addition to these direct impacts, there are also indirect negative consequences

that punish those with madness. Social attitudes surrounding severe mental illness, particularly the perception that a large proportion of madmen commit illegal acts, are harmful because they are incredibly difficult to change (Marzuk 1996; Kiefer 2001). The opinion that the severely mentally ill are dangerous and threaten society is the most important factor in the stigma endured by those with madness. Violent and criminal acts committed by the madman are publicly feared because this behaviour is considered random and unpredictable. Furthermore, scared or aggressive reactions to severely mentally ill people, expressed via rejection, force, and stigmatising remarks, can trigger the violence on which this perception is based (Marzuk 1996, 481; Stuart 2003, 122; Faruqui 2011, 529). Even law enforcement officials adhere to this stereotype, leading to discrimination and differential treatment of madmen in the criminal justice system (Marzuk 1996, 482; Stuart 2003, 122; Watson, Corrigan & Ottati 2004, 49). This fear is sustained by media attention, not only in journalism but in film and television as well, resulting in a never-ending supply of information about the relationship between crime and madness (Stuart 2003, 121; Kesic, Ducat & Thomas 2012). This extensive coverage however draws attention to and exaggerates the prevalence of rare, extreme cases of criminal violence by madmen. It equates to a moral panic which leads to increased social anxiety, adoption of an 'us versus them' mentality, and marginalisation of the severely mentally ill (Stuart 2003; Kerr, Morabito & Watson 2010, 130; Faruqui 2011, 529; Kesic, Ducat & Thomas 2012). Nevertheless, there is little evidence supporting this fear (Marzuk 1996, 481). Numerous recent studies have shown criminal behaviour in madmen compose a very small proportion of all criminal acts (4.3%) and those who do commit offences are usually non-violent (Marzuk 1996; Stuart 2003, 123; Fazel & Grann 2006; Kesic, Ducat & Thomas 2012). In general, most people with madness are not criminals at all (Marzuk 1996, 485). Stigma, as well as the shame that it evokes, is a major obstacle to rehabilitation and may increase future violent criminal behaviour (Hamilton 2004, 1001; Johnson 2011, 20). The stereotypes about mental illness expressed by the general public and media can be internalised, strengthening the mental prison of madmen, and lead to additional but unnecessary external punishments (Kesic, Ducat & Thomas 2012).

The madman is also punished by an increased propensity to victimisation (Marzuk 1996, 486). Given their vulnerable mental state, madmen are more likely to be victims of violent crime. Their impulsive nature, distorted patterns of thinking, poor reasoning, and impaired evaluation abilities result in a weakened capacity to understand danger and protect their person accordingly. This risk is further increased by the proportion of severely mentally ill that are homeless, impoverished, socially isolated, and dependent on drugs and alcohol (Teplin et al. 2005, 911; Khalifeh et al. 2015, 280). Teplin et al. (2005, 913-917) found more than twenty-five percent of those with a severe mental illness were victims of a violent crime such as rape, robbery, or assault within in a twelve-month period: a rate four times higher than experienced by the general population. Another more recent investigation found that forty percent of those with a severe mental illness were victims of a violent crime during the last year, often at the hands of family or friends

(Stuart 2003, 122; Khalifeh et al. 2015, 280). This increased risk of victimisation as a result of madness is particularly punishing because not only do these people experience a violent crime, they also endure incalculable effects on their already damaged mental health (Teplin et al. 2005, 918). Nearly fifty percent of madmen experienced negative psychological effects of victimisation including the exacerbation of their existing mental illness, while eighty percent suffered physical injury as a result of violent crime (Teplin et al. 2005, 919; Khalifeh et al. 2015, 279). Thus, due to severe mental illness madmen are more likely to be the target of criminal offenders, punished because they have weaker mental capabilities and fewer community ties (Teplin et al. 2005, 919; Schopp 2013, 110).

Madmen are further punished by the criminal justice system when they try to report their victimisation, as they are frequently denied the help and faith that would be readily given to a sane person (Pinta 2006). Police encounters with madmen are often described as hazardous for all involved, particularly because law enforcement officials judge the severely mentally ill condescendingly and perceive them to be more dangerous than the rest of the population (Watson, Corrigan & Ottati 2004, 49; Kerr, Morabito & Watson 2010, 117). Officers that attend crime scenes involving a mentally ill person (as a victim or perpetrator) can misinterpret their behaviour, and respond in an aggressive manner that aggravates a seemingly hostile or resistant offender, and results in disproportionate rates of arrest (Pinta, 2006; Kerr, Morabito & Watson 2010, 119; Godfredson et al. 2010). Moreover, the statements of a madman are usually deemed untrustworthy and insufficient sources of valid information about a crime. This results in little effort being put into cases where the madman is a victim, contributing to increased dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system (Watson, Corrigan & Ottati 2004, 50; Khalifeh et al. 2015, 279-280). Severely mentally ill offenders on the other hand experience expedient efforts to ensure they are prevented from further endangering the general public, no matter the crime committed (Schopp 2013). In addition to this experience of the criminal justice system, deinstitutionalisation has meant madmen have reduced access to the psychological help they need (Hamilton 2004, 1001; Bloom 2010). This means the more severely mentally ill are likely to end up on the street, committing crime to survive or because of untreated paranoid delusions (Thompson 2010; Schopp 2013, 106-108). It has also meant prisons have become defacto providers of mental health care with sixteen to fifty percent of inmates suffering a mental illness (Hamilton 2004, 1002; Teplin et al. 2005, 911; MacDonald, Hucker & Herbert 2010; Johnson 2011). Therefore, at every stage of the criminal justice system, madmen are punished by virtue of their madness (Pinta 2006; Macdonald, Hucker & Herbert 2010).

In particular, madmen given prison sentences are punished twice as much as those without severe mental illness. Poor appearances before a jury, coupled with inadequate access to defense lawyers, often results in punishment via physical confinement (Pinta, 2005; Schopp, 2013, 108). Even those who have the grounds to argue the insanity defense, claiming they were incognisant during their criminal activities, have difficulty convincing the court of their madness due to rampant skepticism and evidence being selectively

represented by experts (Erikson & Erikson 2008, 52-53; Schopp 2013, 116-117). Severely mentally ill inmates are the most vulnerable people in the prison population, four times more likely to be the target of sexual or physical abuse by both guards and prisoners. Their untreated disorder is disruptive and reduces the skills necessary to survive in jail, resulting in a disproportionate amount of time spent in solitary confinement, increased likelihood of victimisation, and further psychological deterioration (Hamilton 2004, 1002; Johnston 2013). The severely mentally ill have immense difficulty adapting to the prison environment, often failing to comprehend both the written and unwritten rules of prison conduct, leading to abuse (Johnston 2013). Punishment via prison therefore is an unhelpful, toxic, and cruel system of justice for those with a severe mental illness. It does not treat the cause of criminal or violent behavior, accounts for more than fifty percent of prison suicides, fosters an environment conducive to recidivism, and appears to be little more than a reflection of public resentment towards madmen (Hamilton 2004, 1002-1003; Pinta 2005; Erikson & Erikson 2008, 12; MacDonald, Hucker & Herbert 2010; Schopp 2013; Johnston 2013, 160). These factors mean the severely mentally ill that receive prison sentences are punished much more than other offenders as a result of their madness.

Nevertheless some people argue that prison is designed and expected to be a harsh, hard punishment which all people experience and cope with differently (Johnston 2013, 150). The argument presented thus highlights just some of the controversy surrounding the contention that the madman is sufficiently punished by their madness. Perhaps the most crucial debate around this statement stems from the subjective nature of insanity. Definitions of madness are diverse, and the argument of this essay is based on a prevalent but not exclusive understanding of madness as synonymous with severe mental illnesses like schizophrenia and PTSD (Rieger 2014, 7). Those who understand madness differently, and may define it as encompassing all mental illness, will have a difficult time arguing this same position. There are a vast array of mental illnesses with different psychological symptoms, behavioural manifestations, and effects on the social world. Without a doubt some mentally ill are callous offenders who fully understand the illegality of their criminal acts, and are not punished by their madness (Marzuk 1996, 486). Thus, while it is perhaps not appropriate to argue that all mentally ill are sufficiently punished by their madness, those with severe mental illness, colloquially known as madmen, are (Rieger 2014).

The madman is adequately punished by both the direct and indirect consequences of their madness. The direct experiences of paranoia, delusions, fear, isolation, loneliness, and diminished quality of life confine a severely mentally ill person to an internal prison. The perception (and subsequent stigma) that madmen are dangerous and threaten society generally maintains this internal jail. This attitude is particularly damaging because it is also held by law enforcement officials, resulting in excessive use of force, increased rates of arrest, and harsh sentences for the severely mentally ill. This added punishment exposes madmen to increased abuse, victimisation, and segregation which

foster recidivism, psychotic episodes, and suicide. Nevertheless, as society currently limits punishment to intentional suffering, consequences of madness are not deemed adequate penalties for violent or criminal behavior by the madman (Johnston 2013, 154-155). Therefore people like Ralph Tortorici, while more than sufficiently punished as a result of their madness, must endure further reprimands to satisfy the public's desire for 'justice'.

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Criminology 201
Debates in Criminology

Katie Cammell

The use of prisons within New Zealand involves the imposition of a European criminal justice system upon Māori, which is incompatible with tikanga or mātauranga Māori and is therefore ineffective and causes significant harm. The disproportionate representation of Māori within New Zealand's prisons and their high rates of offending and recidivism are evidence that the existing system is not effective in addressing their culturally specific needs. Attempts by the state to rectify this issue have had no demonstrable impact on reducing the rates of offending or recidivism, and therefore a separate criminal justice system for Māori should be established. Despite the various limitations of introducing a parallel criminal justice system in New Zealand, it is necessary for Māori to have the authority to develop and implement their own justice system which can effectively respond to their needs and rights as tangata whenua.

Imprisonment is an inappropriate, ineffective system for addressing Māori offenders because the Western criminal justice system has a fundamentally different understanding of crime and wellbeing from Māori. The current criminal justice system in New Zealand is founded on a Western-Christian tradition which focuses on the individual rather than the community, and prioritises retribution instead of rehabilitation or reintegration of the offender (Jackson, 1988; Tauri, 1999). In contrast, Māori emphasise the importance of repairing the harm which crime causes to relationships and restoring the mana of both the offender, the victim and their whānau (Quince, 2007). Māori believe that criminal behaviour is the consequence of a lack of balance in a person's emotional, social, spiritual or physical wellbeing, and therefore focus on restoring the balance of the parties involved in a crime (Quince, 2007; Jackson, 1988; Leaming & Willis, 2016). As a consequence of these contrasting understandings of the purpose of punishment, the existing criminal justice system in New Zealand is not sufficiently responsive to the needs of Māori (Nakhid & Shorter, 2014; Lux, 1994). This is evidenced by the overrepresentation of Māori in the criminal justice system, whereby 53 percent of those performing custodial sentences and 48 percent of those serving community-based sentences are Māori (Nakhid & Shorter, 2014). Additionally, the majority of Māori offenders have reoffended within the first two years of completing their sentence (Nakhid & Shorter, 2014). Evidently, the Western criminal justice system which the state has imposed on Māori is a conceptually different approach to justice that is fundamentally incompatible with tikanga and mātauranga Māori (Leaming & Willis, 2016). Therefore, it fails to address the culturally specific needs of Māori in an appropriate way, and instead maintains a system of cultural oppression which causes significant harm to Māori communities (Lux, 1994).

Although attempts have been made to address the disproportionate representation of Māori in prisons and reduce the rates of offending and recidivism, they have been heavily criticised by some Māori for their co-opting of Māori cultural practices into a fundamentally Western criminal justice system. The development of specialised Māori Focus Units within New Zealand male prisons is one example of the criminal justice system attempting to incorporate Māori culture and language into the existing prison system (Byers, 2002). According to Byers (2002), the establishment of Māori Focus Units

facilitated the involvement of Māori in activities, encouraged a sense of pride and identity, prompted the development of respect for others and persuaded acknowledgement of offending. It should be noted, however, that as the chief executive of the Department of Corrections in New Zealand in 2002 Byers is undoubtedly biased in his account of the success of Māori Focus Units. Additionally, despite the positive trends which have resulted from Māori Focus Units, high levels of offending have persisted and only small changes have occurred in terms of decreasing the rates of recidivism (Nakhid & Shorter, 2014; Lux, 1994). Furthermore, through interviews with Māori ex-inmates it was discovered that programs such as the Māori Focus Units were not sufficiently responsive to the individual needs of Māori inmates, and for programs within prisons to be successful they needed to be rooted in aspects of Māori culture such as kapa haka, waiata, and whānau relationships rather than Pākehā beliefs or values (Nakhid & Shorter, 2014).

Tauri and Morris (1997) argue that none of the programs which have been introduced into prisons by the state have been successful because the control and authority over the implementation of the programs remains situated within the criminal justice system rather than with Māori. Consequently, programs such as the Māori Focus Units are a continuation of a historical trend in which the state co-opts the justice practices of Māori without allowing them any power to administer the development or execution of these programs (Tauri & Morris, 1997). Leaming and Willis (2016) have contested that the attempts made by the state to incorporate tikanga and kaupapa Māori have ultimately been unsuccessful because they are co-opted into a system which is fundamentally Western in orientation. As long as Māori cultural practices and beliefs are considered secondary to the existing criminal justice system, a significant improvement in the disproportionate representation of Māori in New Zealand prisons cannot occur (Leaming & Willis, 2016).

Subsequently, there is a need to develop a separate criminal justice system in New Zealand which is created by Māori for Māori, founded on tikanga and mātauranga Māori (Quince, 2007; Tauri, 1999; Rochford, 2004). Jackson (1988) advocates for a bicultural restructuring of New Zealand society and the establishment of an autonomous criminal justice system for Māori which is founded on kaupapa and tikanga rather than Pākehā laws. Under this parallel system, Māori would be diverted from prisons and would have the authority to develop an alternative system which emphasised community service and restitution rather than retribution (Jackson, 1988; Tauri & Morris, 1997). This alternative justice system would take place on the marae rather than in the courtroom or prison, and would therefore be a more appropriate setting for Māori offenders which would prevent them from being further alienated from their communities (Jackson, 1998; Tauri and Morris, 1997). Consequently, Māori offenders would have the potential to connect with their spiritual and cultural identity, and their needs could be addressed in a culturally specific and appropriate way (Nakhid & Shorter, 2014). Furthermore, allowing Māori to have control and ownership over the implementation of a separate criminal justice system rooted in tikanga and kaupapa Māori would recognise the rights of Māori as

tangata whenua and partners in the Tiriti o Waitangi to maintain their rangatiratanga and establish or participate in the criminal justice system (Jackson, 1988). According to Rochford (2004), allowing Māori to assume ownership of their own wellbeing and control over their own affairs would begin the process of healing the damage caused by colonisation, and would ensure that the justice system was effectively responsive to the needs of Māori rather than reflecting the Western understanding of criminal behaviour.

However, there are theoretical as well as practical limitations to the implementation of a separate criminal justice system for Māori in New Zealand. Although the disproportionate levels of incarceration and victimisation of Māori are well documented, there remains insufficient empirical research into these issues (Nakhid & Shorter, 2014; Tauri & Morris, 1997; JustSpeak, 2012). Furthermore, of the research which has been conducted, very little has questioned the institutional racism and systemic bias which currently exists in the criminal justice system (JustSpeak, 2012). As a result of the lack of research into these issues and alternative Māori justice systems, it is unclear whether or not establishing a separate criminal justice system for Māori would have any demonstrable impact on Māori offending, recidivism, or wellbeing. Additionally, the process of urbanisation and the alienation of Māori from their ancestral land and economic base has had a significant impact on Māori communities (Jackson, 1998; Tauri & Morris, 1997). Many Māori have lost the connections of kinship which strengthened Māori communities, ensured the transmission of cultural practices to younger generations, and allowed the elders to exercise authority over the behaviour of members of the community (Jackson, 1998; Tauri & Morris, 1997). Therefore, not all people who are of Māori descent may want to be involved in a criminal justice system which is rooted in tikanga or mātauranga Māori as they are unfamiliar with these cultural practices (Tauri & Morris, 1997). Furthermore, many Māori who are unaccustomed to the marae or its protocols could potentially feel as alienated by the marae as the court system (Tauri & Morris, 1997).

Despite the limitations of establishing a separate criminal justice system for Māori which would divert them completely from courts and prisons, it is evident that the existing criminal justice system is ineffective for addressing Māori offending and that an alternative approach is needed. Attempts made by the state to incorporate tikanga Māori into prisons through programs such as Māori Focus Units have had no demonstrable impact on offending, and can be understood as further attempts by the state to co-opt Māori justice practices into the existing system rather than reforming it. Therefore, a separate criminal justice system for Māori which is founded on tikanga and mātauranga Māori may be more effective at addressing the specific cultural needs of Māori offenders. Although there are limitations to implementing a parallel justice system in New Zealand, it is necessary for Māori to have the power and authority to develop their own justice system in order to effectively respond to the issues and challenges of Māori communities in a culturally specific and appropriate way.

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Sociology 308
Law and Identity

George Greig

The Emergence of a Global Terrorist Threat

The Western world's use of profiling has long subverted the rule of law to enforce a inreasingly ineffective terrorist identity. Profiling in general is the selection of people for specific objectives based on their association to a known or presumed group (Bou-Habib, 2011). It is a legal method of policy and enforcement to ensure the simple and specific prevention of observed threats. However, profiling contains an operative presumption that denies individuals the rights to fair processing, habeas corpus and the basic principles of the rule of law (Bingham, 2010). The use of widespread racial profiling following the September 11, herein referred to as 9/11, attacks has become the foundation for its highly critical discourse.

This analysis will discuss the logic used by nations profiling at their borders to combat what is commonly phrased as the war against terror (Harris, 2012). The events of 9/11 prompted the Western world to react with laws codifying the various races found throughout the Muslim world as potential terrorist threats. The religious and ideological underpinnings of this reaction inherently allowed the law to racially profile those who live in Muslim-dominant societies, namely those of Middle Eastern ancestry. However, racial profiling fails to fulfil its own promise of simple and effective prevention by creating false terrorist identities at the expense of its legality (Schneier, 2012). An approach that is suggested here recognises that profiling is a necessary legal policy that will better serve constituents when designed in a veracious and conservative method. Understanding this approach will require describing how the Western world has legally enforced a Middle Eastern profile, the rationale behind its process and finally a critique of its efficacy and suggested future directions.

The Legal Logic of Profiling in a Post-9/11 World

The 9/11 attacks permitted the legislative creation of a reified Middle Eastern enemy which promised efficiency and security in the war against terror (Bou-Habib, 2011). Beck theorises that the West perceived its world in an unclear danger stemming from its own global neighbours (2002). The United States of America acted as the vanguard of this Western ideology as President George W. Bush announced his 'war on terror' targeting those in Al-Qaeda as well as those under the control of Osama bin Laden (2001). Further, U.S Congress enacted executive orders that targeted all individuals involved directly, or otherwise, with the 9/11 attacks (Bingham, 2010). In effect, a physical and ideological war was waged between Western ideals and Middle Eastern antagonism. The law is a reactionary force that responds to events and circumstances that require meaning, understanding and control. Therefore, the new Middle Eastern threat provided the U.S and its Western allies the precarious conditions necessary for legal intervention (Beck, 2002).

The U.S and other Western powers including the United Kingdom and Canada enacted laws that recognised Middle Eastern individuals as antagonists to state security. These Western nations acted in response to an unexpected, unquantifiable threat with clear and divisive categorisation (Bingham, 2010). In addition, the racial profiling of the Middle East adopted pre-existing notions of Muslim, Arabic villainy stemming from the U.S involvement in the Cold War (Bahdi, 2003). In its pursuit of effective profiling the U.S racialized Middle Eastern identities, forging a systematic, nationalistic othering (Omi & Winant, 1986).

This oversimplified racial profile served the purpose laid down by its governing law. It met the incomprehensible scale of 9/11 with clear action as domestic and international powers became unified with the introduction of the Patriot Act 2001 and Transportation Security Administration (TSA). In summary, the logic of racial profiling in the post-9/11 world emerged from a need to control the uncontrollable and to identify a complex and foreign enemy both geographically and ideologically.

Creating a Terrorist in spite of the Law

The racial profiling of Middle Easterners comes at the expense of the Western rule of law in its procedural legality. The rule of law is a longstanding set of legal principles that necessitates everyone be accountable to the law; the law is certain; and that law is enacted through procedurally proper methods (Dicey, 2010). It is a critical feature of U.S and Westminster law as a failure to adhere to its principles leaves the action vulnerable to dismissal and international sanction (Bahdi, 2003). However, racial profiling was enacted through legal methods that usurped the rule of law's requirements of procedural propriety, legality and habeas corpus.

The U.S jurisdiction saw extreme executive and congressional legal action that targeted Middle Eastern non-citizens against its own rule of law. The U.S executive branch enacted expansive bureaus and policies that justified indefinite detention without notice or judicial process (Legomsky, 2005). It also sought to constrain its own separation of power by removing judicial discretion and its power to intervene in moments of alleged illegality (2005). Further, U.S Congress enacted legislation that used the language of wartime crises to forego issues of legality and procedural propriety (Beck, 2002). Many legal jurisdictions possess inherent powers to bypass mechanics of law. Some commonwealth nations proclaim times of emergency, urgency and war emergency. The lack of democratic process and judicial discretion renders these enactments an imposition of the state's will contrary to Dicey's conception of law (2010). In the U.S profiling has been a common practice among law enforcement to initiate searches, stops and investigations however we can suggest this was the first time in which racial profiling was front-loaded in the legal system (Cleary, 2000). The actions taken by law-makers and executive agents capitalised on the nationwide state of fear to affirm policies that clearly contradicted the rule of law (Beck, 2002). The U.S enabled its racialized legal mechanisms

through domestic straw-manning that emphasised its war against terror before its legal principle. Though its policies did not explicitly describe racial profiling, the social climate that surrounded it implicitly sanctioned its necessity (Legomsky, 2005). Its careful discourse and emphasis on wartime set the U.S as a key driver for the racial profiling of Middle Eastern individuals in response to the 9/11 attacks.

Additionally, aforementioned nations such as Canada and the U.K followed similar expeditions of the law to enforce racial profiling against a Middle Eastern threat. Canada's executive enacted domestic law and policies to detain and investigate non-citizens matching the U.S profiles (Bahdi, 2003). The U.K parliament enacted legislation comparable to the U.S Patriot Act 2001 and the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, advancing its ability to protect its borders from specified individuals. Two methods of omission and deference allowed the U.K and Canadian laws to be largely influenced by the U.S and its then-prevalent racial profiling practices. First, the Canadian executive branch exercised deference in leaving non-citizens and individuals in transit vulnerable to international travel regulations (Bahdi, 2003). In contrast, the U.K specified that non-citizens suspected of crime or terrorism were liable to detention without charge or process (Bingham, 2010). However, the U.K omitted its own citizens from such indefinite detention suggesting it was complicit in the U.S racial profiling (2010). International diplomacy is often slow to criticise the actions of ally nations committing acts of illegality in mutually-shared times of threat and emergency. Operating through the diplomatic atmosphere of Beck's "world risk society" enabled law-makers to openly dismiss the legal principles that are seemingly reserved for its own citizens (2002). The mechanisms and conventions regulating these commonwealth nations had no observable effect as their law acted in accordance with the U.S direction in the emerging post-9/11 new world order against the Middle East (Beck, 2002).

The Importance of Identity and Identification on the Law

Racial profiling inherently fails in the modern sphere of global terrorism as identifying the colloquial wolf in sheep's clothing has heightened in complexity. To understand the modern war against terrorism, we must clarify who is being targeted and under what grounds. The profiling practices immediately following 9/11 enabled indefinite detention, search and deportation of anyone who identified or appeared to be of Middle Eastern ethnicity. Emphases on visible designations of race and ethnicity were recklessly used as markers of adherence to the Muslim faith, reductively conflating ideas of race, religion and culture (Schneier, 2012). Targeting the Muslim faith was a direct response to the Muslim ideologies of the Al-Qaeda organisation that executed the 9/11 attacks. Considering that Islamic radicals have committed almost 20 notable attacks since 9/11, a strong focus on potential Muslim radicals is justifiable. The critical issue here is instead that ethnic identity does not serve as an accurate marker of their religious practices nor their membership with radical jihadist ideology (2012). Therefore, one of the fundamental failures of utilising racial profiling against Muslims is its inability to separate race from religion.

On the outset, using a racialized metric for profiling religiously-motivated terrorists is a legally and systematically ineffective model. The logic of profiling was originally rooted in its ability to profile current occurrences of crime and terrorism and generalise the individuals or groups who committed them (Cleary, 2000). It relied on patterns and trends in past and present behaviour to isolate its demographic from the general population. However, the current trend of racial profiling uses immediate observations and superficial criteria to assert unfounded conclusions. The effects are two-fold resulting in legally unenforceable actions and systematic failures to identify potential threats.

Firstly, the actions of governments and law enforcement agencies have become far more accessible in the wake of globalised independent media. The social views of our increasingly liberal, anti-establishment society reflect on the administrative practices of the executive branch (Miller, 2013). Actions that unjustifiably contravene the rights to religious freedom or racial identity inevitably attract public scrutiny and judicial intervention (Harris, 2012). The U.K has experienced extensive legal proceedings resulting in the detention and subsequent release of ISIS affiliates and supporters like Mohammed "Jihadi John" Emwazi. Emwazi escaped U.K control mechanisms through the use and exploitation of racial common law defences practiced in Westminster law (Sommers, 2015). Racial profiling should not escape such public outcry and legal actors should move beyond its inherently faulty presumption of race as an appropriate profiler (Cleary, 2000). Unfortunately, racial profiling has the potential to miss intended individuals due to its prejudicial nature. The procedural straw-manning that once upheld its function no longer evades the critical eye of the population that empowers its law-makers. If law-makers and state actors intend on targeting these high-risk individuals, then it must reform its current approach to a legally legitimate method adhering to the rule of law and the processes guaranteed therein.

Secondly, racial profiling uses statistically inaccurate models that fail its own function and perpetuate poor law-making. Law manifests to serve the functions of society contending that the success or failure of these purposes determines the law's fate. Law enforcement agencies and executive branches often grant their agents wide discretion to act and report per their own evaluations (Legomsky, 2005). Further, the sharing of statistical data between academics and government agencies has been minimal due to administrative concerns of defensive policing and issues of vicarious liability (Cleary, 2000). Therefore, law-makers and public figures are privy only to figures that seemingly affirm the effectiveness of racial profiling and the individuals it apprehends. Racial profiling is constantly understood in a context of confirmation biases and discursive semantics conflating radical Islamic terrorism and the many racial denominations of the Middle East. Additionally, these statistical oversights demonstrate a base rate fallacy that allows irrelevant information to influence its legal standing (Schneier, 2012). The total lack of critical analysis allows the titular wolf to not hide in sheep's clothing but rather be a shape entirely. The current racial profiling in U.S and U.K systems presupposes that one's racial identity can be indicative of their current and future religious or ideological

identification. However, the individual or institution profiling ascribes the individual's race and presumes their identity thereafter (Bou-Habib, 2011). The profiled individual cannot change their ethnic composition or the racial perceptions of others; conversely however, religious and ideological identities are not similarly innate. The current state of racial profiling and the laws pertaining to profiling has rendered the practice irrelevant. The future of law and terrorism lies in the innovation and improvement of security profiling.

Returning the Rule of Law to Modern Profiling

The use of race in profiling must be supplanted with a more accurate and conservative metric to affirm the rights of the individual and the security of the state. In general, profiling is an inevitable system of law-making and enforcement that views observable qualities as indicative of committing or not committing an unlawful act (Cleary, 2000). The political nature of the law, crime and more recently global terrorism contends that the law is inseparable from the perceptions and desires of the masses (Miller, 2013). This exposition serves as a practical reminder that reforming profiling of terrorist threats is more appropriate than conceptualising an alternative. The law governing the profiling of terrorist threats should redefine its targets, return itself to the rule of law and engage in stronger communication between the core branches of government.

A legal policy with clear, accurate intentions will naturally adhere to the idealism of the rule of law. The legislative background and executive powers that enabled the 9/11 era policies operated in states of emergency, detracting attention from its contravention of basic rights. The targeting of racial groups with the added connotations of religious persecution and indefinite detention is a clear violation of various rights, articles and treaties in domestic and international law. As contended by Dr Sam Harris, a new and informed approach would combine the practice of general behavioural profiling with a religious profiling element (2012). It can instead be suggested that a simply broader ideological profiling would suffice due to the reflexivity of an individual's ability to corrupt religious and spiritual beliefs. It may be true that Islamic radicals have committed a great number of terrorist acts but it does not justify the persecution of the entire religion for the ideological interpretations of a predictable few (Bahdi, 2003). Necessarily, a legal and political declaration of the ideological idealism that the respective state is profiling would create certainty in the law rendering all equal to the law (Dicey, 2010). Executive powers such as discretion and beholding the interpretation of reasonable grounds must be minimized and held to a high standard to prevent personal biases and malpractice from abusing legal rights (Withrow & Dailey, 2012). The intentions of profiling and its empowering legislation should be deliberated and communicated domestically and internationally to encourage wide discourse. In summary, profiling must be redefined and used to communicate ideological beliefs deemed dangerous. This will provide a structural approach to avoid the ambiguities and injustices of the recent past.

Finally, the most effective way of representing the interests of society and the state is by ensuring the law of profiling interacts between the executive, parliamentary or congressional bodies and the judicial systems. Westminster models of government and those closely related operate in a separation of powers affirming a democratically elected parliamentary sovereignty, an elected executive to inform and enforce the law and finally a judiciary to interpret the law and hold these powers to account. The initial legal response to 9/11 and the subsequent racial profiling involved the frequent use of executive powers that bypassed judicial analysis and parliamentary deliberation (Bahdi, 2003). Omitting the parliamentary process may ignore the democratic process but escaping judicial process removes the important function of the common law (Dicey, 2010). The common law develops understandings, limits, and eventually precedent that directly impacts both law-makers and those it governs (2010). Ensuring the effectiveness and fairness of future profiling law will require a tight integration of the respective bodies of government. An informative executive represents and educates its constituents while an integrated judiciary involves the law of the land, international jurisdictions and ensures it legal process (Bingham, 2010).

A Hopeful View on Profiling

Profiling may generate strong social distaste and objection but it is an inescapable system of law-making and enforcement. We should collectively work to improve our understanding of its implications and address the people it targets as well as those it does not. In summary, racial profiling in its current form is no longer an effective means of perceiving and addressing global terrorism inflicted by ideological radicals. The reform of security profiling necessitates a clear definition on who we target as well as further discourse and communication of relevant policies and simultaneously a stronger integration of the branches of government. The systems used to enforce previous conceptions of racial profiling against issues like Islamic radicalism have created deep divides that we must now systematically address to ensure a safe and egalitarian environment.

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History 300
Major Problems in Historical Method

Ella Palsenbarg

John Tosh argues that the historian 'must strive to understand each age in its own terms, to take on its own values and priorities, instead of imposing ours' (Tosh, 2010, p. 7). Accepting this, the question becomes how best to pursue this goal. In the study of American slavery, no dispute has been more contentious. Diametrically opposed, humanist and cliometric schools continue to debate the merits of quantitative data in understanding the dynamics of the family under slavery. This paper will argue that such a battle to determine the 'immortal' historiography of slavery is not only futile, but a great disservice to the pursuit of history (Stampp, 1976). By examining the historiography of slave family dynamics to date, this paper will demonstrate the vitality of both kinds of data in achieving the ultimate purpose of history; comprehending the real experience of people living in the past.

Kenneth M. Stamp and Robert William Fogel epitomise the humanist-cliometric debate. Published in 1956, Stampp's seminal humanist work, 'A Peculiar Institution' (1956), combats the hitherto common presumption that slavery was an 'inevitable' (p. 5) economic necessity given the circumstances of the Old South. Littered with contemporary first hand accounts of both slaves and their masters, Stampp challenges the traditional justifications for slavery. Using this qualitative evidence, Stampp (1956) convincingly details the 'great heaviness' (p. 382) of life as a slave. By contrast, Fogel and Engerman's 'Time On The Cross' (1974) attempts to 'reconstruct the entire history of American economic development on a sound quantitative basis' (p. 6). Using largely quantitative evidence, Fogel and Engerman (1974) argue that this data shows 'what really happened' (p. 8) in the South. Theirs is not the traditional narrative of severe exploitation, subjugation and demoralisation but rather a claim to 'correct the perversion of the history of blacks' (Fogel & Engerman, 1974, p. 258).

While even Stampp (1976) acknowledges value in the cliometric quantitative method, he and many others have also criticised its flaws. Herbert Gutman (1975) himself used a cliometric approach to criticise inaccuracies in 'Time On The Cross'. Gutman (1975) notes many gaps in the data used by Fogel and Engerman, suggesting that their conclusions on the slave 'family' are flawed given their sole focus on marriage, only one aspect of family life. He also points out that Fogel and Engerman rely almost exclusively on 'negative evidence' (Gutman, 1975, p. 162), drawing conclusions based on absent data rather than what was actually recorded. However, greater than the errors in data are the methodological shortcomings inherent in the cliometric approach. Fundamentally, the study of slavery is a study in human experience. Like all history, the value in studying the slave family is to glimpse the real lives of 'real slaves and masters', to appreciate 'the rich and varied texture of life in the Old South' (Stampp, 1976, pp. 28-9). This cannot be achieved if the only evidence deemed worthy is that of 'disembodied abstractions and statistical averages' (Stampp, 1976, p. 28).

However, it cannot be said that the continuing and increasingly widespread use of quantitative data has not enriched academic history. John W. Blassingame (1979) used a combination of 'the best objective evidence' and 'autobiographies of former slaves' to

emphasise the 'importance of stable family life' to the slaves themselves (pp. 172, 175). Whether one agrees with Blassingame's thesis or not is irrelevant, what is significant is that it cannot be dismissed out of hand as ill found in one-dimensional evidence. The strength of Blassingame's argument lies in its combined use of numerical data and first hand accounts.

By comparison, Richard H. Steckel (1986) uses entirely quantitative data to explain 'The Excess Mortality of American Slaves'. On his first page, Steckel (1986) cites more than four different statistics used in previous works to measure infant mortality amongst slaves in pre-Civil War America. Steckel (1986) goes on to measure these and other statistics against similar statistics from the 20th century. In doing so, Steckel (1986) demonstrates the flaws inherent in the cliometric approach. Inaccurate, poorly contextualised data can lead to overstated, understated or false conclusions. For example, Steckel (1986) argues that 'plantation size had no systematic influence on early death' (p. 435) of infants. Conversely, Brenda E. Stevenson (1996) asserts the plurality of experience between slaves who lived on moderately sized plantations and those that lived on larger properties. While Steckel (1986) draws his conclusion based solely on unreliable cotton plantation birth and death lists, Stevenson (1996) uses first hand accounts to inform similar quantitative evidence. If we accept the aim of history as understanding the lived experience of real people who lived in the past, Stevenson (1996) makes the more compelling argument. Drawing on contemporary evidence to inform numerical data while acknowledging its biases will always be a more compelling method of writing history than quantitative data alone.

Similarly, if written history is to take the form of argument, as is convention, the evidence used must be not only as accurate as possible, but compelling. It is a product of human nature that every individual is going to be convinced by different kinds of evidence. While economic historians such as Fogel and Engerman may be compelled by numbers, social historians like Jacqueline Jones may place more weight on first hand accounts. Thus, history as a discipline is best served by the use of a variety of evidence. Ultimately, a number can only tell us so much about what family life was like under slavery. It is the voices of the slaves and masters themselves that can tell us the most about 'what really happened' (Fogel & Engerman, 1974, p. 8), as they perceived it.

It must also be noted that there are certain aspects of the past for which quantitative data will be unsatisfactory in examining. In the case of slave family life: gender roles, the plurality of experience and accounts of overseer brutality simply cannot be expressed by numerical data alone. In 'Labour of Love, Labour of Sorrow', Jacqueline Jones (1985) uses an array of first hand accounts to demonstrate the relentlessness of 'work, work, work' (p. 13) and its effect on slave family life. Jones (1985) also uses these sources to illustrate how 'rampages of violence' (p. 20) at the hands of overseers impacted slave familial relations. Similarly, Deborah G. White (1992) uses contemporary evidence to contradict the traditionally accepted notion that the 'dominant role in slave society was played by men'

(p. 226). Like White, Stevenson (1996) argues that the slave family was matrifocal and asserts on the basis of first hand accounts that it was the racist and sexist customs of the time which undermined the slave family not their matrifocal nature.

Yet, at times humanist scholars can be said to blur the line between observer and sympathiser, clouding their accounts with their own judgment of those that lived in the past. For example, asserting certain aspects of slave life as 'the most challenging and devastating of slave experiences' (Stevenson, 1996, p. 223), can become akin to social memory rather than historical analysis. However, the clinical nature of quantitative evidence can also facilitate social memory, allowing audiences to read within its numbers, 'a picture of the past that serves to explain or justify the present' (Tosh, 2010, p. 3). Perhaps more so than many periods, the brutality inherent in the slave experience compels emotions or a desire to sanitise that experience in those who study it. Given this, it is all the more important to use both quantitative and qualitative evidence to ensure historians are writing history, not re-imagining events to serve collective social memory.

Edward H. Carr (1961) observed that 'the facts speak only when the historian calls on them: it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context' (p. 5). It is clear historians have much power in determining the narrative of past experience. Given this solemn responsibility, it is vital that we employ the advantages of both humanist and cliometric methods in order to achieve the best possible understanding of slave family life, as the slaves themselves experienced it. To accomplish this, historians must 'get on with their research [and] adapt their procedures to the problem at hand' (Stampp, 1976, pp. 1-2), instead of battling to claim their 'radical reinterpretation' as the sole and accurate narrative of the past. Human experience is entirely subjective; its reconstruction requires a variety of evidence and nuanced analysis. This can only occur if historians are committed to learn from each other and employ the best of all available methodology in their quest to accurately recreate the past.

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Gender is a social construct, and the way in which we perform it can be understood through the construction and consumption of culture. In this chapter, gendered space serves as a battleground for ideas, whereby ideals and rights are contested, and questions of lingering inequalities are addressed. This inequality is culturally prescribed, and our essays highlight how it is perpetuated through the construction of women in culture.

Hopkinson identifies the gendered stereotyping that affects our expectations and the norms of wider society. Arguing that advertising's ubiquity is the very reason we can't escape its influence, Hopkinson highlights three constructed ideals that typify women in advertising. What follows is a careful comparison of these three archetypal women in light of feminist and postfeminist theory. Through a critical lens, it is possible to see that the postfeminist theories that laud women for embracing their sexual freedom and dominance in these advertisements are framed within a heteronormative gaze. Essentially, femininity is employed as a marketable commodity, which fits neatly into the hegemonic neoliberal capitalist narrative. A woman's power is tied to consumerism, a construction that becomes exclusionary when alternative femininities are deliberately avoided so as to maximise marketing potential. The real danger arises in the portrayal of women as sex objects, perpetuating gender stereotyping and, in turn, gendered inequalities. So it is, therefore, that framing women in advertising in a postfeminist, sexually empowered manner does a disservice to women as it continues their objectification and attaches worth only to their bodies and not to any of their other attributes.

Christie, on the other hand, analyses the means through which the Women's and LGBT Rights movement of the sixties capitalised on the anti-Communist sentiment to stand up for their rights. Construction of identities is intrinsic to this article, whereby women and members of the LGBT community found their political voice in aligning with each other and demonstrating that a significant group of minorities were being excluded from the very ideals that America was championing at the time, namely democracy. At the time, there was a marked disconnect between democratic perception and reality. Yet, the freedoms gained during the sixties were limited in achieving parity with the dominant white male political elite, as the constraints of the Cold War and liberal capitalism meant that not all goals were able to be met. Here, the gendered construction of identity was the source of liberation, and while some breakthroughs were made, the American ideal of the nuclear family was so deeply ingrained in anti-Communist sentiment that it was impossible to disrupt without compromising America's Cold War position.

Gendered construction serves as an interesting viewpoint to address existing inequalities in society. As expressed in Christie's article, the ultimate goal is to achieve parity with the dominant power, and considering that gender itself is a construct helps to situate this

inequality in culture. It is through disrupting the hegemonic discourse that this chapter is most effective, from both a historical perspective and a media perspective.

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Special Issues in Gender

Brooke Hopkinson

Advertising is ubiquitous in today's society, with some estimates suggesting that people are exposed to upwards of 3,000 adverts each day (Kilbourne, 1999, p. 58). With adverts comprising a sizable proportion of magazines, newspapers, television, and Internet material, it is vital to examine the content and influence of advertising. Advertising is a form of socialisation, operating to inform and dictate the norms and desires of society (Stankiewicz & Rosselli, 2008). Thus the social impact of advertising should not be underestimated. In addition, advertising is becoming increasingly sexualised, with adverts commonly portraying sexually objectified women (LaTour & Henthorne, 1993). This representation of women in advertising is contributing to a myriad of detrimental effects on women and society, including issues of self-esteem, disordered eating, body-dissatisfaction, self-objectification, and poor psychological wellbeing (Stankiewicz & Rosselli, 2008). Additionally, it should be acknowledged that men's representation in advertising is also increasingly being sexualised, and likewise promoting an unattainable ideal, producing various deleterious effects (Jhally & Kilbourne, 2010). However, despite this increase in the sexualisation and objectification of men in advertising, it occurs to a lesser extent compared to women (Jhally & Kilbourne, 2010). Therefore, although acknowledging that men's representation in advertising has its issues, this essay shall focus predominantly on the representation of women in advertising. Ergo, this essay will examine women's representation in advertising and the way in which femininity and female sexuality are socially constructed through advertising. Furthermore, this essay will examine the extent to which heteronormative ideals are contested or reinforced through advertising. By utilising post-feminist and other feminist theories, this essay will examine how women's representation in advertising operates to be empowering or harmful for women.

Despite the ubiquity of advertising, most people believe themselves to be immune to advertising's influence, claiming that they are inattentive and, therefore, unaffected (Kilbourne, 1999, p. 27). However, it is precisely this belief that we are impervious to advertising's influence that makes it so effective (Kilbourne, 1999, p. 27). As Kilbourne cites in the documentary Killing Us Softly 4: Advertising's Image of Women, it has been suggested that only eight percent of an advert's content is actually processed consciously, while the rest is absorbed at an unconscious level (Jhally & Kilbourne, 2010). Therefore, although people may not directly attend to the adverts, and subsequently feel unaffected, they still have a powerful influence on people's subconscious (Kilbourne, 1999). Furthermore, what is presented in advertising comes to define our society and reality, by dictating our norms, ideals, and desires (Stankiewicz & Rosselli, 2008). Thus it is important to examine the way femininity and female sexuality are portrayed in advertising, as these concepts are social constructions influencing our daily lives, which are largely created and reinforced through advertising.

Traditionally, women have been represented in advertising as passive sex objects, pigeonholed into being decorative objects or housewives, reliant on men (Zimmerman & Dahlberg, 2008, p. 72). However, recently these so-called "keep her in her place"

depictions of women in advertising are declining; instead a shift toward portraying women as active, assertive, and sexually powerful is occurring (Zimmerman & Dahlberg, 2008, p. 72). The discourse of empowerment, or what Lazar (2006) refers to as 'power femininity', is increasingly being utilised to promote commodities to women. This depiction of women as assertive and powerful ostensibly contradicts the heteronormative notion that conflates femininity with passivity (Malson, Halliwell, Tischner, & Rudolfsdottir, 2010). Advertising that portrays ostensibly empowered women is understood in post-feminist terms as a positive shift in women's representation in advertising (Gill, 2008; Lazar, 2006). However, the extent to which such depictions of women actually represent a positive and empowering change in the way women are represented in advertising will be debated. Acknowledging this shift in women's portrayal in advertising, Gill identifies three 'figures', or ways female sexual agency is constructed in contemporary advertising, "the young heterosexually desiring 'midriff', the vengeful woman set on punishing her partner or ex-partner for his transgressions, and the 'hot lesbian'" (Gill, 2008, p. 35).

The figure known as the 'midriff', named so because the middle part of the body was often exposed through the fashionable crop-tops of the mid 90's to mid 2000's, is one of the common contemporary portrayals of women in advertising that contests women's previous passive representation (Gill, 2008, p. 41). The 'midriff' is characterised by a young, conventionally attractive, heterosexual woman, who purposely demonstrates her allure and sexual power (Gill, 2008). Gill asserts that 'midriff' advertising consists of four themes, including emphasis on the body, sexual subjectification rather than sexual objectification, promotion of the notions of choice and autonomy, and highlighting the idea of empowerment (Gill, 2008). This 'midriff' figure of advertising is exemplified in the Wonderbra adverts of the 1990's (Gill, 2008). For example, a 1999 advert shows a young woman wearing a black cleavage-enhancing bra looking seductively at the camera, with the text 'I can't cook. Who cares?' printed across her cleavage (Malson et al., 2010, p. 2). Another vivid example is the Wonderbra advert of model Eva Herzigova in her underwear, with the caption 'Hello Boys' (Malson et al., 2010, p. 2). These Wonderbra adverts epitomise Gill's 'midriff' figure in advertising as the women in the adverts appear to be desiring sexual subjects, personally choosing to present themselves in an ostensibly sexually objectified manner because it suits their interests (Gill, 2008).

A second figure, referred to as the 'vengeful woman', has also become a standard portrayal of women in contemporary advertising (Gill, 2008). So-called 'revenge advertising' emphasises the notion of the 'battle of the sexes', and depicts women as gaining the advantage by punishing their sexual partners who have misbehaved (Gill, 2008, p. 46). A striking example of this 'vengeful woman' type advertising is in an advert for Lee jeans in 1997, which shows a woman's stiletto-heeled boot resting on a naked man's bottom next to the caption 'Put the boot in' (Gill, 2008, p. 47). The violence of the image was defended under the rhetoric of 'girl power', in which it was argued that the image was not intended to demean men or promote violence, but rather about women's empowerment

(Gill, 2008, p. 47). Additionally, Gill (2008) classifies a third figure, the 'hot lesbian', as a figure that is becoming an increasingly common portrayal of women in advertising. Women depicted in this way, are somewhat similar to that of the midriff; as the 'hot lesbian' is always conventionally attractive, being "slim yet curvaceous, with long flowing hair and makeup" (Gill, 2008, p. 50). The 'hot lesbian' is always presented in a highly sexualised manner, almost always shown kissing or holding another woman in scenes that often draw on ideas from heterosexual male pornography (Gill, 2008). An example of this 'hot lesbian' advertising is the 1996 Boisvert lingerie advert, where an attractive woman is shown putting on sexy black underwear, followed by her entering a restaurant in a black suit, where clips of her earlier dressing are interspersed with approving looks from surrounding men (Gill, 2008, p. 52). The woman then meets her companion, which the viewer only sees the back of, and they share a kiss, where it is then revealed that the woman was meeting another woman (Gill, 2008, p. 52). Subsequently the text 'Do men deserve this?' appears on screen, followed by a 'No' (Gill, 2008, p. 52).

The above descriptions of the 'midriff', 'vengeful woman', and 'hot lesbian' present three common ways female figures are presented in contemporary advertising (Gill, 2008). It should be acknowledged that the aforementioned depictions of female figures in advertising are polysemic, and can be construed in a multitude of ways (Gill, 2008, p. 51). Thus, an argument can be made that by portraying women as confident and having agency, the heteronormative understanding of women as 'passive' is contested, and accordingly these images are empowering representations of women (Lazar, 2006). Conversely, other arguments assert that although these women are not portrayed as passive, they still reinforce heteronormativity, as they are formed from within heteronormativity, and depict a highly constricting and exclusionary form of femininity (Gill, 2008).

The argument that these adverts contest heteronormative ideals and are empowering is most commonly associated with post-feminist theory (Malson et al., 2010). Post-feminism embraces sexuality, viewing sex as a form of power which women possess (Zimmerman & Dahlberg, 2008). Whilst heterosexuality remains normative in 'midriff' depictions, it can be argued that heterosexual-power relations are altered, as, contradictory to heteronormative expectations, the 'midriff' appears as the desiring subject (Malson et al., 2010, p. 9). The overt display of sexuality that is present in 'midriff', 'vengeful woman', and 'hot lesbian' advertising contests the heteronormative idea of the domestic woman (Machin & Thornborrow, 2006). Utilising the post-feminist approach, these 'midriff', 'vengeful woman', and 'hot lesbian' adverts show women that they can be powerful and independent, while also looking sexy (Zimmerman & Dahlberg, 2008). Accordingly, postfeminist arguments present beauty practices and attempts to achieve the feminine ideal in terms of personal pleasure, and thus, as being subversive (Lazar, 2006). Under this post-feminist rhetoric, the pursuit of the feminine ideal and beauty depicted in advertising becomes a feminist project of 'empowerment' and enjoyment for oneself (Lazar, 2006). With this approach, the 'midriffs', 'vengeful women' and 'hot-lesbians'

presented in adverts signify the power that can be achieved through the purchasing of the advertised commodities (Lazar, 2006). Additionally, although all three of the typified figures arguably subvert heteronormativity by portraying women as assertive and powerful, the 'hot lesbian' also clearly challenges heteronormativity by portraying homosexuality. Likewise, the 'vengeful woman' in adverts contests heteronormativity in some instances by depicting a reversal of society's patriarchal power structure, by presenting men as subservient to women.

Furthermore, the adverts disseminate the post-feminist notion that gender equality has been achieved, and that women today can 'have it all', along with desiring self-aestheticisation (Lazar, 2006, p. 505). This self-aestheticisation invokes the use of Fredrickson and Roberts' (1997) Objectification Theory, whereby women come to internalise the 'male gaze' or an observer's perspective of themselves and their physical appearance. No longer are women just being objectified, but they are self-objectifying, as the adverts disseminate the notion that through self-objectification power can be achieved (Lazar, 2006). The feminine sexuality displayed in these adverts is argued to present a reclaiming and celebration of women's sexual desire (Lazar, 2006, p. 512). In doing so, these forms of advertising present women not only as subject to the male gaze, but also encouraging it (Amy-Chinn, 2006). Hence by acknowledging women's sexual desire these adverts purportedly challenge heteronormative assumptions of women as sexually passive (Lazar, 2006). This demonstrates a shift in advertising, whereby sex and sexuality has moved from being presented as exploitative to that of being empowering for women (Lazar, 2006, p. 512). Therefore, rather than women being presented purely as objects of male desire, women are instead depicted as actively choosing to present themselves as overtly sexual to demonstrate their independence and liberation (Halliwell, Malson & Tischner, 2011).

Despite the possibility for these contemporary representations of women in advertising to be construed as empowering and challenging heteronormativity, there is a convincing counter argument; the arguments are all constructed from within a heteronormative framework, which consequently dictates their interpretations (Amy-Chinn, 2006). As the 'midriff' is presented as possessing sexual agency, interpreting such figures as sex objects might initially appear contradictory (Malson et al., 2010). However, it is the heteronormative presentation of the 'midriff' that operates to negate the independence and sexual agency that she ostensibly represents (Malson et al., 2010, p. 13). Malson and colleagues (2010) assert that although the heterosexually desiring 'midriff' contests heteronormative ideas of women as passive sexual objects, in doing so they draw upon pre-existing imagery such as that of pornography designed for the male gaze (Malson et al., 2010, p. 13). Thus, despite the post-feminist rhetoric presenting self-objectification positively through empowerment, this viewpoint is criticised as women commodify themselves for "consumption by the voyeuristic male gaze" (Amy-Chinn, 2006, p. 157). In this way femininity remains a highly marketable commodity of consumer capitalism (Blair, 1994). Therefore, the ostensibly 'empowered' 'midriff', 'vengeful woman', and

'hot lesbian' are in fact designed for a male gaze. This notion is supported through Objectification Theory where women then perceive adverts, such as the Wonderbra, through an internalised male gaze, and subsequently think of themselves in terms of how men would view them if they had the Wonderbra product. Therefore, contemporary advertising's presentation of female empowerment and challenging of heteronormativity is ersatz. Although the 'midriff' advertising exemplified by the aforementioned Wonderbra adverts presents women as assertive, and accordingly contradicting heteronormative notions of women as passive, the adverts remain undeniably situated within a dominant heteronormative framework (Amy-Chinn, 2006). While men were not actually in the ads, they were unmistakeably present in their address and recognition of the male gaze, with 'Hello Boys' and 'I can't cook. Who cares?' constructing the viewer as male (Amy-Chinn, 2006, p. 163). Thus, the adverts utilise a heteronormative framework in both their imagery and text. Furthermore, the direct addressing of the male audience with 'Hello Boys' reinforces the idea that one of the main purposes of lingerie and a woman's body is its effect on men (Amy-Chinn, 2006, p. 165).

The supposed 'empowerment' is derived exclusively from physical appearance and women's conformity to beauty and sexuality norms (Halliwell et al., 2011). These presentations of women in advertising appear to offer choice, albeit only to women who embody the specific heteronormative ideal, being slim yet ample-breasted, conventionally attractive, able-bodied, and generally white (Malson et al., 2010, p. 4). Therefore, although 'midriff', 'vengeful women', and 'hot lesbian' adverts depict ostensibly 'empowered' women, they almost always portray this highly specific version of femininity (Gill, 2008; Malson et al., 2010). This subsequently reinforces restrictive heteronormative ideals of femininity through the consistently excluded femininities, therefore simply presenting a masked and different form of oppression. Moreover, advertising presents women's power as reliant on consumerism and the advertised products, with cosmetic products being necessary to work toward the unattainable ideal of femininity that promises empowerment (Lazar, 2006). Subsequently the sexual agency that is presented in advertising is merely pseudo-empowerment, and does not actually have an empowering effect; instead it may be deleterious to young women (Halliwell et al., 2011).

As women's representation in advertising focuses almost exclusively on the body, appearance is presented as the only way to attain power and success (Machin & Thornborrow, 2006). Consequently, other forms of agency are excluded for women, as bodies become women's defining characteristic (Machin & Thornborrow, 2006). This is exemplified in the aforementioned Wonderbra advert portraying a woman in a Wonderbra looking seductively at the camera with the text 'I can't cook. Who cares?' printed across her cleavage (Malson et al., 2010). Although the advert may be construed positively through the midriff's escape from traditional gender roles and domesticity, it continues to reinforce sexual attractiveness as the most important aspect of a woman's identity (Malson et al., 2010). The advert acknowledges the male gaze, implying that the reason nobody cares that she can't cook is because men appreciate her breasts. This

reinforces the idea that women's abilities and intelligence are irrelevant or secondary to appearance. The Miss Representation documentary comments on this bodily focus, acknowledging that in the mainstream media women's intelligence and achievements are often ignored in favour of focusing on their appearance (Newsom & Scully, 2011). Subsequently Blair (1994) states that achieving the feminine norms of beauty and sexuality is often necessary to gain social and economic success.

In contrast to this post-feminist argument of such adverts being empowering, a plethora of research has demonstrated the potentially deleterious effects of advertising's current portrayal of women (Halliwell et al., 2011). As previously discussed, the women presented in advertising embody a homogenous kind of beauty and femininity, specifically that which is young, white, slim, able-bodied, and heterosexual. Due to its ubiquitous presentation, this photo-shopped and airbrushed, unattainable hyper-feminine ideal becomes the standard to which all other forms of femininity and sexuality are measured (Lazar, 2006). Thus, many women experience dissatisfaction with their appearance as it is implied that any deviation from the feminine ideal is inadequate or abnormal (Harper & Tiggermann, 2007, p. 649). Subsequently, women's representation in advertising has also been associated with the proliferation of eating disorders, likely due to advertising's endorsement of unattainable beauty standards (Lazar, 2006). Hence, advertising detrimentally contributes to this post-feminist idea that celebrates women's apparent 'equality' and 'choice' while concomitantly reinforcing an exclusionary form of femininity and sexuality that requires the purchase of commodities and incessant body maintenance (Amy-Chinn, 2006). Additionally, under the post-feminist rhetoric, adverts are depicting scenarios in which the patriarchal power relations of society are reversed, where it is women with their sexual prowess that have power over men (Lazar, 2006, p. 512). Subsequently these adverts are criticised for exaggerating the advancements made by the women's movement towards gender equality. Gill's (2008) aforementioned 'vengeful woman' archetype that punishes men exemplifies this. These adverts depicting women as aggressive can have negative repercussions including invoking vicious responses from 'men's rights' groups claiming that men are now the oppressed gender (Lazar, 2006). However, this cannot be further from the truth as not only are these representations of women's power restrictive and limited to their sexuality, the gendered power reversal depicted in adverts does not even translate to gender-parity in society (Lazar, 2006). Moreover, images of sexually objectified women can also detrimentally influence perceptions of sex and sexual behaviour, as seeing sexually objectified images has been demonstrated to "increase men's acceptance of rape myths, interpersonal violence, and gender role stereotyping" (Stankiewicz & Rosselli, 2008, p. 587). Thus advertising's representation of women contributes to the trivialising of sexual violence and perpetuates particular ideas, such as the attitude that women are valuable predominantly as objects of men's desire (Stankiewicz & Rosselli, 2008). Additionally, by duping women into believing that power can be attained by adopting the socially constructed norm and ideal of femininity and sexuality, women will subsequently be less likely to address the true issues that perpetuate women's inequality in society (Machin &

Thornborrow, 2006, p. 187).

In conclusion, this essay has examined how femininity and female sexuality are represented and socially constructed through contemporary advertising. Utilising the figures of the 'midriff', 'vengeful woman', and the 'hot lesbian' (Gill, 2008), this essay explored the argument that dominant heteronormative ideals are contested through the representation of these figures in advertising. Additionally, this essay provided a strong counter argument, asserting that this alleged challenging of heteronormativity is simply a veneer, and heteronormative ideals of femininity and sexuality are actually perpetuated through these representations. Through the rhetoric of empowerment, femininity and female sexuality is commodified in advertising for the consumption of the male gaze (Amy-Chinn, 2006, p. 157). Advertisements sell the notion of femininity and reinforce the patriarchal ideology that lies behind that notion (Blair, 1994). Furthermore, this essay critiqued the post-feminist argument that these adverts are 'empowering' by describing some of the various harms that are an implication of women's representation in advertising. Although this essay primarily focused on how advertising's portrayal of femininity and sexuality is currently disempowering and detrimental, this should not be taken to mean that all sexualised depictions of women are negative (Stankiewicz & Rosselli, 2008, p. 588). Instead advertising needs to represent healthy sexuality that is not constructed within a patriarchal heteronormative framework, and incorporate various expressions of femininity that are not as limiting as the current portrayals. It would be of greater societal benefit if advertising ceased equating the heteronormative notion of femininity and beauty with empowerment, and instead portrayed women as successful and empowered for more than just their appearance.

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History 241
Making Sense of the Sixties: the USA 1954-1973

Anna Christie

Despair, Disillusionment and National Malaise: Possibilities and Problems in the Struggle for Gay and Women's Liberation in Cold War America

When pressed to give his recollection of 'the sixties,' historian John D'Emilio observed that as a homosexual, 'the sixties' happened in the 1970s (D'Emilio, 2002). While at face value this appears ahistorical, D'Emilio's statement invites further argument around the broader issue of placing the 'sixties' in the chronology of post-war America; suggesting that instead of an era bound by the decade's beginning and end, 'the sixties' were bound by events, outlook and mood (D'Emilio, 2002). As D'Emilio contends, exposure to Cold War geopolitics bound American experience in the post-war period (D'Emilio, 2002). This precipitated scrutiny of the nation's role and purpose on the global stage as well as an interrogation of the citizen as a component of the nation and thus a bearer of its values and responsibilities. A subsequent study of homosexual and female identities as constructed within this discourse of anti-communism, patriotism and national security, belays tensions between seeking to alienate the communist 'other' and promoting all-American values. The emergent women's and gay liberation movements relied on these tensions to expose fissures in the discourse surrounding identity so to form of an awareness of their collective oppression and provide discursive space in which this could be contested. Successively, the extent to which these movements liberated their participants remains debatable given the use of oppositional strategies of both assimilation and revolt. Within the relative merits and limitations of these strategies, the wider legacy of the 'sixties' becomes visible as both a, "watershed decade, out of which nothing in American life emerged unchanged," and a source of, "despair… disillusionment… [and] national malaise." (D'Emilio, 2002, p.216; Debenedetti & Chatfield, 2003, p.451).

The 'new frontier' envisioned by John F Kennedy at the dawn of the 1960s captures the profound confidence of a nation at the height of its power and influence and a deep insecurity regarding internal and external threats to this position (The New York Times, 1961). Unlike the answerable threat of the Axis powers, the Cold War failed to present any clear recourse to direct engagement without risking thermonuclear war (D'Emilio, 1998). This distinction necessitated a changed portrayal of national security towards depiction in ideological terms (Smith, 1992). Consequently, communism became an epidemic requiring a 'doctrine of containment' to protect free society from external and internal subversion (Smith, 1992). National vitality came to rely on arranging citizens into nuclear families so as to embody the democratic values capable of discrediting communism's economic and political systems (Belmonte, 2010). Thus, what an American could do for their county was to conform to sanctioned representations of the nation, both as the best protection and best offensive against anxieties unleashed by atomic weapons and geopolitical instability (Belmonte, 2010; The New York Times, 1961). To sustain the fragile division between accepted forms of masculinity and femininity as one of the greatest weapons against the lure of communism, and their deviant forms as capable of causing society's internal collapse; dominant discourses on national security sought to ostracise domestic groups deemed harmful by identifying them with the communist 'other' (Smith, 1992). As the conflict deepened, the range of identities expressible in the public realm narrowed (Smith, 1992). For women, gendered divisions

between husband and wife expressed the viability of liberal capitalism (Belmonte, 2010). While a woman could exemplify the American work ethic through employment, her primary focus could remain her home and children thanks to the freedom and affluence denied to her soviet counterpart (Smith, 1992). Expressions of this identity at either extreme were prohibited. If a woman gained permanent employment, she threatened a bastion of masculinity (Coontz, 2011). Yet if she lavished excessive attention on home and family, she over-domesticated her husband and risked raising a new generation of homosexuals (Coontz, 2011). For homosexuals, engaging in 'perverted' sexual acts indicated a deficiency in the moral fibre of the individual, at odds with the courageous and hard-working all-American male (D'Emilio, 1998; Belmonte, 2010). Homosexuals presented a weakness in the national fabric; lacking the strength to resist communist subversion and seducing others to a similar weakness (D'Emilio, 1998). As traversing the boundaries of the accepted identity of the citizen carried the penalty of banishment to the margins of society, the inconsistencies of advocating individual autonomy whilst simultaneously imposing domestic ideals were infrequently tested – that is, before the 'sixties' (D'Emilio, 1998; Meyerowitz, 1993).

While dissent existed in the 1950s, D'Emilio suggests that internalising oppression and a failure to transform collective grievances into large-scale grass roots activism protected inconsistencies in the discourse around identity from significant challenge (D'Emilio, 1998). The question then becomes, what about the 'sixties' allowed for collective oppression to be identified and challenged in the national discourse. As both the gay and women's liberation movements occurred in the late 1960s, the framework for realising collective oppression had been established by precedent movements in shifting 'personal' matters into the realm of political reform (D'Emilio, 1998; Hall, 2011). The lasting legacy of the Civil Rights Movement in seeing, "basic human problems as public problems," aided in the establishment of urban gay communities bound by common experiences of personal oppression, although these remained 'collectively closeted' (Hall, 2011). The impact of this legacy upon the women's movement was to expose links between politics and personal experience through consciousness-raising, leading to the perception of sexism as a collective experience perpetuated by society (Hall, 2011).

Utilising this platform of collective discontent, the early 1960s saw women and homosexuals adopt the activism exemplified by concurrent movements to expose parallels, rather than chasms, between the national experience and that of oppressed minorities (D'Emilio, 2002). Inspired by the student-led sit-in movement in 1960, early activists sought to apply the civil rights model to their own causes (D'Emilio, 2002). Whether it was homosexuals directly engaging with police brutality, the clergy and the mental health profession, or women with the government, education and employment; those who had increasingly become targets of institutional oppression, "insisted on the right to define their own experience and claim fully the power to shape their lives." (D'Emilio, 1998; Hall, 2011). Parallel to this, the New Left and Antiwar movements exemplified a different means of challenging the dominant discourse on identity (D'Emilio, 1998). In seeing participants of the social movements as the true bearers of

American values, their efforts to replace the corrupt institutions of liberal capitalism with alternatives was to reclaim the lost legacy of American exceptionalism (D'Emilio, 1998; Hall, 2011). Without these pre-existing efforts to frustrate the dominant discourse around national and individual identity, the possibility of mobilisation following Stonewall and the publication of the Feminine Mystique would have been lessened considerably (Rimmerman, 2015).

A common descriptor for the 1966 founding of NOW following the publication of Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystique, is to perceive it as 'birthing' second wave feminism (Hall, 2011). The Stonewall Riots in 1969 as the violent reaction of New York's gay community to persistent police brutality and harassment gains the similar accolade of 'birthing' gay liberation (Rimmerman, 2015). As such a reading excludes numerous prior acts of resistance, it is better to perceive these events instead as an anticipated, "rupture," signifying, "how deeply the changes wrought by the 1960s reached into the structures and assumptions of American life." (D'Emilio, 2002, p. 216). Yet having realised their capacity to collectively re-imagine the identities of their participants, emergent movements threatened to fracture along strategic lines based on how their liberation was to be envisioned (D'Emilio, 2002; Rimmerman, 2015).

The precedent discourse surrounding identity and citizenship foreshadowed this division. On one hand, the civil rights model exemplified the political capital gained in contending for virtual equality with the dominant identity of the citizen by exploiting inconsistencies between liberal civil liberties as equally accessible and the realities of oppression (D'Emilio, 2002; Rimmerman, 2015). Prior to Stonewall, this assimilationist approach had been the main currency among the gay movement (Rimmerman, 2015). Although slow, it resulted in significant legal victories, open dialogues with the scientific community and increased media visibility (Rimmerman,2015). Latent responses to Stonewall saw a return to this strategy with the establishment of the GAA which distanced itself from others on the political Left in favour of utilising electoral politics to affect legal reform (D'Emilio, 2002). Similarly, NOW's stance as a, "civil rights movement [speaking] for women," positioned it as an archetypal liberal reform organisation, relying on lobbying, lawsuits and public support to advance its cause (Hall, 2011).

The alternate vision was to perceive liberation as impossible within the constraints of the existing system and subsequently, to seek systemic change as fundamental to each movement's success (Rimmerman, 2015). GLF embodied this approach in seeking broader coalitions with the political Left and a simultaneous focus on multiple progressive issues (Rimmerman, 2015). The women's movement contained similar impulses with efforts to establish 'free institutions' and the objective of the Redstockings and Furies as seeking the, "total transformation … of all social institutions." (Hall, 2011, pp. 53, 69). The fault lines between these two approaches raises doubts as to whether social movements succeeded in liberating the identities of their participants. Instead, one strategy hamstrung the gains of the other; exemplified by Betty Friedan's condemnation

of lesbians as a 'lavender menace' to the public progress made by her own white middle class feminism (Hall, 2011). This suggests that whilst the "rupture" of the sixties allowed new representations of oppressed identities to emerge; the framing of homosexuals and women as simultaneously possessing equal rights and status with the majority whilst also deriving unique identities from their separate communities, reinscribed the dominant culture as one to seek parity with as well as be defined against (Scroggie, 1999). As this limited success to the extent to which the system could be manipulated to sustain these contradictions; the effect was to vastly advance social change where long-standing traditions of democratic rights could be extended to encompass the realm of the intimate (D'Emilio, 2002). However, the full realisation of this progression remained limited by liberal capitalism's bias towards nuclear families and male wage labour (D'Emilio, 2002). This could not sustain significant challenge without compromising America's Cold War personality (D'Emilio, 2002).

The Cold War backdrop to the advent of the 'sixties' placed American ideals under an unprecedented degree of global scrutiny (Smith, 1992). While this produced a consensus as to the content of the ideals representative of the national experience, it also exposed the degree to which traditionalist conceptions of 'America' omitted many Americans (Belmonte, 2010). In utilising these contradictions to expose parallels, rather than chasms, between the national experience and that of oppressed minorities; social movements portrayed their collective oppression as blighting America's democratic, anti-communist identity (D'Emilio, 2002). Exposing the gaps between democratic ideals and democratic realities presented women's and gay movements with the problem of how to realise their liberation within the discourse of identity, patriotism and national security (Belmonte, 2010). Divisions as to whether the existing system required replacement or reform to realise liberation worked to reinscribe the dominant culture as one to seek parity with and be defined against (Scroggie, 1999). The result was to usher in a greater understanding of freedom and social justice for oppressed minorities but to limit its full expression where the systemic inequalities produced by liberal capitalism could not be fully challenged without threatening America's Cold War position (D'Emilio. 2002). The duality of both possibility and restraint when it came to shaping one's identity produced the legacy of the 'sixties' as both, "a watershed decade, out of which nothing in American life emerged unchanged," and a source of "despair… disillusionment… [and] national malaise" (D'Emilio, 2002; Debenedetti & Chatfield, 2003).

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The following pieces provide different arguments and perspectives regarding the constructed economic and political system of capitalism that dominates the globe, and how the construction of this system alters our worldviews and experience of happiness. In the neoliberal-capitalist information age we currently find ourselves, these pieces give us an opportunity to reflect on how we are living, and by what values we are living.

Hare opens this section with an insightful piece on the Islamic financial system, highlighting the differences between the values of western banking and those of Islamic banking. In turn, the way our finances are treated can affect societal opinion on the whole economy - for a world ruled by economy, this can impact all areas of our lives. Crucially, the opinions we construct surrounding money can influence how we work, how much time we spend working, and how the necessity of working can impact how we link money to happiness.

This idea is explored further in Smith's work on consumption, capitalism, and advertising. The concept of happiness being used to sell us products is not new, however Smith critically analyses the discourse surrounding the consumer lifestyle. Does happiness come from having money, or spending money? Or are we stuck between the consumer paradox of always wanting more while trying to spend less?

Rodrigues closes this section by furthering the discussion, using the concept of emotional capitalism. We are asked to consider how class can affect the products we have access to consume, and how this can impact our construction of happiness. Furthermore, the rise of social media has been incorporated into the "happiness industry", and further informs how we construct ourselves and consume others. Capitalism risks creating consumers who are isolated, and alienated from the products we are told will make us happy - yet still we continue optimistically.

Our ideas of happiness and wellbeing are so often tied to our ability to work, and contribute to the economy. However, these authors make us reflect on whether this is the most effective use of our energy. Instead, do we need to construct an ideal of happiness outside of the limitations and expectations of capitalism? Whether you consider capitalism to be problematic, or removed from the equation, these pieces provide perspectives worth consideration.

Theological and Religious Studies 309
Directed Study

David Hare

Islamic Financial Principles Provide Christians with a Moral Alternative to Certain Conventional Banking Practices

The early church fathers associated usury with greed, lack of charity, covetousness, callousness, inhumanity and the exploitation of the poor (Young 1977). Money, as a commodity leveraged through the charging of interest presents a moral conflict for Christians and Christian institutions when they participate in modern conventional banking practices that rely on this practice. If conventional banking practices are not compatible with the Christian tenets of justice and social responsibility, does Islamic finance offer an alternative model of credit, contract and exchange (Bader-Saye 2013)?

Where conventional banking's largely debt-based position transfers risk to another party, Islamic banking's asset-based position shares the risk as mandated by Islam's central tenets of justice and social responsibility (Dridi 2010). In accordance with the Islamic legal code of shari'ah, Islamic banking practices prohibit riba (interest taking). If Islam has preserved the economic wisdom of the Middle Ages concerning the exploitative tendencies of usury, the modern Christian church would then be presented with the moral imperative not to use conventional banking practices "that are foreign to a Christian vision of human flourishing," (Bader-Saye 2013).

Profiting from business activity and maintaining a banking industry are not in question here. However, concerning the exploitative tendencies of usury, one needs only to consider the 2007 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and its lasting impact on wide sectors of society. Born out of the speculative investment activities of the money markets, the GFC characterises what happens when pecuniary value becomes more important than intrinsic value (Bader-Saye 2013). Traded financial instruments now dwarf the value and purpose of tangible capital. This 'new' capital is detached from the underlying assets and production that it once represented. Complex financial systems churn mountains of debt through derivative markets consisting of credit default swaps and gambled banking deposits with profiteering as the sole purpose. These financial engines are responsible for the perpetration and concentration of immense levels of wealth into the hands of a few through the use of speculative financial instruments. Less than 1% of the world's population now owns half of global wealth. Put another way, the wealth of the bottom 50% of the world's population equates to the wealth of just sixty of the wealthiest people alive today (Hardoon 2016). The immense power of these financial markets (estimated at twelve times the value of real money) holds sway over the economic, social and political mandates of our societies. At the root of this lies the practice of usury.

Usury can be considered a corrupt practice because it causes an alienation of lender from borrower, while inflicting the secondary effect of detaching capital from its underlying asset values (Bader-Saye 2013). Where conventional banking practice relies on interest charging and thereby transferring risk to another party through trading their liabilities in derivatives (or by shorting – the selling of financial products before they are acquired), Islamic finance offers an interest-free logic that challenges these outcomes of usury. For Islamic banks, these activities are prohibited because speculation is essentially gambling. Instead, the contract between depositor and bank is one of profit-sharing (mudarabah)

– not risk transferring – where both parties share in the fortunes and failures of invested opportunities. Islamic financial rules are derived from ethical principles found in shari'ah, where masqasid al-shari'ah (the objectives of Islamic law) expects Islamic banks to advance justice and social welfare, ultimately promoting the protection and preservation of life and the earth. These principles are derived from the Qur'an and Muhammad's sunna (practice), as well as ijma' (consensus) and qiyas (interpretation) among Islamic scholars and jurists. Qur'anic scriptures remain resolute on the use of riba. From the Surah, "Those who eat Riba will not stand except like the standing of a person beaten by Shaitan leading him to insanity… Allah has permitted trading and forbidden Riba" (Qur'an 2:275). Instead of acting as simply 'lenders of funds', Islamic banks are charged with the responsibility of acting as economic agents connected to the real economy (the Islamic finance industry is valued at US$2.1 trillion) (Islamic Finance 2016), the activities of which are tied to the socioeconomic objectives of resource allocation and equitable wealth distribution (Mansour 2015).

Biblical references, beginning with the Torah, provide a rich seedbed of instruction concerning the charging of interest. For example, Exodus 22:25 explains that you should not lend to the poor as a creditor would and exact neshekh (a biting interest) and Ezekiel 22:12 states, "…you take both advanced interest (neshekh) and accrued interest (tarbit) and make gain of your neighbours by extortion…" Neshekh referred to the leveraging of interest from the debtor's side, and tarbit was used to describe the recovery of interest from the creditor's side. Within Jewish tradition, both forms of interest were forbidden regardless of their emphasis (Buch 2005). The Council of Nicaea threatened to depose clerics if they charged usury, the council of Carthage condemned it and by the medieval period it was banned entirely with heavy penalties attached. It appears the turning point for western societies came at the hands of the merchant classes who needed new mandates for trade and commerce, so it fell to the theologians and philosophers of the day to provide new thinking on how to utilise money in a usurious manner. John Calvin's treatise on allowing the leveraging of interest on money was not about 'permission,' rather it was about providing guidance for the emerging market economies. Calvin's approach to the biblical laws concerning money was to address these problems as conditions of conscience rather than hard and fast rules. History demonstrates that the burgeoning market economy had other ideas on how it viewed usury, which had little to do with the church's original views.

For the early church, the collecting of finances was a Godly endeavour concerned with the plight of the poor, widows and orphans. However, salaries and buildings became more of a concern as the church began to attract enormous levels of wealth, resulting in socially responsible activities accounting for less than a quarter of the church's outgoings by the 5th century (Young 2016). Islamic banks have also ignored the intent behind shari'ah and have abused the principles of fairness and equity in how they have applied their own qiyas of the law. Where there is a lot of money, corruption and profiteering seem inevitable.

Usury and modern day economic crises go hand in hand. The logic of conventional banking is not a justified inevitability. On the contrary, "there is nothing necessary about the existing institution of capitalist credit money" (Bader-Saye 2013). In light of the fact both Islamic scholarly consensus and Christian theological thought have traditionally resisted usurious practices on the grounds of immorality, it begs the question why many Christians and their institutions remain resistant to the interest-free logic of Islamic finance.

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Politics 316
Capitalism and its Critics

Kieran Smith

It has been claimed that capitalism causes people to consume more than is good for them (Akerloff & Shiller, 2015; Cohen, 2000; Lane, 1998). This essay will assess this claim by surveying works that either support or dispute it by examining claims which assert that the capitalist system incentivises firms to sell consumers more than is good for them. This essay then assesses if consumers can actually be induced to purchase products that they do not really want, concluding that capitalism does not cause consumers to consume more than is good for them, but enables them to consume a wide variety of goods. The individual consumer's choices determine if this consumption is beneficial or not.

Some critics of capitalism claim that the capitalist system has a growth imperative which gives firms an incentive to sell consumers more than is good for them. Cohen (2000), for instance, writes that capitalist competition leads to increasingly more efficient production methods. This same competition engenders a bias towards growth so that firms choose to use these efficient new methods to increase production instead of, alternatively, leaving production as is and increasing their employee's leisure time. He sees firms as acting in the interests of the entire capitalist system, by forcing workers to accept a pay package where they have more money for consumption and less time for leisure, despite what the workers would prefer. Ironically, as Steele (1992) points out, this claim ignores the fact that capitalist firms are in competition. In such a situation, a profit seeking firm could attract more workers by offering them less hours for correspondingly less pay, giving it an advantage that other firms would have to emulate in order to survive.

Heath (2009) addresses a similar Marxist claim with regards to capitalism's purported growth imperative. As with Cohen, the first premise is that capitalism leads to increasingly effective production methods, but in this account, increased productivity leads to workers being laid off instead of increasing workers' hours. This again leads to excess production, this time because laid off workers do not have money to buy what the production line produces. However, Heath (2009) writes that in this situation, there is no reason for producers to engender desires in people who have no money to want to consume.

Consumers may also be led to consume more than is good for them if the market system fulfils needs which are either artificially induced by advertising or which simply do not benefit consumers. Akerloff and Shiller describe humans as having two types of 'tastes' (2015, p. 4). The first determines 'what is really good for us' while the second determines 'how we really, actually make our decisions' (2015, p. 4). Conforming to tastes of the second variety may not always be in our best interests and the authors claim that marketers exploit these. In this way capitalism is said to induce people to consume products that differ from what is good for them. The second type of interest creates a demand and the market fulfils it.

A similar claim made by Cohen (2015) holds that humans pursue two different schedules, which order objects that they desire from differing perspectives. The first

schedule is referred to as the pursuit schedule and is ordered based on the relative strengths of the subject's dispositions to pursue these objects. The satisfaction schedule is ordered based on the satisfaction the subject would derive from possessing them. Changing information and tastes causes these schedules to be constantly rearranged and can lead to the unfortunate position where the two are differently ordered. Cohen (2015) claims that capitalism does this, encouraging the pursuit of goods that do not bring satisfaction. Thus, firms have to find ways of convincing consumers to buy products that will not provide them much, if any benefit.

Crisp claims that 'persuasive advertising' overrides the consumer's autonomy by appealing to desires in such a way as to remove the possibility of decision. He distinguishes between persuasive and informational advertising. Persuasive advertising operates on the consumer's subconscious, which according to Crisp, 'is not obedient to the commands of the conscious' (1987, p. 416). According to Crisp, autonomy requires both free will and free action. The subject should be able to make a 'genuine decision' when deciding what to do and they should have the freedom to carry out that action. Crisp writes that even if someone purchases the same product multiple times, this is not evidence that a desire is autonomous. He considers the explanation for this behaviour to likely be that advertising has induced non-autonomous desires in the consumer who is unaware of the desire's true origin. One may wonder why the consumer continues to purchase a non-beneficial product if personal experience informs them that they should not. It seems that unless the product is an addictive substance, they are likely buying it for reasons that benefit them in ways that Crisp fails to acknowledge. Arrington (in Crisp, 1987) claims that a choice is free if the choice maker can justify it in their own mind. Crisp (1987) disputes this idea, writing that consumers are not able to answer why they choose certain products. He goes on to write that persuasive advertising prevents users weighing up reasons. Filho, Lima and Lennon (2014) surveyed consumer justifications for purchasing the Apple iPad. In contrast with Crisp, they find that consumers have many justifications for purchasing an iPad, not just based on its functionality but also based on hedonic or social traits. It seems that consumers do have justifications, although perhaps not of the sort that Crisp considers to be valid. This suggests that Crisp only considers actions as being free if he agrees with them.

In order to decide if consuming a product is bad for a consumer it is worth considering if the desire induced by advertising for that product qualifies as rational. Crisp (1987) argues that these desires are irrational, because if an agent was aware of all the facts about the product, they would not have these desires. Arrington (in Crisp, 1987) disagrees, writing that if rationality requires we must know every fact about a thing before we can desire it, then surely all our desires are irrational. If rationality only requires we have the 'relevant' facts about the thing, then prior desires would be needed in order to determine that the information is relevant. Informational advertising could be seen to supply the information for these prior desires. Crisp, however, sees advertising's effects as more akin to manipulation through brain washing. He considers this to occur when 'a person causes another person to act for reasons the other person could not accept as good or justifiable

reasons for an action' (1987, p. 415). He believes that if the person were aware of the origin of their beliefs they would disregard these beliefs.

Puffery is one form of advertising which Crisp (1987) sees as operating in a way akin to manipulation. It uses suggestive language and images to link the product to unconscious desires for power, sex, wealth, and so on, in addition to repetition which helps keep the product's name in the consumer's mind. Arrington (in Crisp, 1987) considers puffery to communicate the relevant facts which consumers need to make rational decisions. The example he uses is of Pongo Peach Cosmetics which utilises the associational imagery of 'an adventure in paradise' in its advertising. Arrington (in Crisp, 1987) claims that the consumer purchasing Pongo Peach Cosmetics wishes to purchase the subjective effects of the product, the feeling of adventure, not the actual experience. Crisp disagrees, writing that this advertisement would not be successful if it appealed directly to the consumer's conscious self with a message that made it clear that they were only purchasing a subjective feeling. He claims puffery is operating on the consumer's unconscious to interfere with 'their system of tastes' (1987, p. 415), against their will and without their knowledge. Crisp considers that if a desire is to be rational it does not necessarily require all the facts but it must not 'have been induced through techniques the agent cannot accept' (1987, p. 415). But do consumers literally believe these products will have the effects the advertisements claim? Crisp (1987) does not provide proof that they do, and indeed many probably are aware that they are buying a subjective feeling, not whatever experience the advertisement associates with the product.

Even if persuasive advertising is sometimes able to influence consumers to consume things that are not good for them, it does not seem to be able to effectively manipulate in such a way as to create enough demand to support a product line. The effectiveness of this advertising is called into question by the vast sums of money that firms must pay in order to try to produce things consumers will actually want. According to Steele, firms spend 'large sums on research and development and market research' (1992, p. 304). Furthermore, he points out that products often fail despite intensive marketing campaigns and they are commonly withdrawn before even being launched when research finds that consumers will not be interested. In addition, he writes that not all product successes are pre-ordained. Often fads will create surprising volumes of demand. This indicates that at the very least consumer preferences must have some effect on what they choose to consume. However, even if they enjoy these products, they might not be good for consumers if they prevent them from taking advantage of more beneficial opportunities.

Cohen (2000) considers how advertising influences consumers to forsake leisure in order to earn the money required to buy more products, contending that advertising never communicates the fact that leisure must be sacrificed by consumers if they want to purchase goods. He presents the pursuit of leisure products as self-defeating; working to acquire these products results in never having the time to use them. Steele addresses this

particular claim, writing that consumers have alternative sources of information about products such as 'personal experience, word of mouth, journalism, and expert opinion' (1992, p. 308). They can use this information to decide if the benefits of a product outweigh the costs in terms of leisure time lost in acquiring it. Furthermore, they can observe the work time ratios of those around them and make comparisons to assess if they would benefit from adjusting their own lifestyle. Cohen (2000) writes, that firms do not want customers to be satisfied because otherwise they would not continue to buy products. As with the behaviour that Crisp attributes above to non-autonomous desire, it seems that this account does not adequately explain why a customer would ignore their own personal experience and repeatedly buy something that was not beneficial to them.

Lane also sees time spent earning money as time that consumers could use more fruitfully on things that actually make them happy. Lane presents empirical evidence refuting what has come to be known as the economic fallacy. This fallacy 'is the belief that beyond the poverty level higher levels of income increase a sense of well-being' (1998, p. 471). He cites studies that have found that although poor societies are less happy than rich ones, there is very little difference in 'subjective well-being' between well off societies and ones who are even richer. This would suggest that being able to consume more is not as beneficial for consumers as other things they could focus on instead. A study by Myrna Weissman finds that depression is rising in rapidly modernising and economically advanced countries (as cited in Lane, 1998). Even the United States is exhibiting rapidly increasing rates. Lane (1998) writes that people derive the most enjoyment from spending time with their friends and families. If consuming more leads to consumers working more and missing out on the things they would derive the most enjoyment from, then people really are consuming more than is good for them. However, there are other reasons that could be attributed to rising depression in modernised countries, such as decreased living space due to heavy urbanisation, the pervasiveness of bad news through mass media or even higher expectations. Furthermore, 'culture strongly influences...beliefs, values and world views' (Samovar & Porter, 2004, p.3). If people's work and spending habits are leading them away from having happy lives, perhaps culture is to blame. At the least, more evidence is required to eliminate these factors before the blame for all of modern society's ills can be directly attributed to capitalism.

This essay has looked at a few of the arguments for and against the statement that capitalism causes people to consume more than is good for them. It has found that capitalism makes it possible for people to access a wide variety of goods but it does not seem to do more than encourage them to consume. Some writers argued that this encouragement orientates people away from things that they really enjoy. However other factors, such as culture may have more of an effect on this than the free market and more evidence is needed. Many of the critics of the capitalist system surveyed above just seem unable to believe that people could derive enjoyment from consuming goods with very little use value. In short, capitalism enables people to consume a wide variety of goods and services, whether this consumption is good or bad depends on what the individual chooses to consume.

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Sociology 325
Sociology of Emotions

Dielle Rodrigues

In the 21st century, everything has become an illusion of the eye. Our culture has moved from emphasising art to becoming more 'artificial'. We have created a culture of mass deception. Our desires are no longer our own but have become a commodity. The emotion of happiness is no longer felt but seen through standardised eyes of social media. This essay will examine the significance of happiness on consumer capitalism and the effects of social media on the modern consumer, with a predominant focus on Facebook. Through the works of theorists such as Adorno and Horkheimer, Marx and Marcuse, and more modern sociologists such as Ahmed and Illouz, I will explore how happiness has transformed the traditional worker to the more secular 'psytizen' today (Cabanas, 2016). Happiness was once found in more traditional settings such as the church or the family. However, the search for Wi-Fi is almost like the beginning of a new religion - you cannot always see it, but you want to feel the blessings that come from being connected online.

Emotions originate from a subject's beliefs and desires. In modern society, happiness has created a discourse of what is healthy and desirable (Cabanas, 2016). Human happiness ranges from longevity in life to higher quality social relationships. Because happiness is socially constructed, we are not capable of figuring it out for ourselves. The happiness industry thrives on individuals 'faking it till they make it,' as we have to learn and be taught how to be happy. Failure to conform to happiness is a stigma in modern day society (Cabanas, 2016).

Firstly, like capitalism, happiness has an unending cycle of desire and instant gratification. The search for happiness initially began amongst the working class and gradually shifted to the modern consumer. Each group illustrated how the sense of inequality made individuals feel unhappy, leading to their turning towards commodities to fill this void. The working class never had a sense of freedom, and so they simply coined and believed in a version of happiness that was not really there. Workers were less able to create happiness at home or at work because their managers made sure that they laboured, regardless of their happiness. However, the middle and upper classes were offered more emotional freedom and would fulfil their emotional need through commodities, for example, by commissioning works of art.

Art invokes feelings and emotions such as power, prestige, or piety. Many artists during the Renaissance were commissioned to convey particular emotions or to depict individuals as figures they wished to be associated with. This portrait by Raphael, captures the artistic and societal reality of the time, relating commodities and objects to the individual, in reference to the marriage that this portrait was commissioned for. Social achievement could be recognised through these as they conveyed an illusion of happiness, captured in a fleeting moment for future generations to see. This is an early example of how happiness is constructed for social achievement. Marcuse's work in the One Dimensional Man recognises that the separation of a worker in the sphere of labour, produces a similar misery to when an individual's alienation in modern society (Marcuse, 1964). Marcuse recognised that happiness in affluent societies had instead become

domination or achievement (Marcuse, 1964). Like the commission of Renaissance paintings, individuals in the 21st century too boast and frame their own profile pictures on social achievements they think are important. For example, a selfie with a well-known celebrity can generate lots of likes and improve an individual's social status. In contrast, the painting Music in the Tuileries by Manet shows the different way in which social classes and relationships were captured in the past to show modernity and social achievement. This shows a shift in society from a religious to a more positivist thinking, which encouraged people to manifest their material desires because God wanted them to have them, not for God themselves (Ehrenreich, 2009). In the 21st century social media is filled with the same disenchantment of happiness, similar to an oil painting trying to cover up a portrait.

Figure 1. Raphael. (ca.1505-1506). Portrait of a Lady with a Unicorn. [Painting]. Galleria Borghese: Rome.

Figure 2. Manet, E. (1862). Music in the Tuileries Gardens. [Painting]. The National Gallery: London.

Capitalism has created a sense of emotional numbness. With the rise of modernity, most consumers have become isolated and alienated. The modern consumer can now be called a 'psyitzen,' a self-governed individual who is only restrained by the psychological development of their own self-reflective acts and consumption (Cabanas, 2016). A correlation of internal and external factors contributes to happiness, emphasising social capital over the accumulation of commodities and resources. The interpersonal activity of gaining social capital is significant for social achievement in today's world (Leung, 2011). The need to have and be seen with more friends is a sign for living a healthier life with better social connections. The constant dependence on psychological commodities, gives a false sense of happiness. Eva Illouz's term, emotional capitalism, reemphasises how the demand for emotional self-control and the logic of consumption in a capitalist society has found its importance (Illouz, 2007).

The individual who was once the worker, then the consumer, today has shifted roles to also becoming a self-motivator and writer of happiness in an industry of self-help books and talk shows (Cieslik, 2014). The way in which individuals interact in society enabled a change in the role they played initially. The rise of cities and the internet created a space which further fetishized the individual into an autonomous consumer. It became easier to just be another statistic in the masses. Individuals were deprived of their use value and became abstract in order to be able to constantly mould and adapt themselves (Cremin, 2012). Adorno and Horkheimer's work, helps to recognise how Facebook for example, is schematised for easy recognition and superficially differentiated in order to ensure demand. When culture is commodified, it promises to instantly gratify our desires, and provides an illusion to deceive the consumer (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997). There is no authentic response, everything is superficial. Prior to finding happiness in the traditional setting, the modern cultural industry has become obedient to the social hierarchy. An unspoken 'survival of the fittest' mentality has emphasised the importance of obeying social media compared to the loss of value of the church and family.

Secondly, capitalism perpetually cheats the individual of the desire that it promises to fulfil. The culture industry captures the need to be happy, and promotes it by selling the emotion instead (Adorno et al., 1997). There is a class consciousness of the relationship between happiness, the world and capitalism. However, in order to survive we have to be blinded and passionately defend what we constantly desire but cannot obtain. Whilst examining the Dialectic of Enlightenment (Adorno et al., 1997), Simmel notices that the need for connection has increased in parallel with the isolation and rise of modernity and cities. This is important as the culture industry combined with the happiness industry in order to promote a sense of wellbeing but also emphasised spending money in order to feel happy (Adorno et al., 1997). For example, some people blindly follow the Kardashians, as they promote an ideal that some want to emulate.

Everyday people are becoming preachers of motivation. The roles of talk show hosts like Oprah Winfrey, are now being transformed into unlikely inspirational beings. For example, messages of consumption by American label producer and record artist, DJ Khaled, were promoted alongside hashtags and inspirational words of wisdom on his Snapchat and Twitter, including #blessup, a modern consumer take on the Bible. This shows how motivational speech has changed over time; by following these celebrities social achievement is boosted. The happiness industry has become so diverse. Our social media accounts have become our CVs, where we are constantly updating ourselves in order to become 'somebody' online. What was once being 'in the moment', has become carefully calculated and coded today (Morgan, 2013). There are filters and appropriate time frames in which to capture the most likes and attention online. Social media is not just a shell on which we fill our life canvas, but has become a billboard of advertisements. The average person now plays the role of the writer, model and photographer in order to gain social achievement online. Marx similarly draws on how traditionally religion

offered the illusion of happiness. However, Durkheim's theory recognises that modern societies are creating new wants and needs; individualism is no longer seen as authentic unless it is in pursuit of some materialistic goal (Morgan, 2014). The rise of the self-help industry has been created from this goal, by capitalising emotional feeling, profiting from happiness and further promoting narcissism in today's society.

Thirdly, advertising has become so ingrained in individuals that we are deprived of meaning and reduced to abstraction (Cremin, 2012). Society today promotes narcissism where our enjoyment is not brought on by ourselves but always in relation to others. Marcuse's work recognises how happiness is forced and becomes ritualised by unspoken social media commandments. The importance of psychoanalysis shows patterns of what individuals want others to see and who they actually are (Marcuse, 1964). Freud's idea of the unconscious is particularly important to understanding why happiness contributes to social achievement, as desires are repressed and not able to become conscious in a direct manner. Social media offers a platform in which these unconscious desires can be satisfied, explaining our constant desire to go back and interact with social media. However, with greater choice online, comes greater anxiety. The happiness industry feeds from this, and further promotes a sense of comfort that you are not alone and everyone acting the same role in order to survive. It is no longer just images and commodities that individuals are interacting with online. Language and emotion are also passed down, as individuals read the text and interact with the content that is posted.

There are two forms of narcissism, primary and secondary. Primary focuses on self-love in terms of pleasure and self-preservation/ health. On the other hand, secondary narcissism focuses on an object and measures the ego against an ideal. Secondary narcissism regresses into primary narcissism, as the self becomes an object of love. This is why happiness is measured above our egos, as individuals have become preoccupied with themselves and grown anxious from the isolation that social media ironically brings. This again shows how the cultural industry replaces the family as the agent of socialisation. There is always a primitive nature inside individuals, which is dominated by the libidinal drive for pleasure. Therefore, our drives are governed by these pleasure principles in order to achieve social happiness. As products become ego substitutes and promise instant gratification, commodities and social media have become substitutes for showing the emotion of happiness because they suppress fear and anxiety so that we desire more later. The authentic self no longer exists. In order to achieve social achievement, you have to turn the symbolic value of your emotions into an economic asset (Cabanas, 2016).

Lastly, the happiness industry has entered every single realm from media to academia, as well as the entertainment industry and popular culture (Ahmed, 2010, as cited in Cabanas, 2016). The rise of self-help books has described that it is our responsibility to promote our own happiness as well as that of others (Ahmed, 2010). This is relevant as we no longer need books to convey our message; through social media we become the writer and the marketer. Eva Illouz's main argument was that emotions are an important part

of the social organization of capitalism. The making of capitalism with the making of an emotional culture goes hand in hand (Illouz, 1997). Morgan (2014) reemphasises Illouz's argument, as he describes the modern self as a monitoring subject that produces a hyper reflexive alertness in order to cope with the loss of connectedness in the 21st century. His argument emphasises that it is not the objects that you surround yourself with that drive your happiness but the absorption of things that interests you. This is significant as it shows a shift from the commodities, to the idea that you not only superficially engage with social media but now almost put your soul into it. God used to regulate behaviour in order to maintain happiness in the past, however social media and our unconscious self-reflexive nature is now saving the modern soul. The subject or individual is constantly inspecting and trying to adapt its actions for a better social achievement. Illouz describes this as emotional achievement, where life and intimate feelings are captured as emotions but turned into objects of calculation instead (Illouz, 2007). For example, apps such as Tinder are calculated to find the perfect match, based off algorithms. In order to get a swipe, many people will look towards mutual friends to see who they can network with. Happiness again cannot be produced for oneself but a correlation of engaging within the world (Morgan, 2014).

Frank Furedi's book, Therapy Culture, suggests that popular psychology and the emergence of therapy culture only promotes a narcissistic view of everyday life (Furedi, 2004 as cited in Cieslik, 2014). Over time, we are not only affected but so are our peers. Our professional therapist role has shifted onto our friends. Furedi's work also suggests that individuals are becoming obsessed with the pursuit of happiness as the language of emotions frame everyday life (Cieslik, 2014). Similarly, Ahmed looks into Foucault's work to understand happiness as a discourse in modern times. Power relations online can be shaped to appear like the social hierarchies of the past, through language and practices. Everything on social media is popularised by images of socially acceptable lifestyles and identities. This can explain why people look through the invite list of an event on Facebook to see how many people and who is going to boost their social networks. These subtle messages of self-governance motivate everyday people to live up to sometimes unattainable standards - even if what is online is an illusion. This surplus of enjoyment, or jouissance, is unattainable and the cycle repeats itself over and over again. This is significant as this is what Illouz meant by emotional capitalism, the shaping of emotional and economic discourses into one another (Illouz, 2007). Illouz's argument romanticises and recognises that over time, the private self and emotions have become a public performance (Illouz, 2007). There has been a shift in society - morals, technology, and how we interact have changed. No longer are individuals confessing their sins to God and seeking happiness in the redemption that initially came from the church. Technology and apps are becoming the new saviour and shell onto which people can portray who they really are. The externalisation of the self being objectified by visual and language representations shows that you no longer need a body to convey emotion. Instead, you can just react to things such as Facebook posts. Emotional capitalism has moved from expressing emotions through our bodies to the internet, making the last of what it means

to be as authentically human as possible into just another economic activity of personal branding.

In conclusion, happiness is seen through the standardised eyes of social media. Illouz's concept of emotional capitalism shows that emotions such as happiness are no longer just emotions that are felt, but an entire industry of self-help books and positive psychology (Illouz, 2007). The shift from the worker to the consumer in today's society is also important as it recognises that individuals have lost their use value and have been subjected to becoming autonomous standardised individuals online. The rise of narcissism shows the significance of psychoanalysis and how individuals are being more aware of their behaviour online and constructing their behaviour to adhere to social norms and to the hierarchies they are trying to climb. The idea of self-love has become superficial, like happiness. The culture industry has replaced religion and the family as the main agent of socialisation, as the shift of morals and technology has made the modern individual become more of a public performance than a private one. We are all-knowing dupes of happiness; however, the happiness industry does a good job of making us paranoid of our own social and individual achievements. Happiness is no longer an individual experience but a socially experienced one. After all, the illusion of a good painting is more than just a trick of the eye. Today, we are all framed online in our own standardised paintings, conveying emotional advertising in exchange for economic value. Marx reminds us that instead of authentic emotion, we are leaving behind capitalism - the only marks on our canvasses.

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Raphael. (ca.1505-1506). Portrait of a Lady with a Unicorn. [Painting]. Galleria Borghese: Rome.

Finally, Petrovic and Lee take on the idea that our identity is not only informed by factors such as culture, gender, class and location but by the food we consume. More specifically, the different traditions and limitations associated with how we consume our food. In turn, the diets we abide by inform the labels, subcultural and politics we identify with. We all need to eat, but the decisions that go into what we eat can be a reflective insight on how we see the world.

Petrovic provides a reflective and perceptive piece on the different choices one may make when adhering to a Paleo diet. Her discussion on food consumption and alternative medicine allows us to examine what we so often consider 'the norm', and exposes the tiers of ideology within these behaviours. Her argument is not only informed by nutritionists and medical anthropologists, but by her own experience - adding a layer of thoughtfulness, and depth to this piece.

On the other hand, Lee presents an argument regarding her take on a vegan diet, coining her own term: b-ganism, or bourgeoisie-ganism. Her work brings us an intersectional discussion and focuses us to reflect on the liberties certain cultural privileges allow us to take when it comes to our food. Like Petrovic, Lee shows a delightful amount of reflexivity, and uses her own experiences of culture, class and gender to give the reader access to the moral dilemma she and others face.

The observant reader may notice both of these essays are indeed from the same class: Dr Claudia Bell's course on food and consumption. This course, situated within the department of Sociology, uses multiple disciplines and methods to examine how food is produced, distributed and consumed. Furthermore, it engages with the politicisation of food; and how issues such as colonisation, famine and marginalisation through ethnicity and gender can be explored and represented in the food we consume.

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Sociology 323
Consuming Interests: The Sociology of Food

Mia Petrovic

Some see it as a return to ancestral food consumption whilst others a necessary lifestyle decision; either way, the Paleo diet is an instance of Anthony Giddens' life politics in relation to food. Writing in 1994, Giddens formulated the conception of life politics – they are the negotiations and decisions one makes within their social context. However, life politics are not the simplistic and every-day choices but rather ones that reflect our moral compass, political agenda or pursuit of a specific identity. By this nature, those who adhere to a Paleolithic (Paleo) diet reflect life politics in their food consumption. Broadly, factors considered when adopting the Paleo diet include: (i) health benefits from the adherence to ancestral habits, (ii) rejection of modern medicine, (iii) active decisions opposing commercialised food and (iv) a general Paleo "life ethos" that encompasses more than just the consumption of food (Reimann, 2015). I will explore how these four elements are influential in shaping ones' conception, choice and identity surrounding the Paleo diet. Each are fundamental underpinnings to the reflexive Paleolithic individual, though not necessarily homogeneously influential.

The 'science' is a prominent reason individuals choose to adhere to the Paleo diet – and thereby, reflect their life politics through food consumption. The evolutionary discordance hypothesis suggests that human genetics are best adapted for a diet from the Paleolithic era (Pitt, 2016; Knight, 2011, p. 706). Broadly, that is a diet consisting largely of meats, vegetables, fruit and nuts whilst eliminating dairy, legumes, cereal grains, processed foods and additional sugar and salt (Cordain, 2016; Paleo Leap, 2016; Cordain, 2011). Dr. Eaton first exposed the theory on a popular stage with a simple premise: "our genes determine our nutritional needs," (Cordain, 2011). Ten-thousand years ago wheat and grains were introduced in volumes through the Agricultural Revolution, yet Paleo ideals state our genes evolved slowly and have not adapted to these dietary introductions (Knight, 2011, p. 716; Cordain et al., 2005, p. 340). The time since the contemporary diet was formed is, "just a drop in the bucket compared to the 2.5 million years human beings have lived on earth," (Cordain, 2011). Medical Anthropologist and co-author of The Paleolithic Prescription Stanley Eaton noted that all but 0.01% of our genome was formed before agriculture developed; therefore, the medical ills of modern day are largely due to physiological imbalances induced by the Western diet (Pitt, 2016; Reimann, 2015). For example, there is an increasing correlation between gluten and neurological defects as well as a third of cancers being attributed to poor nutritional choices (Reimann, 2015; Cordain et al., 2005, p. 342). Cordain et al. (2005) writes that clinical trials continue to confirm the health benefits of the Paleo diet, therefore, those who follow a Paleo prescription are making a conscious decision to affect dietary change which complements their genetics and ancestry (p. 343; Reimann, 2015). Giddens (1994) notes that life politics can often take the form of such Western assessment, and in regard to the Paleo diet the, "diseases of civilization," that have been conferred to nutrition is something individuals are strongly reflexive towards," (p. 246; Pitt, 2016). What people put into their mouths each day is not just a source of daily energy but a contributor to their health, wellbeing, and longevity (Reimann, 2015). Like Cordain (2011), those who choose to follow Paleo acknowledge that in the same way diesel is disastrous for a

gasoline modelled engine, the effects of non-balanced food consumption can have similar negative impacts on humans.

It is worth noting here the critiques to evolutionary discordance hypothesis – including those of ethnobiologist Gary Paul Nabhan (2004). Nabhan challenges the point that human genetics have not undergone substantial adaption in the past 10,000 years. The example of thalassemia, resistance to malaria, is invoked as an example of micro-evolutionary change (Nabhan, 2004). He suggests that if thalassemia has occurred then it is not unreasonable to expect wider microevolution in genomes related to food consumption. People could very well have evolved to be able to process modern dietary introductions. However, such critique of the Paleo formula needs to be put into perspective. Research into the population of the Yanomamo people of Northern Brazil and Southern Venezuela exemplified a lack of health risks. The people of this tribe showed no signs of hypertension – high blood pressure, a prevalent risk of heart disease – until salt was introduced to their diets in the latter half of twentieth century (Cordain, 2011). Similarly, between 1968 and 1978, there were no reported cases of heart attacks, or any signs of heart disease, within the Greenlandic Inuit population – while there were 2,600 deaths in the United States (Cordain, 2011). Such studies strongly call to question Western dietary impacts on health, as both groups of focus had not consumed any contemporary foods before the studies. For those shaping their life politics, the Paleo diet is therefore preventative if nothing else; 'science' is by its nature theoretical and upon consideration of the topic people choose to follow Paleo to avoid the potential risks. Work, such as Nabhan's, may be correct but as Boris in We Love Paleo states, he ate, "healthy according to conventional wisdom," but did not feel healthy nor agree with the contents of the food he was consuming. He is an example of an individual who exercised life politics when turning to Paleo food habits and credits the, "evolutionary time scale," and 'science' as the core reason for his choice (Reimann, 2015; Cordain et al., 2005, p. 340). Studies challenging mainstream nutritional rhetoric also continue to grow.

A second underpinning to the life politics of those prescribing to the Paleo diet is the rejection of modern medicine. Instead, individuals are opting for alternative means of preventative and remedial health. For Simone, one of the interviewees in We Love Paleo, no drug or supplement prescribed by the doctor combated her chronic brain-fog, severe fatigue or migraines: similarly, Cain had forgotten what it felt like to be 'healthy' and began to compensate his living standards – all until they began to follow Paleo regimes (Reimann, 2015). Michelle was told the next step for her health treatment was to cut into her Colon for a biopsy and she found herself questioning why the next step had to be so invasive? Her decision to go Paleo was initially a rejection of modern medicine but turned into a platform to educate and advocate for an alternative approach to health. Giddens would credit the choices of Simone, Cain and Michelle as examples of life politics. All three, to varying degrees, challenge the uniformed prescription of Western medicine. In our time, medical research is evolving at an ever-increasing pace and invoking ones' life politics takes a position contrary to these tides in society (Giddens,

1994, p. 92). Elevating the Paleo diet within medical spheres has triggered a collective consciousness linking food consumption to health and therefore 'the health crisis.' In present day, well over half of the United States is obese or overweight and 64 million people are at high risk of mortality from various cardiovascular diseases (Cordain et al., 2005, p. 340). These statistics exist as a snapshot of the larger medical marvels modern civilisation is faced with. Lindeberg et al.'s research (2007) found a Paleo diet decreased participants' waist circumference, overall weight and improved their glucose sensitivities. Writing in 2007, Lindeberg et al. did comment that the Paleolithic diet was under-researched however, should be credited as an alternative medical management diet (Pitt, 2016). In present day, the political life choices of individuals such as Simone, Cain and Michelle – along with the thousands of others who adhere to Paleolithic standards – inspire further clinical trials and research that continue to raise the Paleo diet within social circles (Pitt, 2016; Reimann, 2015; Frassetto, Schloetter, Mietus-Synder, Morris Jr, Sebastian, 2009, p. 947). Their medical stories contribute to the evidence supporting a wider medical approach, wider than strict application of modern medicine. During his retirement years, Freddie, another We Love Paleo interviewee, cut out a collection of his prescribed medication (for numerous health conditions) when his daily food consumption followed Paleolithic foods (Reimann, 2015). His health approach changed from simply suppressing medical issues with drugs to combating the root of their cause through diet and lifestyle. A doctor in the United Kingdom struggled accepting pumping countless drugs into his patients and dedicated his life's research to alternative lifestyle choices – dominantly Paleo (Reimann, 2015). The personal choices of such persons mentioned recognise the Paleo diet as an alternative, or supplement, to common medical practice. Their individual actions are political decisions which extend beyond their individual dinner-plates. By crediting the Paleo diet with medical benefits they simultaneously challenge the prescribed narrative of the majority, as well as display a strong example of Giddens' life politics.

One need not look far to witness the effects of commercialised food consumption: McDonald's can be found on every corner, along with constant fast food advertisement and countless food court options. Those on the Paleo dietary scheme avoid such repeated exposure to high sugar, processed and grainy foods both for the medical reasons explored and as a combat to commercialised food sources. Ones' Paleo life politics therefore encompasses emancipatory politics – emancipation from the multinational brands and profit-driven dietary guides (Giddens, 1994, p. 14). These popular food joints appeal to the taste buds of the masses but their high sugar and salt percentages are foreign from Paleolithic ideals. The Paleo diet is, "about eating real food," as opposed to forming 72.1% of ones' diet (as in current America) from processed foods including dairy, cereal grains and refined sugars (Reimann, 2015; Cordain et al., 2005, p. 343). Cordain (2011) contends today's commercialised and standardised foods, "wreak havoc," on the conception of what is 'healthy' food. From the Paleo perspective, our ancient genome is colliding with the globalised world; the repeated exposure to processed foods will foster compound negative effects as consumption builds over "lifetimes, decades and

generations," (Reimann, 2015; Cordain et al., 2005, p. 35). The nature of government policy has commonly allowed for non-Paleolithic foods to be the cheapest on the shelf and the most accessible to the common person. Changing the commercialised nature of food – and the broader health inequalities associated with this – has to come from a political level to be effective (Knight, 2011, p. 717). Those adhering to the Paleo diet, and often advocating for its prominence in society, are exercising their food consumption as an emancipatory life politic. Giddens (1994) notes that life political issues are often opposed to de-traditionalised and commercialised notions of modern day society (p. 246). Over half of the Western population, that are constantly exposed to commercialised food sources, suffer from a form of chronic diet-related disease (Cordain et al., 2005, p. 350). Multinationals are profiting on the increased morbidity and mortality of civilisation formed significantly through popular food consumption behaviours. Avoiding commercialised and standardised food is a form of life politics as adhering to the Paleo diet is an active decision by the individual social agent to act in a particular manner within the consumer market.

In Giddens' (1994) own words, "life politics is a politics, not of life chances, but of life style," (p. 15, emphasis in original). Those who follow the Paleo dietary scheme often encompass a life ethos, in correlation with their food consumption habits, exemplifying life politics (Reimann, 2015). In a Seven Sharp segment Dan, a young New Zealand interviewee, comments on how what started as a weight-loss quest quickly transformed into a way of life. His lifestyle embodied Paleo as a holistic identity in relation to his health and fitness (Mau, Mulligan, & Gayford, 2013). After losing twenty kilos, Dan is now a walking advert for the Paleo lifestyle identity. Similarly, two brothers, inspired by the preventable death of their mother, invested in their Paleo brand to elevate Paleo foods and functional fitness training within the United Kingdom. These transformative life decisions can be understood as the aftermath of embracing a Paleo life political identity (Reimann, 2015). The author of Eat Drink Paleo, Irena Macri, credits Paleo as an every-lasting way of living and eating that encourages durable lifestyle transformations (Reimann, 2015). Concepts drawn into Paleo life politics are in-touch with nature, environmental sustainability and health longevity. Macri sees her recipes as food consumption means that are both ethical and nutritious for the soul (Reimann, 2015). Following and being educated on Paleo ideals opens one to greater food awareness as at its very core is the question: 'where does my food come from?' Significantly, many who follow Paleo do not view their food consumption patterns as a diet but rather a way of eating and living that is committed to optimising their bodies' performance. Speaking in the We Love Paleo documentary, Aaron recognises his health addiction to all things Paleo and finds comfort in the familiarity he shares with his Cross-Fit community. Paleo has become a shared identity that an increasing amount of people invest in. Whether it be for health and medical reasons, or to take a political stance against commercialised produce, to be Paleo is to be a part of a collective – a collective identity (Giddens, 1994, p. 91). Devoting oneself to such an identity is a clear depiction of life politics as Paleo begins to outline the umbrella lifestyle features of individuals choosing to follow its ideologies.

A Paleo diet is an articulation of individuals' life politics on food as it is a reflexive dietary choice based on the factors that surround ones' perception of health, medicine, commercialised food and lifestyle habits. As mentioned, these four influential platforms are not necessarily all considerations encompassed within the entirety of a Paleo followers' life politics but rather, they should be understood as sources of political life persuasion. To best articulate how ones' life politics on the Paleo diet may form based from the four platforms I will conclude by drawing upon my own experience. Upon a medical diagnosis of a family member, I was morally forced and driven to educate myself on food consumption and alternative methods of medicine. I learnt that triggers to some neurological conditions have been tied to processed foods and that the Paleo diet minimises exposure to these. The Paleo diet was instilled into my life politics as I took a stance based on my developing knowledge of health, medicine, commercialised products and lifestyle change. I am, like the others mentioned in this piece, an active social agent that reflected on my surroundings when formulating life politics. I retain balance with modern foods as acceptable whilst relating strongly to the collective Paleo identity that encourages us to, "look after [our bodies] well, as [we] have nowhere else to live," (Reimann, 2015). The life politics surrounding the Paleo diet are therefore like a standard plate of dinner; they are made up of a range of foods – metaphorical for the influential factors explored in this piece – whose quantities and taste appeal are subject to the subjective formulation of an individuals' perception on food consumption.

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Sociology 323
Consuming Interests: The Sociology of Food

Erica Lee

B-ganism, the racist, sexist, elitist vegan lifestyle: Discussions of Giddens and critiques

Introduction

In this essay, I argue that life politics of veganism, or as I prefer to call it: b-ganism, is a site of multiple oppression and reproduction of modernity's 'master identity'. I begin by defining b-ganism and describe its elitist, colour-blind and heteronormative identity. Giddens' concept of 'life politics' is then introduced and illustrated through the b-gan lens. The presumption of emancipation from tradition and hierarchies in b-gan life politics is challenged along with similar critiques of 'self-actualisation'. To discuss this further, I use intersectional literature and my experience as a class-privileged, culture-fluid, woman of colour. I offer additional moral dilemmas potentially faced at the crossroads of oppressions by non-conformist b-gans. Finally, I propose intersectionality as a concept that can create generative power to remedy the truths of my critiques.

Veganism; you mean b-ganism?

Me: "Mum, I can't eat that. I'm vegan."
Mum: "What's bee-gan?"
Me: "No, vee-gan. It means I don't eat meat."
Mum: She scoffs, "Fine, don't eat my food. Talk about privilege, choosing not to eat meat. If only your grandparents could hear you say this..."

My mother's Korean pronunciation of 'vegan' and its link to privilege serves as an inspiration to coin the term b-ganism. B-ganism, short for bourgeoisie-ganism, is what I claim mainstream veganism currently is: a social justice movement for animal rights that is disconnected with other intersections of oppressions. It is the intentional abstaining of animal and animal product consumption, associated with colour-blind, heteronormative, white, middle-class privilege; a concept resonated in numerous intersectional vegan academia (Deckha 2012; Habeeb 2009; Harper 2011; Harper 2012; Navarro 201; Singer 2016). That is to say, that the oppression of animal rights are fanatically crusaded whilst historical legacies of oppression such as that of race, class, gender and culture are made invisible. For example, popular vegan media such as the New York Times bestseller Skinny Bitch explicitly states to reduce animal suffering yet assumes no racial or class induced hinderance to healthful food and knowledge, a heteronormative audience and exotifies non-white food in her recipes (Harper 2011).

Life politics of b-ganism

In the discussion of b-ganism, the concept of life politics becomes pertinent. Giddens (1991) describes life politics as the negotiation between freedom to choose a certain lifestyle and the varieties of moral dilemmas that comes with those decisions, with the ultimate goal of self-actualisation. He explains that this 'freedom' is a "fundamental benefit" of our current social context, where increased global interconnectedness and exposure through travel, media, migration and technology, gives us multitudes of choice, voice and resources (Giddens 1991, 231). This creates a reflexive order where

what individuals do impact global issues and global issues impact individual issues (Giddens, 1991). Whilst he admits there are barriers to emancipation from tradition and hierarchical dissemination of power of the pre-modernist times that limit our 'freedom', the very concept of life politics presumes a certain level of emancipation (Giddens 1991). This places individuals as sites of 'generative power' rather than passive receivers of 'hierarchical power' (Giddens 1991).

Let us see exactly how this relates to b-gans. B-gans, the heteronormative, white, middle-class vegans of majority culture, bask in the 'fundamental benefit' Giddens talks about. Their position in society faces minimal barriers to their freedom of choosing the vegan lifestyle. Of course, that is not to say that b-gans are completely without struggles. As Cherry (2006), Chuck et al (2016), Greenebaum (2016) and Paxman (2016) claim, veganism is perceived as a separatist practice, one that is of unpopular politicised identity and therefore rejected, alienated and loses social status in context of greater society. Additional moral dilemmas b-gans face are those outlined by the dominant subcultures of veganism which are divided according to the motives of choosing this lifestyle; issues of personal health, sustainability and environmental protection, animal rights and religion (Harper 2011, 222). Ultimately, b-gans negotiate their freedom of choice and varieties of moral dilemmas by reconciling themselves as 'moral crusaders for the animals'. Perhaps it is this stance against speciesism that allows them to resolve the potential guilt of privileged status whilst still reaping the benefits of their superior position. It is a form of moral lapse where hedonistic endeavours are favoured over acting on problems of human oppression, which may deter their pleasures as a result of social position shift.

Questioning b-gan emancipation: the grand illusion

It is worth reassessing here, the notion of emancipation with minimal barriers for b-gans. If we were to critically look at our current overarching condition in Western society, we are in fact universally shackled to the ideologies of patriarchal, neoliberal capitalism (Aavik 2015; Harper 2012; Singer 2016). Is Giddens' idea of lifestyle politics an illusory negotiation between perceived freedom and an unlabelled new order of hierarchical power i.e. capitalism? All whilst drowning in the exponentially growing moral dilemmas due to our interconnectedness to the world of "fictitious social relations" (Crouch 2013, 5)?

If consumption is an identity project, the decisions we make are about who to be (Giddens 1991). In other words, we create an individual sense of morality and identity through consumption. What is slowly foreshadowing a tragic epiphany is that the knowledge and food b-gans, albeit, anyone, consume are commodified into symbolic signifiers of current ideology (Marx 1990). When one consumes a commodity, they are consuming the social construct of the product and how it adds to their identity. For instance, b-gans commonly own juicers at home. What the juicer signifies is a symbol of wealth, 'superior' knowledge to the majority of the population about nutrition, a

level of domesticity and ideas of a leisurely lifestyle. When one buys a juicer, this is the identity they are buying. The problem is that this juicer was marketed this way and mass produced with the goal of making profit. It was not created because it is an essential gadget in a nutritional vegan diet. Most options that are out there for consumers such as b-gans to choose from bear resemblance to the production intention. This means that when b-gans 'freely choose', they are selecting from a catalogue of commodities that were produced by the ideologies of neoliberal capitalism hence the choice is not free at all but a mere reproduction of dominant ideas. We become embodiments of the ingested and purchased signifiers whilst having the illusion of a 'unique' moral basis.

In a similar train of logic, Giddens' notion of self-actualisation can also be critiqued. As consumers are 'unknowingly' embodying dominant ideologies, what they think of their 'true' self, realised through consumption, is also an illusion. That is to say that the self they strive to become is once again a reproduction of dominant ideologies since, the commodities, or 'identity builders', were embodiments of the very ideologies. The self-actualised selves of b-gans are ones that reproduce the oppressions such as that of race, class, culture and gender. These oppressions lie at the heart of the capitalistic system which make possible the structural injustice and exploitation, ironically also of other species, leading to creation of profit (Marx, 1990). Despite crusading speciesism, by failing to address the other human oppressions, the b-gan identity works against its moral philosophy of protecting animals in the greater sense. Essentially, b-gans, whether they are aware or not, become contributors of the system they are trying to fight against.

Non-conformist b-gans; at the bottom of the rocks

What is it like then, for those who stand at the intersections of multiple oppressions to partake in the very lifestyle that perpetuates these oppressions? Here, Giddens' presumption of emancipation from hierarchical power is even further challenged. In Western societies where patriarchal neoliberal capitalism dominates as the main ideology, those who fall outside the "master identity [of] white heteromasculinity" are in fact still subjected to hierarchical power (Singer 2016, 2). Race, class, culture and gender oppression persist in ways that limit freedom of choice. In Harper's work on intersectional veganism, she illustrates that 'the black woman's' freedom in the US is hindered by the legacies of slavery that places her racial conglomerate in low socioeconomic positions, inferior culture and gender (2012, 170). Power of agency, to her experience, is propagated by the 'master identity' as he deems appropriate, according to measure of conformity to his image.

Vegans who deviate from the 'b-gan identity' also face further entrenchment of moral dilemmas. On top of those already explored, issues such as cultural or ethnic identity dilemmas arise. For instance, as a 1.5 generation Korean New Zealander woman, I hold a constructionist perspective to my ethnic identity. I see my culture as hybrid, pluralist, dynamic, and situational (Cornell & Hartman 2007). However, adopting a vegan lifestyle has confronted me with the moral dilemma of not being the 'right' kind of vegan, i.e. the

b-gan, as well as being perceived as a rejector of my Korean culture and values. Whilst I occupy a privileged class, I am not white, I resist the idea of heteronormativity, and partake in ethnic minority culture. This has made me uneasy standing in solidarity with the vegan movement whilst Pamela Anderson's body was objected to promote anti-fur use and 'Asian' food was exotified and 'othered' in several vegan potlucks.

Uneasy was an immensely underrated emotion when it came to being seen as rejecting my Korean heritage. By rejecting consumption of meat, I was undermining the Confucian values of collectivism, family harmony and filial piety; disobeying what my mother thought I should eat, disrupting the smooth flow of a family dinner and not joining in with the same dining experience my family was having (Hyun, 2001). I was disregarding comfort foods, which are intensely time consuming to cook and are symbols of love and dedication to the family (Azar et al 2013). Comfort foods are also represented as sites of nostalgia and transformation of space into 'home' for immigrant families, which was very true for my parents (Sutton-Brady et al 2010). To carry on, I was dismissing the hardship of my grandparents who lived in times of hunger and scarcity and worked hard to make sure meat, synonymous with wealth, was something their family could consume (Nam et al 2010). Worst of all, I was seen as betraying Korea, siding with the 'white other' and implicitly insinuating inferiority of my race and culture. This historically stems from the occupation of US militants in 1940s South Korea, where their presence came as an intervention to Japanese occupation. Due to this, American soldiers were viewed as 'saviours' and white supremacy was deeply embedded in the Korean society (Kim 2006).

Intersectionality: empowerment and generative power

Now aware of the complex, persisting hierarchical power in b-gan life politics, how do we make power generative? I put forth the concept of intersectionality. Conceived by black feminist academic Patricia Collins (2005), intersectionality is an approach to reveal 'naked truths' i.e. make visible multiple oppressive forces by taking a stance from a location of oppression overlap. It considers the multidimensional, multilevel nature of lived experiences in relation to greater society (Williams-Forson & Wilkerson 2011, 11) It is committed to social justice and deconstruction of power systems.

Despite lack of explicit statements, discussions of my own experience as well as that of Harper (2011, 2012), were intersectional approaches to b-gan life politics. Taking the perspective of individuals located in intersecting oppressions, these forces were able to be recognised as well as understood in relation to each other. This grants individuals to see in what realms they are privileged and constrained, to better understand their identity. In that process, they may feel empowered, just as I did, to practice agency to open conversations, challenging ideas and societal structures. Simply because the pervasively intrusive nature of ideology seems inescapable, it does not mean we cannot impact it. Afterall, Giddens' (1991) observation of a globally connected society is only

made possible because of its constituents; the individuals. Rather than rendering helplessly trapped under structural powers, I encourage the readers to cease moments of empowerment as sources of generative power.

For me, the process of writing this essay became the source of my generative power: a form of emancipation not often experienced in my daily life. It is because of brief moments like this, that despite all its dilemmas and hardships, I voluntarily throw myself deeper into marginalisation by choosing to be vegan. As a 1.5 generation Korean New Zealander woman who chooses to be vegan, my life politics are governed by the principles of intersectionality, constantly tested by multiple oppressions and dilemmas. It is my personal form of resistance to the power structures that surround me which I hope serves as empowerments to non-conformists alike.

Conclusion

This essay has critically approached concepts of veganism and life politics. I revealed the paradoxically oppressive nature of the practice of veganism by naming it b-ganism. Major site of constraint for b-gan life politics, if not, all consumer life politics in the Western world, was explained to be the dominant ideology of patriarchal, neoliberal capitalism. Further hindrance for vegans, those who don't fit the identity of a b-gan, was suggested to be continuing legacies of oppression such as racism, sexism and classism. My own experience was used to demonstrate additional moral dilemmas related to ethnic identity for individuals in similar social positions. Intersectional approach to b-gan life politics was recommended as a source of generative power. It is with this power that participation in the reflexively ordered, globalised society is enabled as well as dissolving the very idea of b-ganism back to veganism.

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